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Chapter One
Introduction: Constructivist Angles
The essays assembled here are about differing accounts of science, belief, 
and the humanities and, especially, about differing views of their actual, 
proper, or desirable relations. The decade during which they were written 
has been a time of enormous technological expansion across the globe, of 
political, social, and economic upheavals in the West as elsewhere, and of 
correspondingly significant shifts in the intellectual world. All these have 
brought painful collisions of aims, styles, and practices in both the sci-
ences and the humanities. These essays—on clashes between established 
and innovative views of knowledge and cognition, on different ways to 
frame the relation between “science” and “religion,” on new configura-
tions of the sciences and the humanities, and on the divergent realities of 
climate change—address interconnected aspects of these shifts, strains, 
and collisions. The title of this volume and, relatedly, that of this chapter 
say something about the perspectives from which they do so. The terms 
“relativism” and “constructivism,” like all “ism” labels, are only minimally 
informative and, in both these cases, also subject to recurrent misunder-
standing. As I seek to suggest here, however, the views they name, when 
duly elaborated and understood, can be endorsed without apology, and 
the angles they offer can be illuminating and productive.
I
In the broadly accepted sense of the term used here, constructivism is a 
way of understanding the relation between what we call “knowledge” or 
“beliefs” and what we think of and talk about as “reality.” In constructiv-
ist accounts of that relation, the specific features of what we experience 
as “the world” or “nature” (objects, events, entity-boundaries, properties, 
categories, and so forth) are viewed not as independent of our sensory, 
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perceptual, conceptual, and discursive activities but, rather, as built 
up, specified, and articulated—or, as it is said, “constructed”—through 
those and other of our activities.1 Accordingly, the products of cognition, 
“knowledge” or “beliefs,” are seen not as correct-or-incorrect representa-
tions of the autonomously existing features of a given world, but, rather, 
as linked perceptual-behavioral dispositions continuously strengthened, 
weakened, and reconfigured through our ongoing, more or less effective, 
interactions with our particular physical and social environments. Also 
accordingly, what we regard as specifically scientific theories or beliefs are 
seen not as the duly epistemically privileged products of a distinctive set 
of truth-directed procedures but, rather, as the contingently stable prod-
ucts of especially tightly linked, mutually shaped, conceptual, discursive, 
and material practices pursued in accord with practically effective meth-
odological traditions. The phrasings here are mine, but these descriptions 
represent views proposed and developed over the past century by theo-
rists in a range of fields, including the psychology of perception, theoreti-
cal biology, philosophy of mind, and the history, philosophy, and sociol-
ogy of science.2
Constructivist epistemology is often identified with “social construc-
tionism.” Distinguishing between the two is difficult because both terms 
have shifting, overlapping usages and the various views named by each 
have complex intellectual-historical connections. Nevertheless, their 
simple identification obscures important differences of origin, empha-
sis, and intellectual operation. In the sense of the term intended here, 
constructivism has been developed largely by theorists interested in the 
dynamics of knowledge formation, either at the individual level, as in 
the cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind, or at the sociohistorical 
level, as in the history and sociology of science. Social constructionism, 
as the term is widely used, is a rather differently motivated and differently 
directed enterprise. As practiced by cultural critics and other scholars 
in the humanities and social sciences, it operates largely in connection 
with efforts to expose questionable assumptions associated with prevail-
ing social practices. Thus, when constructivist historians of science speak 
of the social construction of scientific knowledge, they are commonly 
emphasizing the complex collective, dynamic, and institutional aspects 
of the formation of such knowledge, aspects ignored in conventional 
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conceptions of science as an intrinsically truth-directed enterprise pur-
sued by individual agents. When, on the other hand, cultural critics speak 
of the social construction of racial or gender distinctions, they are com-
monly emphasizing the culturally mediated forces involved in the per-
ception and maintenance of such distinctions, forces often obliterated or 
denied in efforts to preserve and justify existing social hierarchies.
Conflations or confusions of constructivist accounts of scientific 
knowledge with social constructionist cultural criticism helped inflame 
the “science wars” of the 1990s and continue to be produced and circu-
lated.3 Although the intellectual clash between constructivist and realist-
rationalist epistemologies is genuine, the so-called wars, certainly the 
idea of widespread “attacks on science” or “abandonments of reason” by 
trendy academics and French intellectuals, were always something of a 
mirage. More than two decades have passed since the initial volleys were 
fired and the early coups have been followed by increasing intellectual 
irrelevance. Constructivist challenges to traditional views of scientific 
knowledge remain controversial but are no longer routinely equated with 
sophomoric slogans and glibly dismissed. The empirical study of sci-
ence by social scientists—or, as it is now known, science and technology 
studies (STS)—is an internationally established field producing widely 
respected research and theory. As younger generations of practitioners, 
including philosophers, elaborate constructivist views of science, knowl-
edge, cognition, and belief, even the once harrowing charge of relativism 
has begun to lose its bite.
 Suggestions of the contingency, relationality, or contextual depen-
dence of such venerated qualities as truth, scientific validity, or moral 
virtue have long been seen and represented as “amounting to” or “entail-
ing” a plainly self-refuting position commonly labeled “relativism.” 
Understood as the idea that all views, objects, and practices are equally 
true, good, proper, and so forth or as the refusal of all value judgments, 
the position, insofar as it exists, is, of course, foolish and objectionable. 
The qualification (“insofar as...”) is required because, as I have argued 
for some time and detail here in chapter 2 (“The Chimera of Relativism: 
A Tragicomedy”), “relativism” thus understood is largely a phantom 
heresy, continuously generated by the seesaw logic of much orthodox 
thought itself: if not classic realism, then classic idealism; if not absolute 
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objectivism, then absolute subjectivism; if not one uniquely valid  judg-
ment/theory, then all equally valid judgments/theories; and so forth.4 
The phantom may be given added apparent substance, however, by such 
heavy rhetorical scaffolding as glib conflation, crude decontextualization, 
tendentious paraphrase, and slapdash intellectual history.5
While the foolish ideas and refusals so labeled have few citable, quot-
able, flesh-and-blood advocates, they are commonly attributed to those 
advocating quite different, usually philosophically unorthodox but often 
reasonable and desirable ideas and attitudes. Among the latter are empiri-
cally instructed, conceptually well-honed views to the effect that what we 
take to be good, true, proper, important, and so forth depends on and 
varies with, among other things, our assumptions, expectations, and cat-
egories as these are shaped by, among other things, our inevitably indi-
vidual experiences and situations in historically and otherwise particu-
lar worlds. Accordingly, and as the practice indicated in the title to this 
volume, “relativism” can be understood as a cultivated consciousness of 
the irreducible plurality of human perspectives and the contingency of 
all value judgments. Thus understood, the term names an intellectual dis-
position in close accord with the constructivist views of knowledge and 
belief outlined above and elaborated in the chapters that follow.
Along with these views and dispositions, practices of symmetry are a 
recurring theme in this volume. As distinct from more or less dubious 
claims of equality, they involve acknowledgments and elaborations of sig-
nificant similarity, correspondence, and/or continuity where sharp dis-
tinction and hierarchized difference are otherwise claimed or assumed. 
Such practices are especially desirable in conjunction with efforts to 
describe and explain social, behavioral, or historical phenomena, where 
broadly self-centric (for example, Eurocentric, androcentric, presentist, 
or “whiggish”) accounts  are likely to be prevalent. Thus, in fields such 
as anthropology, historiography, and sociology, practices of symmetry 
operate as forms of disciplinary self-discipline or, one could say, as efforts 
at impartiality and objectivity.
An early expression of principled epistemic symmetry appears in the 
proto-constructivist study, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, 
by Ludwik Fleck (1979 [1935]). Fleck, a microbiologist and medical 
historian, rejected the idea that there are specific, identifiable features 
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of genuinely scientific knowledge that mark it off clearly from so-called 
primitive understandings of the world and from earlier specialized knowl-
edges now seen as erroneous. “Whatever is known,” he wrote, “has always 
seemed systematic, proven, applicable, and evident to the knower. Every 
alien system of knowledge has likewise seemed contradictory, unproven, 
inapplicable, fanciful, or mystical. May not the time have come to assume 
a less egocentric, more general point of view?” (23). Fleck’s thoroughly 
historicist and reflexive tracing of the emergence of a scientific fact (his 
example is the identification of a pathogen for syphilis) is the product of 
just such a point of view. As such, Genesis and Development has figured as 
a model of constructivist historiography in science studies and, in main-
stream epistemology, as an example of “‘extreme’ epistemic relativism.”6
The so-called symmetry postulate was initially formulated by 
Edinburgh sociologist David Bloor as one among a set of four “tenets” 
(causality, impartiality, symmetry, and reflexivity) defining a new pro-
gram in the sociology of scientific knowledge (Bloor 1976). In contrast 
to rationalist philosophy of science and prevailing sociologies of science, 
both of which saw “social” explanations as relevant only to erroneous 
theories or to the resistance to correct ones, the “Strong Programme” 
would investigate the social forces involved in the fortunes of all scien-
tific theories, correct as well as erroneous, true as well as false, rational as 
well as irrational, including, in principle, the theories it produced itself. 
Misstated as the claim that all theories are equally true or that scientific 
theories are mere reflections of social forces, the symmetry postulate 
has been recurrently cast as a naive and debilitating relativism and dis-
missed accordingly. Thus philosopher Paul Boghossian, commenting on 
Bloor’s views and constructivist sociology more generally, writes, “[I]f 
you say that the correct explanation for all scientific belief is in terms of 
the political goals, interests and prejudices of the scientist, you make it 
impossible to criticize a specific scientific belief as merely reflective of 
such prejudice” (Boghossian 2002, 223). Of course, neither Bloor nor 
any other constructivist sociologist says that “the correct explanation for 
all scientific belief is in terms of the political goals, interests and preju-
dices of the scientist.” Nor do constructivist accounts of the formation and 
stabilization of scientific knowledge make relevant discriminations and 
challenges impossible. Rather, by making visible the complexity of the 
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processes through which scientific (and other) beliefs are communally 
established, including the multiplicity of agents and interests involved 
and the significance of specific social, institutional, cultural, and discur-
sive conditions, they illuminate controversies over the validity of specific 
knowledge claims, present as well as past, and indicate the types of activ-
ity required either to establish them communally or to challenge them 
effectively.7
The symmetry postulate and other tenets of the Strong Programme 
were not initially well phrased or well explained, and, as the program was 
pursued by researchers and theorists in the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and Europe, important clarifications, elaborations, and modifica-
tions followed.8 In a series of radical modifications that came to be called 
actor-network theory (ANT), French philosopher/sociologist Bruno 
Latour advocated a “generalized” symmetry principle in accord with 
which the consequential activities and operations of objects and nonhu-
man animals would be treated symmetrically with those of human agents 
in accounts of the emergence of scientific facts: for example, sick cows 
and petri dishes acknowledged along with scientists and physicians in the 
emergence of the microbe theory of disease. Understood as promoting 
the moral status of animals as equal to that of humans and as granting due 
recognition to the previously ignored or slighted capacities of “things,” 
the generalized symmetry principle contributes to current embraces of 
Latour as a posthumanist “object-oriented” thinker and to appropria-
tions of ANT as a properly non-anthropocentric program of research. 
However dubious some of these understandings and appropriations,9 
Latour’s engagements with ideas and practices of symmetry have been 
important in the development of constructivist science studies, and his 
more recent metaphysical ventures and concern with environmental 
issues have figured significantly on the intellectually scene more broadly. 
His treatments of scientific knowledge and religious belief are examined 
here in chapter 4, and his influential responses to the epistemic and rhe-
torical challenges of climate science are discussed in chapter 7.
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II
An interest in intellectual controversy and an emphasis on the radical con-
tingency of value judgments have both been central to my work for some 
time, partly in response to the “canon wars” in the Anglo-American liter-
ary academy but more broadly, in Contingencies of Value (Smith 1988), as 
an effort to develop conceptually workable alternatives to dubious ideas 
of intrinsic, objective, or universal value. A subsequent book, Belief and 
Resistance (Smith 1997), deals with the complex social and psychological 
dynamics of belief and skepticism in current epistemological controver-
sies, and I extend its major observations to debates over religious beliefs 
in my 2006 Terry Lectures, Natural Reflections: Human Cognition at the 
Nexus of Science and Religion. Publication of the latter (Smith 2009) was 
the occasion for the interview in chapter 3 (“Religion, Science, and the 
Humanities”).
Natural Reflections examines two contemporary intellectual ventures 
involving science and religious belief. One is a set of efforts by anthro-
pologists and scholars of religion to “explain” religion, as it is said, “scien-
tifically,” here largely on the basis of claims about human behavior emerg-
ing from evolutionary psychology. I call it the New Naturalism. The other 
is a set of efforts by scientifically informed theologians to demonstrate 
the compatibility of scientific knowledge with traditional religious teach-
ings, here through theistic readings of selected concepts in the natural 
sciences. I call it the New Natural Theology.10 Practitioners of both ven-
tures, I suggest, exhibit certain endemic cognitive tendencies, includ-
ing confirmation bias, dissonance avoidance, and dualistic thinking. As 
noted by the interviewer Nathan Schneider, a report of the book in The 
New York Times (Fish 2010) attracted considerable attention from read-
ers. Based on the report, many of them took my evenhanded treatment of 
the explanation-claiming social scientists and compatibilist theologians 
as endorsing one or the other side of a supposed fundamental conflict 
between “Science” and “Religion,” both conceived in simplistic, mono-
lithic terms. Several others took my notice of the coexistence of scientific 
and religious practices in the lives of many people as endorsing biologist 
Stephen J. Gould’s notion of science and religion as “non-overlapping 
magisteria” (Gould 1999). Commenting on these misunderstandings 
in a subsequent column (Smith 2010), I note that while, in Gould’s 
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account, science and religion remain monoliths or, as one clever reader 
puts it, “rocks of ages” (Gould’s book is itself titled Rocks of Ages), my 
own efforts—in effect, to pulverize both rocks—are quite different.
The framings of the relations between science and religion in Bruno 
Latour’s writings are strongly, indeed strikingly, symmetrical. As I indicate 
in chapter 4 (“Anthropotheology: Bruno Latour Speaking Religiously”), 
Latour gives uncommon care and imagination to elaborating their par-
allels and correspondences. Also, here in company with, among others, 
Paul Feyerabend (1975) and Paul Veyne (1988), he stresses both the 
comparable constructedness of the entities of each (scientific facts as well 
as religious fetishes) and the comparable contingency of their existence 
(angels as wells as quarks). Fairly uniquely among theorists of science, 
however, Latour has sought to make religious experience vivid for his 
audiences. And, in a major work (Latour 2013), he insists, questionably 
in my view, on both the distinctness of the “mode of existence” of the 
entities of each and the incommensurability of their respective “modes 
of veridiction.” Latour explicitly abjures the word “belief ” (croyance) 
here.11 Acknowledging the difficulties of such a drastic refusal and pos-
sible objections to it, he explains the move as follows:
Belief is obviously multimodal and many of its significations 
are innocent, but the word also designates the attribution of a 
mental state to those we encountered during colonial explora-
tion. This state of mind …[depends] on an epistemological 
division imposed a priori between truth and illusion. It is this 
division which justifies a desire to put an end to beliefs and to 
destroy illusions, idols, in the name of anti-fetishism.12
The reference here is to colonialism and anti-fetishism, but Latour else-
where indicts more general devaluations of religion—and the icono-
clasms that attend them—issued in the name of enlightenment, ratio-
nality, and science. These devaluations commonly involve the drawing 
of strong contrasts between supposedly distinct mental states or pro-
cesses, and the contrasts are commonly aligned with sharp distinctions 
between what are specifically named scientific “knowledge” and reli-
gious “belief.”13
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One can sympathize with Latour’s desire to bar such contrasts. As 
he suggests, they draw on views of mental life that are mired in dubious 
rationalist assumptions and perpetuate simplistic notions of scientific 
thought as well as of religious experience. Many of the views in ques-
tion are ancient but transported into contemporary discourse by ratio-
nalist traditions in philosophy of mind and related empirical disciplines. 
Important challenges to those views have been mounted over the past 
century by historians and sociologists of science—Latour among them—
and by some dissident philosophers of science. As indicated above, how-
ever, related challenges have been mounted on other fronts, including 
the psychology of perception, theoretical biology, and some dissident 
regions of cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Latour rejects natu-
ralizing explanations of religion and writes scornfully of efforts to explain 
subjectivity in terms of “genes” or “neurons.” Research and theory in the 
fields just mentioned, however, are worth his attention and that of the 
science-studies community more broadly. The challenges they raise to 
rationalist assumptions are powerful, and their alternative accounts of 
cognition have important implications for how we understand subjective 
experience, knowledge, and belief.
Mainstream cognitive science, shadowed by classical epistemol-
ogy, seeks to explain how, as it is said, we acquire accurate knowledge of 
the world, the crucial assumption being that such knowledge is required 
to navigate the world and that humans, perhaps uniquely, are equipped 
in some way to obtain it. The question might be less tendentiously and 
more usefully phrased, however, as how do we, like other organisms, come 
to operate effectively in our worlds. Phrased this way, cognition is under-
stood not as the production of more or less accurate internal representa-
tions of a fixed, given, exterior world but as an ongoing, dynamic process 
involving the entire organism interacting with its specific environment. 
This pragmatist-constructivist understanding of cognition has multiple 
names and important variants, among them, “ecological,” “embodied,” 
“dynamic,” and “enactive.”14 In virtually all its variants, however, it has 
been developed as an alternative to traditional rationalist views.
The understandings of cognition referenced above offer compelling 
ways to reframe the familiar contrasts drawn between scientific and reli-
gious ideas: “genuine knowledge” versus “mere belief,” “reason” versus 
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“irrationality,” and so forth. Among other things, they suggest that reli-
gious ideas are formed not through any special cognitive process, either 
especially defective as rationalists suggest or uniquely transcendent as 
theologians may claim, but through the same general processes as any 
of our ideas or beliefs, from everyday notions to scientific or philosophi-
cal theories.15 Though distinctive in many ways, the various entities con-
structed through those processes, from the scientist’s quarks and mole-
cules to the philosopher’s rocks and tables and the religionist’s demons 
or divinities, would therefore be equally open to symmetrical, commen-
surable explanation. These views of cognitive process also suggest that 
the dispositions and activities associated with doing science and with 
practicing a faith are continuous with each other and with the disposi-
tions and competencies exhibited in other cultural, social, or personal 
domains, from art and music to commerce and politics. Contrary, then, 
to familiar theological claims and rationalist assumptions, what are com-
monly called “religious” beliefs and experiences are not unique, either 
ontologically or cognitively, and their elaborations and associated prac-
tices are not altogether distinct from those found elsewhere in our cul-
tures and lives.16
In a lengthy entry on “psychology” in the online version of An Inquiry 
into Modes of Existence (AIME), Latour characterizes the field as the 
improperly “interiorizing” counterpart to what is now widely recognized 
as the improper “exteriorizing” of epistemology.17 The suggestion is that, 
while classical epistemology explained the manifest success of scien-
tific knowledge by positing the lawful operations of a supposedly objec-
tive Nature, psychology explains the presumed irrationality of religious 
belief by positing the wayward operations of a subjective Mind. In some 
respects, Latour’s dismissal of psychology recalls the rejection of “psy-
chologism” in early twentieth-century phenomenology, where the argu-
ment was that the objects of phenomenological investigation could not 
be explained using the methods or appealing to the empirical concepts of 
the experimental psychology of the time (Kusch 1995). In this regard, it 
also recalls two other perplexities of contemporary interdisciplinary and 
cross-cultural research. One is the “hard problem” of contemporary phi-
losophy of mind: that is, the challenge of explaining in observable, physi-
cal terms what is experienced in consciousness. The other is the emic/etic 
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distinction of ethnography: that is, with regard to indigenous practices, 
the fundamentally different perspectives of the native participant and the 
observing anthropologist. At least part of the difficulty in each of these 
cases is translating not merely between different verbal and conceptual 
idioms, which can be “hard” enough, but also between deeply different 
and sometimes mutually incompatible conceptual tastes and ontological 
commitments.
Such cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural translations require a good 
bit of intellectual and ethical tact. In relation to the new forms of inter-
disciplinarity between the sciences and the humanities, such tact would 
involve not merely recognizing different disciplinary aims and perspec-
tives but also acknowledging crucially different intellectual histories 
and personal temperaments among practitioners and being symmetri-
cal about all these in relation to one’s own. And, in regard to the some-
times dubious cosmopolitics proposed for the Anthropocene, it would 
involve not the recognition of common interests or attachments but the 
search for practically congruent ones, a goal that seems at least conceiv-
ably achievable.
III
A mood of distress is evident across the humanities, along with efforts 
to update and transform those disciplines—and, sometimes, thereby to 
redeem them—via closer connections to the sciences. In some respects, 
these developments involve head-spinning reversals. Where, in the past, 
one heard claims of the creative, conceptual, and moral superiority of the 
humanities to the merely mechanical, merely numerical, merely utilitar-
ian natural sciences, one now hears assertions of the epistemic superi-
ority of science to the merely frivolous, objectionably elitist, manifestly 
obsolete aims and methods of the humanities. Or where, in the past, 
the biological sciences were understood to be fundamentally complicit 
with sexist, racist, imperialist ideologies, Darwin’s writings are now 
closely studied as, among other things, especially illuminating for femi-
nism. The new ecumenical attitudes toward the natural sciences on the 
part of humanities scholars are, in my view, altogether to be welcomed. 
But two-culture caricatures remain in play across the academy as well as 
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in the culture at large, and they contribute to a new or newly energized 
scientism now displayed within the humanities as well as against them. 
The epistemic aims and claims in play in some of these programs, and 
especially in their promotion, invite critical attention. I consider them 
in chapters 5 (“What Was ‘Close Reading’?: A Century of Method in 
Literary Studies”) and 6 (“Scientizing the Humanities: Shifts, Collisions, 
Negotiations”).
The oversimplifications I noted above in clashes over the knowledge-
claims of science and religion recur in clashes over how the sciences are 
related to the humanities, with some additional twists. Distortions in 
both cases reflect a long history of polarized opposition, with ongoing 
disputes over which should be epistemically privileged. Both pairings 
require, accordingly, due attention to the multiplicity and heterogeneity 
of the practices designated by each term and also to the complexity of 
their respective historical, institutional, and cultural connections. Thus 
“science,” as in the title of the promotional book What Science Offers the 
Humanities (Slingerland 2008), should be pluralized in these debates, 
not only to mark the parallel with the humanities but also to acknowl-
edge just that double multiplicity and heterogeneity.18 In view of the spe-
cific obliterations attending current promotions of the integration of the 
humanities with the sciences, it is also important to recall their histori-
cally different aims and functions. Attempts to articulate those differ-
ences face considerable conceptual and rhetorical difficulties, however, at 
least if they seek to be duly symmetrical.
Many of the arguments promoting new methods and approaches in 
the humanities cite huge intellectual changes or “tectonic” shifts, mostly 
scientific and technological advances, as requiring the proposed transfor-
mations. But just about everything else in the academy has been chang-
ing as well, with consequences not always recognized either by those 
promoting radical reforms or by conservative defenders of traditional 
methods and missions. The various explicit missions of literary study in 
the Anglo-American academy—aesthetic appreciation, moral edification, 
cultural education, and so forth—have always depended on assumptions 
about the broader social functions of such study, especially in relation 
to classroom teaching, the de facto area of the “application” of literary 
research.  The pursuit of those missions has depended, accordingly, on 
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what faculty knew or believed about the capacities and interests of stu-
dents, which could, and regularly did, become out of phase as both stu-
dent and faculty demographics changed. Thus, as I note in chapter 5 in 
connection with the presumed aims of literary study, preparing the sons 
of the upper classes for leadership in the professions in the early twenti-
eth century was different from providing upward social mobility for the 
sons and daughters of immigrants in the 1930s or job credentials for war 
veterans in the postwar years.
Changes outside the academy have also always affected understand-
ings of the role of the humanities and their value in the larger society. 
Important changes in recent years include immigrations from increas-
ingly diverse regions of the globe and, with them, increasingly complex 
cultural encounters; radically new art forms and media and, with them, 
radically different ways of becoming acculturated; newly conspicuous 
global phenomena, environmental as well as political, and, with them, 
intellectual and ethical perplexities on a scale not previously experienced. 
It may be defensible but it is not obvious, under these conditions, that 
humanities education in North America should focus on the canonical 
works of the Western literary, philosophic, and artistic tradition.
Critical, pedagogic, and scholarly practices in the humanities also 
change in response to more or less independent intellectual and cultural 
developments, and faculty recurrently find their own talents, training, 
and past achievements out of phase with currently dominant interests 
and approaches. In the 1980s and 1990s, the appearance of deconstruc-
tion, cultural studies, postcolonial criticism, and queer theory made pro-
fessional life difficult for those in literary studies with standard postwar 
training. Never mind the historical missions of moral edification and aes-
thetic cultivation: what was one to do when one’s specialty was Golden 
Age Spanish literature and all one’s colleagues and students seemed to 
care about was Chicano film studies? Not surprisingly, professional life 
can also become difficult when one’s specialty is Chicano film and all 
one’s colleagues and students seem to care about is digital games and 
posthumanist animal studies.
Conservative defenses of traditional practices in the humanities often 
charge the new affiliations with the sciences with “scientism,” some-
times, but not always, with good reason. Since the term, like other “isms” 
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discussed above, is subject to variable usage, it requires some attention 
here. An appreciative engagement with concepts and findings in the nat-
ural sciences in studies of art, literature, or religion does not, in my view, 
warrant the label “scientism” or make such studies dismissible on just 
that count. On the contrary, the encouragement of such interdisciplin-
ary engagement has been a focus of much of my professional life. What 
I characterize as such in these essays as elsewhere is the idea or evident 
assumption that the aims and methods of the natural sciences should 
be taken as models for all knowledge practices. The idea was articulated 
influentially by biologist Edward O. Wilson in his 1998 book Consilience: 
The Unity of Knowledge and is often attended, as in Wilson’s book, with the 
idea that the humanities disciplines are at best prescientific and should 
be shepherded as quickly as possible, along with some still vagrant social 
sciences, into the fold of the natural sciences. To those who view science 
this way (not only or always scientists) and who understand the humani-
ties as defined only by the objects they study, this evidently makes per-
fect sense: people who study artworks, literary texts, historical records or 
anything else should be studying them scientifically. But if one views the 
sciences in the ways suggested by a century of research and theory in con-
structivist history, sociology, and philosophy of science and conceives 
knowledge in the ways suggested by a century of research and theory in 
cognitive science and constructivist epistemology, then one might be 
prepared to see the humanities disciplines as defined not by the objects 
they study but, as I detail in chapter 6, by their distinctive epistemic ori-
entation, in which case their absorption by the natural sciences makes no 
sense at all.
IV
A number of themes outlined above—rival epistemologies, the complex 
dynamics of belief and skepticism, practices of symmetry—figure cen-
trally in chapter 7 (“Perplexing Realities: Practicing Relativism in the 
Anthropocene”). Written initially for a conference on Climate Realism, 
it argues that being realistic about climate change does not require an 
endorsement of philosophical realism or an abandonment of critical 
practices with regard to the natural sciences or anything else. On the 
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contrary, the views of reality and accounts of science likely to be most 
serviceable in these connections are to be found where philosophical 
realism has been most effectively challenged: that is, in science and tech-
nology studies and in the work of constructivist theorists—academic 
philosophers and others—engaged with developments in related empiri-
cal fields. Accounts of these matters offered in the mainstream regions of 
such fields (cognitive psychology, neuroscience, behavioral ecology, and 
so forth) continue to be hobbled by dubious assumptions and concepts. 
That is not good reason, however, for humanities scholars to dismiss 
the accounts or the fields. On the contrary, it is good reason for them to 
engage work in those fields, precisely, critically: to examine the accounts 
carefully, to invoke the findings with due discrimination, and to contrib-
ute to the ongoing reformation of the dubious assumptions, concepts, 
methods, and explanations. In relation to the current ecological crisis, 
along with economic crises, ethnic conflicts, the “dark sides” of informa-
tion technologies, and other matters of broad contemporary concern, it is 
likely that work in such empirical fields will be more conceptually useful 
and potentially politically transformative than an inevitably limited num-
ber of metaphysical or spiritual conversions, however philosophically 
sophisticated their inspiration.
With regard to denials of global warming, environmentalists have 
come to recognize not only the significant operation of powerful eco-
nomic and material interests but also the existence of deeply vested 
cognitive interests and the power of quite primitive endemic impulses, 
cognitive and other. Not all the failures of acknowledgment of climate 
change on the part of the general public are the product of false beliefs 
deliberately promoted by energy moguls. Other social and psychologi-
cal forces, more elusive but no less powerful, are clearly in play here as 
elsewhere. Indeed, the efforts of several environmental activists are 
now directed at detailing such forces, often in the hope that widespread 
knowledge of them will help counter their general operation. Though I 
am wary of talk of human universals, I have entertained for some time the 
idea of two general tendencies that seem to explain a good deal of human 
history. The first is People would rather continue believing what they’ve 
always believed than believe something different. The second is People would 
rather think well of themselves than otherwise. Clearly the first tendency is 
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involved in climate denialism. In view, however, of current political direc-
tions in the United States and elsewhere, there is reason to think that the 
second may matter at least as much. Irrational behavior often reflects an 
effort to escape the cognitive dissonance of radically new news. But it can 
also reflect the rage of resentment, the conviction—justified or not—of 
insult beyond injury. If there is a lesson here for environmentalists, it is 
that formidable resistance to enlightenment about climate change may be 
found not only among the uninformed and misinformed but also among 
losers of place or face.
One of the major perplexities created by the complex state of affairs 
that we, or some of us, name climate change is the inevitable multiplic-
ity of operative realities: not many ways of perceiving a shared world but 
many worlds in the sense of irreducibly divergent experiences, percepts, 
constructs, and cosmologies. In influential writings, Bruno Latour has 
suggested that the way to arrive at the commonality he sees necessary to 
address the realities of the Anthropocene is by overcoming existing con-
ceptual divisions—drawn, in his view, by Enlightenment metaphysics—
between subjects and objects, humans and nonhumans, and nature and 
society. To accomplish this, he writes, “we should abstain from de-ani-
mating the agencies that we encounter at each step” (Latour 2014, 14). 
Thus and only thus, he maintains, shall we be able “to move out of the 
impasse in which modernism has dug itself so deeply” (15). No doubt, 
with regard to the ongoing degradation of the environment and the 
threat of planetary ecological catastrophe, the conceptual divisions that 
concern Latour contribute to the thinking involved in the current politi-
cal paralysis and perpetuation of disastrous practices. As I suggest above, 
however, there are other sources of collective inertia and self-destruction 
that are at least as relevant and perhaps even more powerful. The cogni-
tive liabilities and other primitive tendencies noted here are not confined 
to Moderns. Nor can they be said to stem from Enlightenment metaphys-
ics or from what Latour, among others, indicts as modern thought, or, 
for that matter, from present political arrangements as argued by other 
theorists of the Anthropocene. Moreover, the tendencies involved, both 
typically and historically, are not lamentable flaws of human character. 
They are fundamentally double-valued human dispositions, individually 
and collectively advantageous under many conditions, disadvantageous 
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under many others. There is no point to denouncing them. Nor, I think, 
should we hope or expect to eradicate them, whether through species-
wide self-transcendence, efforts at a counter-enlightenment, or other-
wise. We might, however, strive to be aware of their powerful operation 
in ourselves as well as others so as, perhaps, to be more disposed to act, 
individually and in concert, in better ways rather than worse.
Angles are not solutions. Angles are perspectives. Solutions to prob-
lems of the kind evoked here can only come out of ongoing engagements 
with specific conditions and can only be provisional ways of opening 
out—not, in my view, to utterly new ways of being but to relatively new 
ways of thinking and to better ways of continuing. What this volume sug-
gests is that those ways are likely to be better for all concerned, nonhu-
mans included, when, as the angles offered here may incline us, we are 
especially alert to the contingency, complexity, and multiplicity of our 
worlds and to our own all-too-human ways of being in them.
Chapter Two
The Chimera of Relativism: A Tragicomedy
Whatever sort of thing relativism is taken to be—doctrine, thesis, crime or 
folly, insight or abyss—it is certainly, from the perspective of intellectual 
history, exceptionally elusive. Is there a single specifiable claim or denial, 
even a minimally describable “family” of them, shared by Protagoras, 
Montaigne, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Franz Boas, Paul Feyerabend, Jacques 
Derrida, Bruno Latour, and the majority of undergraduates on today’s 
college campuses? All these have been said to “embrace” or “espouse” 
relativism, or to have “slipped” or “fallen” into it, by reason of some utter-
ance they have made or failed to make, some attitude they have displayed 
or failed to display.19
Logicians suggest that we are in the presence of relativism when one 
or another self-evidently solid and important thing (for example, truth, 
value, meaning, or reality) has been said by some perverse or logically 
injudicious person to be “relative to” something soft or slippery (for 
example, context, culture,  language, conceptual scheme,  individual per-
spective, or political interest). But such X- is- relative- to-Y statements are 
almost always distortions of what has actually been said. What has often 
actually been said—as in the case of the figures I have mentioned, from 
Protagoras to Latour—are statements to the effect that human percep-
tions, interpretations, and judgments are not absolute, universal, or objec-
tive in the sense of being independent of all perspectives and/or invariant 
under all conditions; that what we take to be real, true, and good depends 
upon and varies with, among other things, our assumptions, expecta-
tions, categories, and existing beliefs as these are affected to one degree 
or another by, among other things, our particular experiences and situ-
ations, both past and ongoing; and that these in turn are affected to one 
degree or another by, among other things, our historically and otherwise 
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particular social, cultural, and institutional environments, including the 
conceptual and verbal idioms prevailing in our communities.
These statements of variability and contingency have challenging 
implications for familiar ways of talking and thinking about truth, value, 
and reality; but they are not claims about any of these terms or concepts 
taken as autonomous entities or properties. Statements about the depen-
dence of our perceptions, interpretations, and judgments on various 
more or less unpredictable and uncontrollable sets of conditions do not 
amount to denials of the existence of anything that could be called truth 
or to claims about the purely subjective, purely verbal, or purely social 
status of things such as stones, mountains, quarks, germs, or genes that 
we may take to be, in some unproblematic sense, real. Rather, statements 
of these kinds, often said to be relativistic, alert us to the relational aspects 
of seemingly autonomous entities and seemingly inherent properties and 
to the fact that the quite heterogeneous situations that we name truth, 
fact, knowledge, science, or reality are often quite complexly constituted 
and sustained. Such statements also alert us to the historicity and the 
often far-from-unproblematic meaning of such ideas as objective truth or 
transcendent value and to the deeply problematic nature of reality if it is 
understood as an autonomous, absolutely privileged realm of being.
The sorts of statements just described are not shallowly reductive, 
deterministic, or gloomy. They do not claim that human perspectives 
vary only historically or culturally; they do not require us to believe that 
the human mind is a blank slate; they do not commit us to the view that 
people from different eras or cultures have nothing in common, or that 
each culture or period is a distinct and isolated universe, or that the dif-
ferences among our perceptions, interpretations, or judgments are always 
very large or very significant. I note all these negatives because the sorts 
of observation that I am describing here—observations of contingency, 
variability, and/or relationality, often labeled relativist or taken as reflec-
tions of an implicit doctrine of relativism—are commonly paraphrased in 
just these ways or said to have just such dubious or unhappy implications.
I
In the human sciences, what often elicits the charge or label “relativism” 
is the display of certain attitudes, notably those of epistemic tolerance, or 
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the recommendation of certain methodological principles—especially, 
in recent years, principles involving explanatory or evaluative symmetry. 
The two disciplines that have proved most generative of the attitudes and 
principles in question are history and anthropology or, more precisely, 
historiography and ethnography—the charting of other times and other 
people. Of course, the observation of human variety in travel, includ-
ing time travel, does not always increase tolerance or chasten egotism. 
It can just as readily deepen misanthropy or ratify a sense of the perfect 
reasonableness and absolute propriety of one’s own views and practices. 
Nevertheless, reports of what seem to be other ways of being human have 
operated virtually from their beginning as a reservoir of counterexamples 
to standard views of what is natural, necessary, or inevitable for members 
of the species to do, feel, or think.
Along with more particular forms of sophistication arising from their 
work in the archives and in the field, historians and anthropologists 
often develop a generally heightened consciousness of the variability of 
human practices, institutions, and individual responses. While a sharp-
ened awareness of this kind may develop from everyday observation, as 
reflected in the prudential axioms of folk relativism (different strokes for 
different folks and so forth), of particular interest here is the explicit cul-
tivation of such awareness in the pursuit of disciplinary aims as recom-
mended by such influential early twentieth-century historians, anthropol-
ogists, and social theorists as Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, Carl Becker, 
and Ludwik Fleck and, later in the century, by such important figures as 
Benjamin Lee Whorf, Thomas Kuhn, and David Bloor.20 While not all 
these figures described their views or programs as relativistic and none 
proclaimed any doctrine under the label of “relativism,” each stressed the 
dependence of our ideas and practices on historically and culturally vari-
able conditions and on individual perspectives, and all emphasized the 
consequent need to cultivate a self-conscious wariness in their respec-
tive fields. These scholars and theorists made such points against what 
they saw as dubiously self-privileging aims, claims, and methods in their 
particular fields, and their remarks were directed more or less exclusively 
and explicitly to fellow practitioners. The principles in question were 
not, in other words, produced out of the blue, nor were they directed to 
humanity at large or intended to govern the general conduct of ethical 
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or intellectual life.21 This last point requires special emphasis because it 
is routinely missed by commentators who, after plucking those recom-
mended principles from their intellectual, institutional, and historical 
contexts and improperly absolutizing and universalizing them, go on to 
register outrage or alarm at the absurd, unwholesome, or debilitating 
implications that they thereupon derive from them—the implication, 
for example, that all beliefs and cultural practices are equally worthy of 
respect or that “reasons” cannot or should not count in our assessment of 
truth claims. Indeed, the obliteration of relevant historical, intellectual, 
and institutional contexts is crucial in the generation of the doctrines, 
“claims,” or “theses” that make up the chimerical beast—part straw man, 
part red herring—commonly evoked under the name “relativism.”
This chimera—or, as I have called it elsewhere, fantasy heresy—is not 
the product of dishonest or intellectually incompetent people. On the 
contrary, it is largely the issue of critical efforts by intelligent, sometimes 
ethically motivated, often exceptionally well-trained people. What must 
be added, however, is that they are trained in quite particular conceptual 
idioms. Such idioms may be well established in their own fields and serve 
their professional purposes satisfactorily in the domains of their custom-
ary disciplinary practices. Nevertheless, the concepts that are central to 
those idioms, and the conceptual syntax that is central to their deploy-
ment in descriptions, analyses, and arguments, are themselves histori-
cally contingent and local, not necessary or universal. 
An example of the significant operation of such conceptual idioms 
can be seen in an argument offered by philosopher John Searle, reviewing 
and endorsing philosopher Paul Boghossian’s book, Fear of Knowledge: 
Against Relativism and Constructivism (2006). Hypothesizing what a 
Native American might say about how his tribe originally came to occupy 
its lands, Searle argues that it is a “requirement of rationality” that “any-
one who makes such a statement is thereby committed to the existence of 
a fact,” that this “commitment in turn carries a commitment to being able 
to answer such questions as … What is the evidence?”, and that “only 
certain kinds of things can count as evidence” (Searle 2009, 91-92). For 
Searle, as for Boghossian, it is self-evident that the things that can count 
as evidence do not include traditional accounts transmitted in tribal leg-
ends. Accordingly, neither of them can understand—and both therefore 
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regard as merely ideologically motivated—a claim to the effect that tra-
ditional accounts can and do count as evidence for members of the tribe 
in the sense of having conviction-affecting weight for them. Of course, 
tribal legends do not count as evidence in United States courts, or in 
the arguments of most academic philosophers, or when anthropologists 
address each other regarding scholarly claims. But the reasons they have 
no evidentiary weight in these contexts have nothing to do with some-
thing “built into the fundamental structure of thought and language.” 
Nor do they have anything to do with “the requirement[s] of rationality” 
except insofar as rationality is itself understood in historically and other-
wise quite particular ways: here, in ways that operate with inter-validating 
reference to terms like statement, fact, and evidence.22
Relativism-refuting scholars typically take for granted certain defini-
tions, distinctions, and conceptual relations that other scholars—pre-
cisely those whom they charge with embracing an absurd or appalling 
relativism—have come to view in crucially different ways. Because the 
relativism-refuters appeal in their arguments to those presupposed defi-
nitions, distinctions, and relations, their arguments may appear, at least 
to those who share their conceptual idioms and syntax, to demonstrate 
that the alleged “claims” of the alleged “relativists” are indeed absurd or 
appalling. But, for the same reason—that is, because the relativism-refut-
ers deploy and depend on the very concepts and relations that are at issue 
(concepts such as truth and reason, relations such as those between what 
are referred to as facts and evidence)—their arguments can have no intel-
lectual force for the alleged relativists, who know themselves not to be 
saying the foolish things they are charged with saying and who do not 
and cannot take for granted the concepts, definitions, distinctions, and 
relations to which the relativism-refuters appeal. The result is pure non-
engagement and perfect deadlock. The chimerical beast called Relativism 
lies always already slain but, as one of “the philosophical undead” (Rouse 
2002), it always walks again.23
There are signs that this tragicomic episode of intellectual history 
may have run its course. Most cultural anthropologists and historians of 
science abide by the now well-established methodological principles of 
their respective disciplines without giving them much thought or find-
ing it necessary to explain or defend them to anyone.24 At the same time, 
The Chimera of Relativism: A Tragicomedy 29
the scope, force, and interest of formal exposures and refutations of what 
is named “relativism” appear to be diminished in the current philosophi-
cal literature and elsewhere. Indeed, some younger logicians and philoso-
phers now unapologetically detail and defend relativity-affirming theses 
as such, while, for better or worse, a genial folk-relativist ethos (live and 
let live) seems to prevail among students on many of our de facto mul-
ticultural campuses.25 Where full-throated formal denunciations of rela-
tivism continue to be voiced in contemporary discourse, they seem to 
issue primarily from protectors or would-be restorers of some threatened 
or faded orthodoxy—for example, positivist scientism, rationalist epis-
temology, or Vatican infallibilism—and are clearly designed to discredit 
one or another currently significant challenge.26
In spite of these hopeful developments (hopeful, at least, from some 
perspectives), anxieties about the implications or consequences of what 
is identified as relativism linger, and there are also recent efforts to refute 
relativism on what are said to be scientific grounds. Two contemporary 
sites of antirelativist energy require special attention. The first centers on 
the claim that cultural relativism is refuted by the demonstrated existence 
of cognitive universals. The second involves the fear or charge that rela-
tivist convictions lead to politically debilitating neutrality in the face of 
oppression and other social ills.
II
According to an influential group of evolutionary psychologists and cog-
nitive anthropologists, we now have evidence of what they refer to as “the 
psychic unity of mankind”—specifically, the existence of innate, evolved, 
universal mental mechanisms underlying all human thought, behavior, 
and culture (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). Questions can be raised about 
the empirical basis and conceptual coherence of this view, which is by 
no means accepted by all psychologists or cognitive scientists. What con-
cerns me here, however, is the attendant argument that the demonstrable 
existence of such universal mechanisms undercuts certain alleged rela-
tivist claims.
The argument just described appears in a book, In Gods We Trust 
(2002), by cognitive anthropologist Scott Atran. Atran observes that 
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“there is a long-standing claim on the ‘relativist’ side of anthropology, 
psychology, and the philosophy and history of science to the effect that 
people who live in ‘traditional’ cultures … live in conceptual worlds that 
are profoundly and incommensurably different from our own world (and 
each other’s worlds)” (84). According to Atran, “this claim is mistaken in 
light of the following facts” (emphasis added): “1. There is considerable 
recurrence of symbolic content [of supernatural beliefs] across histori-
cally isolated cultures … 2. This recurrence owes chiefly to universal cog-
nitive mechanisms that process cultural input (information) in ways that 
are variously triggered but subsequently unaffected by the nature of the 
input.” Atran then lists some beliefs recorded among the Itza’ Mayans of 
Mexico that “we” would find hard to believe or to restate in any way that 
made sense—for example, that a certain sorcerer transformed himself 
into a dog, that a person “ensouls” a house, and that a house has a soul.27 
On such beliefs, he comments as follows:
From the forgoing we might conclude that we and the Itza’ 
just live in conceptually different everyday worlds. That peo-
ple abide such apparently different worlds may, in turn, be 
taken as support for the flexibility of the human mind, that is, 
a mind unconstrained by cognitive structures that are evolved 
… task-specific or innately determined and content-con-
straining. But this conclusion is wrong. (86)
The somewhat awkward phrasing here coincides with the tenuousness 
and circularity of the argument. Atran speaks of a conclusion wrongly 
drawn from ethnographic data about the strange beliefs of other people 
and an idea wrongly drawing support from that data. The conclusion is 
that people can live in conceptually different worlds; the idea is that the 
human mind is flexible. But is either of these wrong, and are they wrongly 
concluded? Is it not the case that people, even some who eat daily in 
the same faculty-club dining rooms, can live in conceptual worlds that 
are profoundly different—for example, as I suggest above, relativizing 
anthropologists and relativism-refuting philosophers? And is it wrong 
to conclude from, among other things, the wide variety of cosmologies 
encountered by ethnographers that “the human mind”—which of course 
names a range of capacities and activities—is flexible?
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Two other questions are significant for the logical and rhetorical 
force of Atran’s argument. One is whether the general observation that 
“the human mind is flexible” is properly glossed as the technically par-
ticular (and manifestly self-contradictory as stated) claim that the mind 
is “unconstrained by cognitive structures that are evolved [,] … task-
specific or innately determined and content-constraining” (86). The sec-
ond is what makes a “fact” out of Atran’s explanation for the cross-cul-
tural recurrence of the thematic content of various supernatural beliefs. 
According to his argument, such recurrences are evidence for the exis-
tence of universal cognitive mechanisms, but the only basis he offers for 
the existence of such mechanisms is the questionable contention that 
their operation is the only thing that can explain such recurrences. The 
cognitive-universalist claim and the supposed ethnographic evidence 
for it are bootstrapped onto each other and the purported refutation is 
totally circular.
Contrary to Atran’s contention, the recurrence of various mythic 
and religious themes can be explained without positing highly specific, 
content-constraining cognitive mechanisms. One notes, for example, 
the existence of such widespread—indeed pan-cultural—phenomena as 
sunrise and nightfall and the prevalence of such salient objects, events, 
and experiences as birds and snakes, journeys and warfare, illness and 
dreams. Also, as described in other chapters here, there are important 
alternatives to the strongly innatist, adaptationist view of mind and cog-
nition that Atran invokes here as factually established.28 Such alterna-
tive views do not, as he suggests, come down to the blank slate of classic 
empiricism or to cultural-environmental determinism. They certainly do 
not claim that the human mind is altogether unconstrained. What they 
maintain or indicate instead is that, although various species-wide cogni-
tive capacities, traits, or tendencies may exist, they must, in their actual 
operations, interact continuously with other more or less highly individ-
uated traits and tendencies and also with the traces of individual experi-
ences in particular physical, social, and cultural worlds. The point is sig-
nificant for the operation of any putative human or cognitive universal, 
from language ability to the often popularly posited “moral sense.”
Theorists and scientists proposing these alternative views of human 
cognitive or psychological development would reject Atran’s reductive 
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and otherwise dubious account of the generation of supernatural con-
cepts by highly specialized mental mechanisms. They would also reject 
the mind-as-blank-slate view that Atran refers to, somewhat oddly, as 
“relativism” and that he implies is the only major alternative to his own 
strongly mentalist account of cognition. The individual “mind,” however 
we understand the term, is shaped by multiple forces, and its operations 
and products are of course limited or “constrained” in many respects; and 
“the human mind,” taken either individually or as a species characteris-
tic, is flexible. These are not mutually exclusive observations. To maintain 
that the mind is flexible, in the sense of being responsive and capable of 
ongoing modification, is not to deny the existence of constraining forces 
on cognitive processes and products, including forces arising from general 
features of human neurophysiology as shaped over evolutionary time.29 
The conflict of views that Atran evokes here is spurious. If there are any 
pure cultural determinists remaining in anthropology, or any strict envi-
ronmental determinists among behaviorists or Jesuits, none of them has 
much authority in the current intellectual world.30 There are real conflicts 
here, but they are not over whether Nature or Nurture, evolved neuro-
physiology or culturally contingent experience, is decisive in shaping the 
content of our beliefs. The conflicts are over the contested institutional 
dominance of different factions in the contemporary social sciences, with 
so-called cognitive approaches seeking not only to displace older and no 
doubt limited approaches but also to hold their ground against newer 
and arguably more fertile developments.31 “Relativism” here, as often 
elsewhere, is a straw herring.
III
I turn now to the other current objection to relativism that I mentioned 
earlier. This is the fear or charge that relativistic convictions lead to ethi-
cally reprehensible neutrality or political passivity. One can understand 
how the charge or anxiety originates. Where the theoretically described 
variability of human perceptions, interpretations, and judgments is 
manifested as consequential conflicts and those conflicts come close 
to home, efforts by historians, anthropologists, and other scholars to 
maintain methodological symmetry and to treat all sides evenhandedly 
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may appear improper and will be, from certain perspectives, objection-
able. Moreover, efforts at neutrality under such conditions are likely to 
become strained for the scholars themselves. For example (quite close 
to home for Americans), an otherwise conscientiously impartial soci-
ologist of science may find it hard to treat current, local promotions of 
biblical creationism symmetrically with efforts by biology teachers to 
present evolution without disclaimers in public high schools. Similarly, 
a Western-educated anthropologist may find it hard to report impartially 
on such exotic practices as female genital cutting. Under such conditions, 
the determinedly impartial sociologist of science or symmetry-maintain-
ing anthropologist may be too involved in the outcome of such struggles 
or too conscious of the effects of such practices on the lives of people he 
or she knows well, or can imagine vividly enough, to maintain an other-
wise proper neutrality.
Where a conflict of views—perceptions, interpretations, or judg-
ments—is neither hypothetical nor in the remote past, but actual, sharp, 
current, and caught up in one’s personal history or sense of personal 
identity, it is understandably difficult to be impartial. Where, moreover, 
the conflict involves people or communities to whom one has generally 
recognized obligations of kinship, friendship, membership, or alliance, 
it may be ethically improper—and, from some perspectives, politically 
culpable—for one to remain neutral. Thus, many sociologists of sci-
ence were dismayed by their colleague Steve Fuller’s recondite account 
of the comparable scientific status of evolutionary theory and Intelligent 
Design during his testimony in a school-board trial in the United States.32 
Similarly, many feminist scholars were disturbed by anthropologist Saba 
Mahmood’s representation of Muslim women’s self-subjection to patri-
archal teachings as a mode of personal agency comparable to forms of 
agency valued by Western feminists (Mahmood 2005). There is, it might 
be said, a time for programmatic symmetry to be laid aside and for strong 
partisanship and explicit advocacy or critique to be taken up. I believe 
there are such times. But I also believe that they are not determinable in 
the abstract or in advance. Rather, I would say, those times are determined 
for each of us by the relevant particulars of our personal histories, identi-
ties, and obligations as well as by the particulars of the conditions that 
present themselves. Here, as often elsewhere, the best—most ethically 
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responsive and intellectually responsible—way to handle the apparent 
difficulties created by relativist commitments is to relativize even fur-
ther—that is, to acknowledge the significance, for oneself as for others, of 
even broader ranges and more subtle forms of contingent circumstances.
It may be presumed that, in their public actions as scholars, both 
Fuller and Mahmood were responsive to the relevance of various con-
tingent circumstances. There is room for argument, however, about their 
respective decisions and also reason to speculate about how they arrived 
at them. It is not clear, for example, that Fuller considered as carefully as 
he might have done the long-range intellectual, educational, and political 
consequences of his testimony, as a credentialed social scientist, on behalf 
of the crypto-creationist side in the school-board trial. Similarly, it is not 
clear that Mahmood presented all the crucially relevant features of the 
lives and situations of the Muslim women she studied—for example, the 
history or threat of physical violence under which they may have acted. 
One may also wonder to what extent Fuller’s generally populist senti-
ments, often directed against the science establishment, put him in ideo-
logical alignment with the promoters of Intelligent Design.33 And simi-
larly, one may wonder to what extent Mahmood’s strict neutrality in her 
representation of the Egyptian women’s mosque movement reflected a 
degree of protectiveness toward Islam, which, as a Pakistani-born woman 
(and in view of ongoing displays of Western arrogance and condescen-
sion), she could share with her subjects. In short, it is not clear that these 
two seeming demonstrations of objectionable relativistic impartiality 
were actually altogether impartial. Indeed, what may disturb critics of 
relativism in such cases is not politically objectionable neutrality but evi-
dence of a relevant bias, muffled by a claim or show of fairness, for what is 
viewed as the wrong side of some current political struggle.
The preceding discussion acknowledges the genuine difficulties 
that may be presented in ethically or politically charged situations by a 
cultivated consciousness of the dependence of our perceptions, inter-
pretations, and judgments on culturally and historically variable per-
spectives—or what are often called relativistic views. But I want to say 
something against the facile and, I think, fundamentally improper asso-
ciation of such a consciousness with ethically irresponsible or politically 
culpable quietism. Clearly, the ways we act politically, the forms taken 
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by our partisanship and by either our advocacy or our critiques, can be 
determined more rather than less thoughtfully and on the basis of infor-
mation that is more rather than less extensive, accurate, and relevant. 
Political actions can also be determined with greater rather than lesser 
concern for possible consequences, for broader and longer-term rather 
than only immediate and local consequences, and for consequences for 
wider rather than narrower ranges of people. In all these respects, politi-
cal actions can be judged better rather than worse in the sense of being 
more rather than less ethically responsive and more rather than less effec-
tive in achieving either the particular political ends sought or some more 
broadly shared social goals. For these reasons, relativistic views, in the 
senses I have evoked here, do not make ethical or political judgments 
impossible. Moreover, when political activities are assessed in terms of 
the broad ethical and pragmatic dimensions just described, their ener-
gies are not diminished by what are called relativist convictions. On the 
contrary, it seems obvious that such convictions—that is, an acute con-
sciousness of the historical and cultural contingency of human percep-
tions, interpretations, and judgments (including one’s own) and of the 
sometimes significant variability of human interests and perspectives—
would tend to make someone’s political activities both more ethically 
responsive than and at least as effective as actions undertaken by some-
one with resolutely universalist, absolutist, and/or objectivist convic-
tions regarding the Truth and the Way.
Relativistic considerations do not commonly paralyze personal 
agency. They may, however, affect the form of the actions one takes and 
the processes by which one arrives at them. For example, a strong con-
sciousness of the possible relevance of unknown conditions and alterna-
tive perspectives may qualify the terms and tones in which one issues a 
denunciation or calls for an intervention. Such considerations may also 
make one hesitate—take more time, review a wider range of options—
before one grabs a gun or gives an order to fire one. It is not clear, how-
ever, that these are politically undesirable effects. As the sorry history of 
many political movements and interventions suggests, the contingen-
cies we deny and the variability we overlook for the sake of solidarity 
or for a show of unshakable conviction commonly come back to hit us 
or haunt us.
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When thoughtfully worked through and put into practice responsibly, 
relativist convictions—in the sense of a cultivated consciousness of the 
variability and contingency of what operates as the real, the true, or the 
good—are neither ethically nor politically compromising. But, of course, 
not all relativistic convictions are thoughtfully worked through or respon-
sibly evoked. On the contrary, expressed in sloganized forms (everybody 
has his own opinion, who’s to say what’s good or bad, and so forth), such 
ideas can be voiced mindlessly, lazily, and often with very bad manners 
(for example, condescendingly) or with very base motives (for example, 
to justify otherwise objectionable self-serving policies or practices). This 
brings me to some concluding observations.
IV
There are many reasons why the invocation of relativism, or even just ref-
erence to it as a topic, can be distasteful. For one thing, its exceptional 
elusiveness, as detailed earlier, makes relativism a genuine headache to 
think about, difficult to describe coherently, and almost impossible to 
argue about productively. Also, the recurrent philosophical equation of 
relativism with foolish or crude positions, such as an everything-is-equal-
to-everything-else egalitarianism or an anything-goes nihilism, operates 
as a distinct disincentive to introduction of the term, even where it would 
be descriptively apt. Most significantly, perhaps, the mindless, lazy, or 
cynical voicing of relativist slogans, as just described, gives relativism an 
understandably bad name among intellectually and ethically scrupulous 
people and, for that reason and others, leads to its strenuous disavowal by 
thinkers whose views, given a range of familiar characterizations, might 
well be regarded as relativistic.34 If we seek to dispel fire-breathing chime-
ras, these difficulties must be recognized.
General observations to the effect that meanings and values are radi-
cally contingent, or that perceptions, interpretations, and judgments are 
essentially variable, have been articulated with a variety of affects and 
motives: earnestly, ironically, in good faith, in bad faith, despairingly, glee-
fully, to challenge dubious claims of objectivity or universality, to explain 
incomprehensible difference, to plead for tolerance, to justify neglect. But 
occasional or even frequent delivery with bad manners or base motives 
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does not make such observations invalid. Nor does it oblige us to shore 
up or reaffirm otherwise dubious conceptions of objective truth, univer-
sal value, or transcendent criteria. Rather, when general ideas of variabil-
ity or contingency are invoked and applied objectionably—for instance, 
where an ill-considered view is lazily excused as “just one man’s opinion” 
or an immediately consequential objectionable practice is shrugged off as 
“traditional in our/their culture”—then exposure and criticism are prop-
erly directed at the laziness, cynicism, or obscurantism involved, not at 
general observations of variability or contingency, or at that cloudy crea-
ture “relativism.”
Finally, the horror or embarrassment of relativism is, I suspect, the 
horror or humiliation of mortality. Observations of radical contingency 
and irreducible variability are disagreeable because they remind us that 
our achievements are fragile, that our meanings are not altogether under 
our control, and that there may not be truth at the end of our efforts or 
justice at the end of our struggles. They are disagreeable because they 
oblige us to recognize the limited significance of all that we hold impor-
tant, the perishability of all that we cherish, and our own fickleness and 
faithlessness. Some people regard these reminders as pessimistic or nihil-
istic; others see them as useful in pursuit of a sensible and ethical life. 
It’s no doubt a matter of personal temperament. As folk-relativist wis-
dom has it, it takes all kinds to make a world and there’s no point arguing 
about tastes. Of course that would include intellectual worlds and philo-
sophical tastes.*
* “The Chimera of Relativism: A Tragicomedy” originally appeared in Common 
Knowledge, vol. 17:1, pp. 13-26. © 2011, Duke University Press. All rights reserved. 
Republished by permission of the copyright holder. www.dukeupress.edu
Chapter Three
Religion, Science, and the Humanities: An Interview
This exchange was originally posted on the Social Science Research 
Council blog, The Immanent Frame, by Nathan Schneider, an editor of 
the blog. The heading read as follows: “Barbara Herrnstein Smith is a 
distinguished literary scholar at both Brown and Duke who, since her 
undergraduate days, has had a special interest in the uses and misuses of 
scientific psychology. Her latest book, which stems from her 2006 Terry 
Lectures at Yale University, is Natural Reflections: Human Cognition at the 
Nexus of Science and Religion (Yale, 2009). It explores the ways in which 
contemporary cognitive science and evolutionary psychology are being 
called upon to, once and for all, explain religion.” (Schneider 2010)
NS:  Natural Reflections  has been the subject of a lively debate on 
Stanley Fish’s blog at  The New York Times. Have you found the 
exchange productive?
BHS: One-shot retorts, or seesaw exchanges on blogs, are rarely mod-
els of intellectually productive discussion, but Stanley Fish’s columns 
attract thoughtful readers, and I found the responses to his column 
on Natural Reflections instructive. Two related anxieties were repeatedly 
voiced on the basis of Fish’s description of my evenhanded—or, in fact, 
determinedly symmetrical—treatment of religious beliefs and what we 
take as scientific knowledge. One is that I am flattening out important 
differences between them. The other is that I’m refusing to take a stand 
on a major issue of our time, and thus—wittingly or unwittingly—giving 
aid and comfort to the wrong side. The first of these worries is unwar-
ranted. While I locate the differences between “science” and “religion” 
on multiple levels, I don’t diminish either the significance of such differ-
ences or the stakes that may be involved in identifying them accurately. 
The second worry is, I think, misplaced in principle, and reflects increas-
ingly oversimplified public views of science, religion, and the relations 
between them. Most of the commentators anxious about what side the 
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book comes out on are concerned, I think, about such issues as the pro-
motion of creationist ideas in science classes, or the clerical condemna-
tion of contraceptive devices or homosexuality—that is, public issues 
in which noisy literalist convictions clash with established scientific 
accounts, or where informed secular attitudes are confronted by uncom-
promising ecclesiastic doctrine. Such concerns are understandable and 
I share them. But taking a clear stand on such issues does not require 
choosing sides between Science and Religion, conceived as monolithic 
adversaries in an epic battle.
NS: How does this kind of discussion compare with what your previous 
books have generated?
BHS: Though I think of myself as a peace-loving scholar, what you call 
“lively debate” seems to be my destiny—or, perhaps, addiction. Virtually 
all my books have been involved in lively enough intellectual clashes: 
value wars, theory wars, culture wars, and science wars, among others. In 
the late 1980s, at the height of the so-called canon wars, a writer for The 
New York Times  described  Contingencies of Value  as “a bible of relativ-
ism”—and he didn’t mean it as a compliment. Indeed, it was my initially 
surprised encounter with such overheated reactions to my account of lit-
erary value that led me to think more closely about such head-on intel-
lectual collisions—what I came to call “the microdynamics of incom-
mensurability.” I describe how they play out in current debates over 
belief, knowledge, truth, and science in two subsequent books, Belief and 
Resistance and Scandalous Knowledge.
NS: Well before the publication of the book, videos of the Terry Lectures 
on which it is based were available online. Did responses that you 
received from the public or other scholars on the basis of those videos 
affect how the book developed?
BHS: Some people who watched the videos told me about it and 
murmured general appreciations, but what affected the development 
of  Natural Reflections  most significantly were the responses of students 
to presentations of my views in seminars that I gave at Duke and Brown 
while turning the lectures into a book. The groups included, at various 
times, the daughter of a rabbi, two strenuous secularists from abroad, 
a devotee of Daniel Dennett, and at least five people reexamining their 
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relation to the Catholic Church. I found, without quite planning it, that 
my efforts in each session were directed in large measure to keeping 
everyone on board—engaged, active, talking, and thinking, rather than 
grandstanding or sulking—as we went through the readings. By the con-
clusion of each semester, there seemed to be a way of putting things—of 
describing and understanding the nature of “religion,” “science,” “belief,” 
and the relations among them—that was acceptable to virtually every-
one (though I lost the rabbi’s daughter early on, and one of the hardline 
secularists held out to the bitter end). It was the process of reaching that 
way of putting things, and especially discovering what made it go well 
or badly, that was crucial for what I came to see and want as the ethos 
of the book.
NS: What first brought you, as a scholar of literature, to matters of sci-
ence and religion?
BHS: As it happens, one of my first published works (in a magazine of 
undergraduate writing at City College in New York in the 1950s) was 
on the psychology of religious conversion. I was much taken by William 
James’s  Varieties of Religious Experience,  though I also kept a copy of 
Nietzsche’s  Zarathustra  in my pocket. Matters of science, particularly 
biology and psychology, occupied me centrally during my school years 
and, though I went on to receive degrees in literature and have worked in 
such fields as Renaissance poetry and critical theory, those interests have 
remained strong and are reflected in virtually everything I have written. 
As for matters of religion, they were there all along, though I didn’t always 
identify them as such. Of course, when Renaissance poetry isn’t about 
love, it’s about religion. My experiences studying and teaching works 
such as Donne’s  Holy Sonnets  and, for several years, Milton’s  Paradise 
Lost stood me in good stead in my recent encounters with Christian the-
ology, contemporary biblical exegesis, and the complexities of religious 
sentiment. Also, critical theory has always been concerned with the 
nature of truth and the operations of rhetoric, imagination, illusion, and 
belief—think of Aristotle’s Poetics—all questions that are central as well 
to the study of religion.
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NS: The Times posts mention your once having worked with the great 
psychologist B. F. Skinner. Did he influence you, and has his influence 
borne itself out in your career?
BHS: The answer is yes, but it needs some context. What brought me into 
Skinner’s orbit was not behaviorism. It was a summer job as a technician 
in his laboratory when I was already a student in literature at Brandeis. 
But I learned a lot about behaviorism along the way—certainly enough 
to know that it was not manifestly absurd or Satanic. Most significantly, as 
it turned out, I had the chance to read Skinner’s Verbal Behavior in manu-
script—which is to say, before Noam Chomsky’s review of it. Few people 
have actually read the book, which has nothing to do with rats, pigeons, or 
Pavlovian-conditioned children. In any case, the account Skinner devel-
ops there helped form my sense of language-use as a dynamic, embod-
ied, context-sensitive social practice. Other major influences on that view 
were books I was reading around that time by anthropological linguist 
Benjamin Lee Whorf and literary theorist Kenneth Burke—both home-
grown American originals, I might note, like Skinner himself. All of this 
inclined me to be skeptical of what I saw as Chomsky’s impoverished 
conception of language and implausible account of how it is acquired 
and used—and also, for related reasons, of Habermas’s notion of com-
munication ethics. These and other skepticisms deriving from, among 
other things, my undergraduate work on the psychology of perception, 
early encounters with William James and Dewey, and that pocketful of 
Nietzsche put me at odds for the next fifty years with widely held views 
in language theory, value theory, epistemology, and, most relevantly for 
this conversation, what is now called cognitive science.
NS: What, in particular, about recent cognitive science of religion caught 
your attention?
BHS: In spite of the skepticisms just mentioned, I approached works such 
as Lawson and McCauley’s  Rethinking Religion, Pascal Boyer’s  Religion 
Explained, and Scott Atran’s  In Gods We Trust  with considerable inter-
est, viewing them initially as contemporary continuations and updates of 
the great naturalistic tradition in the study of religion—works by figures 
such as Hume, Weber, and Durkheim. The up-front association with evo-
lutionary theory was intriguing, and I hoped to find out what was new 
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in both anthropology and religious studies, and perhaps have something 
to report about it all for my Terry Lectures. In the course of working 
through several shelves of volumes and numerous articles and reviews, 
I learned quite a bit about the institutional politics of religious studies 
and about some exceedingly bemusing beliefs and practices exhibited 
by people around the globe. But what ended up engaging my atten-
tion most significantly were the no less bemusing beliefs and practices 
exhibited by these contemporary researchers of religion themselves. So, I 
decided to frame my report on these developments from my perspective 
as a part-time sociologist of knowledge and to include, in my assessment 
of the now self-dubbed “cognitive science of religion” (I call it the New 
Naturalism), some duly critical and cautionary observations.
NS: How much do you think cognitive science, when shed of its more 
ideological exaggerations, can really tell us about religion?
BHS: What seems right to me is the idea that many widespread and 
recurrent types of belief and practice associated with religion reflect the 
operation of quite general human cognitive and behavioral tendencies. 
That idea doesn’t originate, of course, with cognitive science. Expressed 
in different terms, we find it in Hume’s Natural History of Religion and the 
work of many later theorists of religion. What’s more original in the new 
approach is the idea that many of those tendencies reflect the evolution-
ary history of the species. To the extent that the cognitive science of reli-
gion elaborates those ideas and connects them to other ongoing work on 
religion, culture, cognition, and human behavior, its contributions can be 
substantial. What seems dubious to me is the claim that the tendencies in 
question reflect the activation of specific Stone Age mental mechanisms 
that can be, or already have been, identified by cognitive scientists. What 
seems utterly stultifying is the attendant suggestion that everything else 
said about religion is irrelevant, superficial, or pre-scientific.
NS: How much does this New Naturalism share with the New Atheism 
of Richard Dawkins and, for instance, Daniel Dennett, whose Breaking 
the Spell calls for a new, naturalistic science of religion?
BHS: It’s important not to confuse the project I refer to as the New 
Naturalism—that is, cognitive-evolutionary studies of religion—with 
the so-called New Atheism. The New Naturalists are attempting to 
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explain religion; the New Atheists are seeking to discredit it. Not all New 
Naturalists are atheists, and the project does not arise from an antipathy 
to religion. Boyer, a cheerful Frenchman, generally maintains an anthro-
pologist’s neutral distance from the beliefs he describes. Atran, a serious 
American, expresses an ambivalent appreciation of religion throughout 
his book. Dennett’s efforts in Breaking the Spell, which would qualify as 
New Naturalist as well as New Atheist, are limited in both regards by a 
very narrow understanding of religion and a correspondingly dubious 
conception of beliefs—religious and otherwise—as static, discrete items 
of cerebral furniture.
NS: By holding up the work of classicist Walter Burkert above cognitive 
scientists like Scott Atran and Pascal Boyer, are you arguing that scien-
tists should leave explanations of religion to humanists?
BHS: Not at all. Burkert’s  Creation of the Sacred: Tracks of Biology in 
Early Religions  figures in my book, not as a humanistic explanation of 
religion, but as an evolutionary-biological explanation of it that is duly 
historically informed and otherwise intellectually spacious—as many 
New Naturalist explanations are not. My point is not that humanists can 
explain religion (or anything else) better than scientists but that, if your 
objective is to develop empirically responsive, intellectually connectible 
naturalistic accounts of religion, then the resources of humanistic schol-
arship—including its archives, objects of study, participant perspec-
tives, and techniques of analysis—should be recognized as valuable and 
necessary ingredients. Burkert’s explanations of various features of reli-
gion—he deals with sacrifice, oracles, priests, prayer, moral command-
ments, and many other things—are often more compelling than Boyer’s 
or Atran’s not because they’re softer or sweeter but because, among 
other things, they are better grounded empirically. All three invoke evo-
lutionary biology, primate studies, genetics, and game theory. Typically, 
however, Boyer’s and Atran’s explanations come down to speculations, 
offered as facts and findings, about hypothetical, unobservable mental 
mechanisms. Burkert’s accounts come down to observations (and, to be 
sure, also speculations) about recurrent patterns of human behavior as 
evidenced in manuscripts, inscriptions, historical records, and archeo-
logical artifacts. Of course Burkert’s experience as a scholar of ancient 
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civilizations probably made him especially attentive to political and insti-
tutional aspects of religion, and also to imaginative elaborations of reli-
gious beliefs and practices, all of which are significantly neglected in New 
Naturalist accounts. But such experience need not be confined to human-
ists. It is available to anthropologists and psychologists if they think it is 
significant for the project at hand. After all, Burkert, undertaking pretty 
much the same project as Boyer and Atran, made himself familiar with 
a considerable array of new research and theory in the sciences before 
offering an account of the psycho-biological springs of religion. The trou-
ble is not the cognitive scientists’ limited knowledge of art, literature, or 
political and social history, but their failure to grant the relevance of such 
fields of knowledge to the ongoing project of “explaining religion.”
NS: How compelling do you find the recent trend among those trying to 
bring science to bear on literary theory? Should humanists generally be 
striving to draw more from the “hard” sciences in their work?
BHS: The question is apt. I’ve been thinking about that “trend” (as you 
put it) quite a bit lately, and I hope to write about it. I’m always mind-
ful of my own early participation in such efforts—for example, in Poetic 
Closure, by making use of gestalt psychology to describe the perception 
and experience of literary forms. My models at the time—admirable 
ones, I still think—were E. H. Gombrich’s Art and Illusion and Leonard 
B. Meyer’s  Emotion and Meaning in Music. I’m certainly sympathetic to 
projects involving interdisciplinary incorporations and extensions and 
could point to an array of achievements, current as well as past, that attest 
to their value. Work by a number of Duke colleagues comes to mind 
(Mark Hansen and Robert Mitchell, among others), along with Elizabeth 
Wilson’s recent book, Psychosomatic. As such work illustrates, relevantly 
informed scholars in literary studies and other humanities-based disci-
plines may incorporate concepts and findings from natural-science fields 
in ways that can be subtle, original, genuinely illuminating, and some-
times significantly transformative for their own fields. Burkert’s Creation 
of the Sacred is, of course, another example. I would have to add, however, 
that some of the current efforts to bring science (under some very limited 
views of it) into literary studies are energized by extremely dubious aims 
and motives. I think especially of hapless offerings by people who are 
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persuaded that their discipline has gone to the dogs (the major alleged 
agent of that dissolution being some vague menace called “postmodern-
ism”) and who think it can be redeemed only by large, duly stiffening, 
injections of natural science. These convictions have a surprising degree 
of uptake among minimally informed people outside the field of literary 
studies, including, I’m sorry to see, some distinguished scientists.
NS: How can humanists—particularly after incidents like the  Sokal 
Affair—make their voices heard by those in the scientific community in 
a productive way?
BHS: Alan Sokal is not a good representative of the scientific commu-
nity in that regard, but his hoax was an effective piece of mischief that 
did much to deepen an already existing chasm created by a century of 
mutual ignorance and mutual caricature. I would stress the mutuality of 
that ignorance and those caricatures. Humanists and scientists are inevi-
tably divided by significant—and, I think, by no means undesirable—
differences of intellectual training, intellectual temperament, and intel-
lectual idiom. They can converse productively with each other, however, 
when both recognize their own limits and provincialisms, and when 
each grants due respect to the worthiness of the other’s projects and 
achievements. The readiness of some publicly visible scientists to dismiss 
humanities scholarship as trivial or unenlightened is, of course, painful. 
But if humanists, including scholars of religion, seek to be heard across 
the two-culture divide, they must be willing to give ear to reports of rel-
evant developments in the natural sciences and to acknowledge—and, I 
would say, challenge—the readiness of many of their colleagues to cast 
scientists in correspondingly demoting, not to say demonizing, roles.
Chapter Four
Anthropotheology: Bruno Latour Speaking Religiously
To talk about religion again. … No one appointed him, 
nothing marked him out, if not the certainty that once 
we modify, as he has done (as he thinks he has done), 
the common version of the sciences, everything else 
can start to change—first and foremost, religion.
—Latour, Rejoicing: Or The Torments of Religious Speech
Bruno Latour is a relatively recent taste in the Anglo-American acad-
emy. He has been publishing important work in the anthropology and/
or sociology of science since the 1980s but, until the past five years or so, 
has been greeted largely with antagonism or indifference by science and 
humanities faculty alike. While Latour’s work (or tendentiously selected 
passages from it) was a prime target of science warriors in the 1990s, peo-
ple in the humanities have generally found his writings too remote from 
current concerns to seem interesting (he has had little to say, for example, 
about the politics of race or gender, at least explicitly) or too closely asso-
ciated with the natural sciences to seem approachable. In recent years, 
however, invocations of ideas and approaches associated with Latour 
have become commonplace, along with citations of specific texts he has 
authored, especially those with irresistible titles.
For many readers, Latour is most closely identified with actor-net-
work theory (ANT), a set of radical concepts and sophisticated methods 
developed originally in the sociology of science. He is also well known, 
especially among people in the humanities, as a subtle analyst of moder-
nity and, more generally, as a vigorous advocate of environmentalism. 
Less widely known are Latour’s extensive writings on religion. These 
include, from the 1970s, a doctoral dissertation on biblical interpretation 
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and a related study of the early twentieth-century writer, Charles Péguy; 
a long essay from 1996, Petite réflexion sur le culte modern des dieux 
Faitiches, later translated as “On the Cult of the Factish Gods”; an impor-
tant lecture from 2002, “‘Thou Shall Not Freeze-Frame,’ or, How Not to 
Misunderstand the Science and Religion Debate;” and, also from 2002, 
a small but in many ways extraordinary book, Jubiler ou Les tourments 
de la parole religieuse, recently translated as Rejoicing: Or the Torments of 
Religious Speech. Religion, or religious “being” as a specific mode of exis-
tence, figures centrally in An Inquiry into Modes of Existence and, along 
with Nature, is one of the major categories of analysis in Latour’s Gifford 
lectures, Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climatic Regime (2017). 
Indeed, the hope and effort to frame a proper and—in Latour’s impor-
tant term—“diplomatic” account of religion, and especially of its relation 
to science, have been central motivating forces in his work for at least the 
past two decades and, in some respects, from the beginning. 
Virtually any reader who undertakes the serious study of Latour’s writ-
ings (as distinct from casual sampling or heresy-hunting) will find them 
engrossing, instructive, often exhilarating and always impressive. But “the 
humanities” make up a very mixed package of practices in the present 
Anglo-American academy, and people currently working in the fields so 
designated make up a very mixed multitude. The ways in which any of 
us take up Latour’s work, to “recompose” that package or otherwise, will 
depend, of course, on our particular assessments of those practices and 
on our aims and angles more generally.35 Additionally, because attempt-
ing to do things “with Latour” will, sooner or later, involve encounters 
with his religious writings and with their particular concerns and per-
spectives, the ways we take up his work are also likely to depend on what 
he would call our “attachments.” A detailed examination of Latour’s writ-
ings on religion is beyond the scope of this essay. What I hope to do here 
is suggest the interest of these writings for scholars in the humanities and 
also to indicate the ways in which they seem likely to create problems 
for such readers, including or perhaps especially for longtime admirers 
of his work.
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When readers fail to understand why I have continually 
changed fields, and when they do not see the overall logic 
of my research … their comments amuse me, for I know of 
no other author who has so stubbornly pursued the same 
research project for 25 years, day after day, while filling up 
the same files in response to the same sets of questions.
—Latour, “Biography of an Inquiry”
 Alluding to his successive studies of science, art, politics, and law, Latour 
has described his general project as “the comparative study of the various 
ways in which the central institutions of our cultures produce truth” or, as 
he also calls those ways, “truth regimes” (2009, ix.) The regime on which 
his earlier work focuses is that of the modern natural sciences. In empiri-
cal—archival and onsite—investigations conducted in the late 1970s and 
early ‘80s and in their theoretical elaborations as actor-network theory, 
Latour has sought to demonstrate that what are commonly taken as sci-
entific truths—facts, laws, discoveries, entities—are not, as commonly 
assumed, fixed, prior, and given by “nature” (itself radically reconceptu-
alized by Latour) but, rather, the contingent products of dynamic net-
works of multiple, heterogeneous elements. The elements include both 
humans—scientists, technicians, bureaucrats, and sometimes farmers or 
fishermen—and nonhuman agents or actors, from sick cows and virulent 
microbes to pulleys and petri dishes. All these are moving in different, 
potentially conflicting directions, and some are stronger or weaker than 
others; but, in laboratories and other centers of calculation and con-
trol, some elements can be linked together to form associations that are 
effective in serving particular human ends. It is the pragmatically effec-
tive linking of such elements that secures what we call the truth of scien-
tific facts (for example, the microbe theory of disease or the structure of 
DNA) and that sustains what we experience as the reality of the entities 
associated with those facts (for example, microbes or genes).36
This constructivist-pragmatist understanding of scientific truth and 
knowledge reflects an increasingly commanding tradition of research 
and theory that extends from Ludwik Fleck’s Genesis and Development of 
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a Scientific Fact, originally published in 1935, to the writings of a num-
ber of mid-twentieth-century historians, sociologists, and philosophers 
of science and, from there, to ongoing work in the field now known as 
science and technology studies (STS). As formulated, elaborated, and 
promoted in writings by, among others, Latour, it has proved compel-
ling to increasing numbers of humanities scholars, along with research-
ers and theorists in the social sciences, both as a set of conceptual and 
methodological resources for work in their own fields and also as a well-
developed alternative to still-dominant positivist views. As research and 
teaching in the humanities continue to involve closer connections to the 
natural sciences, Latour’s work in this tradition can be especially impor-
tant and, in regard to the earnest or aggressive scientism sometimes dis-
played in these developments,37 it can be especially instructive. There has 
been no radical break between Latour’s early and more recent work on 
science and no reversal in the direction of his thought. Since his “coming 
out as a philosopher” (Latour 2010), however, he has supplemented and, 
in some crucial regards, sought to supersede ANT and empirical science 
studies more generally with an array of speculative methods and explic-
itly metaphysical projects. He has also been increasingly explicit about 
what he evokes, especially in Rejoicing, as his particular task or responsi-
bility: that is, to read aright the texts and inscriptions of the religion that, 
as he says, “matters” to him and to translate, transmit, and make effective 
its message for those he calls “Moderns.”38 Latour’s thirty-year-long com-
parative investigation of truth-regimes was pursued in good measure in 
the service of that task. An Inquiry into Modes of Existence can be seen as 
the consummation of the investigation and, with the Gifford lectures, as 
his most valiant venture to date as missionary to the Moderns.
II
Is existence not among the perfections indispensable for respect, 
which the idea of belief never allows us to preserve? Thus I had 
to come back to the crack that runs between epistemological 
questions and ontological questions. The new history of 
the sciences has allowed me to slip in between the two.
—Latour, “On the Cult of the Factish Gods”
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Contrary to routine misunderstandings of constructivist accounts of 
scientific facts, to be constructed—made, built, fabricated, put together 
from heterogeneous elements—is not to be unreal. Abstract facts, like 
material artifacts, are assembled and composed, but both are “real” in the 
sense of being, at least provisionally, stable and consequential. The same 
can be said of gods and other religious beings: demons and divinities, 
spirits and fetishes.
As Latour tells the story in “On the Cult of the Factish Gods” (2010), 
Gold Coast natives, scorned by European traders and invaders, insisted 
that certain wooden dolls—dubbed fêtiches by the Portuguese—were 
gods. The natives, Latour observes, had “constructed” something “that 
went beyond them.” But, he asks, is this not true as well of the facts con-
structed by Western scientists, for example, Louis Pasteur’s “ferment of 
lactic acid,” the existence of which emerges through laboratory instru-
ments and tests? (16) Moderns, with all the apparatus of scientific ratio-
nality, no less than supposedly primitive people with their wooden divin-
ities, invest things that they themselves have made with a power that goes 
beyond them. Facts and fetishes, demons and ferments: “All ask to exist,” 
Latour writes. “None is caught in the choice … between construction 
and reality, but each requires particular forms of existence whose list of 
specifications must be carefully drawn up” (45).
Fetish-gods, like scientific facts, acquire their potency—or, as it may 
be called, their “truth” or their “reality”—within a framework of spe-
cific ideas, habits, discourses, and material apparatus; but the potency 
of neither can survive outside those frameworks. Whether divinities or 
DNA molecules (and, as Latour extends the point in Modes of Existence, 
whether cats, mats, machines, political collectives, or characters in nov-
els), the conditions of their continued existence—he calls them “felicity 
conditions”—are highly specific, not always in place, and always more or 
less fragile. In the case of religious icons, for example, they are breakable 
by the acts of impassioned iconoclasts or modern “critical thinkers.”39
The imputation of an equivalent real existence to the facts of modern 
science and the divinities of putatively primitive religions—or, put differ-
ently, the acknowledgment of their equivalent ontological status—is an 
example of what Latour calls “symmetrical anthropology.” He explains its 
method and aim in the essay: “By taking the most respected beings of a 
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culture—our own—as examples, we can shed light on the most despised 
beings of another culture” (45). The most respected beings of our own 
culture are scientifically established facts and entities. The most despised 
beings are African fetish-gods, the demons afflicting the immigrant 
patients of a French ethnopsychiatrist and, not quite “of another culture,” 
the Virgin as sighted at Lourdes. Latour’s symmetrical anthropology can 
be seen as due scientific impartiality, as a generous exercise of the sympa-
thetic imagination, or, perhaps, as practicing relativism with a vengeance. 
It can also be seen as a sophisticated elaboration of the rhetorical move 
known, especially in theological circles and in response to derisive icono-
clasms, as tu quoque: “You, too! the supposedly enlightened ones: you do 
just what you scorn us, the supposedly benighted ones, for doing.”
In describing the facts of modern science symmetrically with reli-
gious beings, Latour does not seek to demote the authority of the truth-
regime of Western science. What he seeks to demote—indeed, to undo 
utterly—is a set of dichotomies and commonly skewed dualisms that 
have become central to modern Western thought: nature as divided from 
society, objects as divided from subjects, real as opposed to manmade 
or constructed, and existent as opposed to (merely) believed-in. But of 
course, and not incidentally, he thereby promotes the epistemic dignity 
of the experiences of those who fear demons or see visions of the Virgin, 
and the ontological dignity of those beings themselves.
In a classic constructivist treatment, our experience of the truth of sci-
entific facts and the reality of visions of divinities would be understood in 
terms of more general, largely social-psychological dynamics. Thus Fleck, 
in Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, describes the complex pro-
cesses involved in the formation and stabilization of what he calls “belief 
systems,” with scientific paradigms and religious doctrines, along with 
political and other ideologies, as examples. In Fleck’s account, the coher-
ence and stability of all such systems are preserved through the ongoing 
mutual adjustment of the perceptions, prior beliefs, background assump-
tions, and shared material practices of the interacting members of a social 
group or “thought collective.” Fleck called the resulting shared sense of 
the truth of some fact or doctrine among the members of such a group 
a “harmony of illusions”—illusions not in the familiar and itself dubious 
sense that there was some otherwise verifiable set of objective facts that 
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contradicted them, but insofar as that sense of truth was projected out-
ward and regarded as an objective correspondence of idea and world.
Latour has repeatedly expressed admiration for Fleck’s work, and 
the affinities of their respective accounts of facts and truth are evident.40 
The detailed historical-sociological narrative of the establishment of the 
microbe theory of disease in The Pasteurization of France closely paral-
lels Fleck’s narrative, in Genesis and Development, of the establishment 
of the Wassermann test for syphilis, including the way a key pathogen is 
coaxed into existence in the laboratory. Crucial to Fleck’s account, how-
ever, is an analysis of the social-psychological dynamics involved whereas 
Latour rejects explanatory appeals to the psychological and, in Modes 
of Existence, banishes the term “belief.” 41 Also, significantly, while both 
reject table-thumping empiricisms in favor of constructivist understand-
ings of facts and truths, Latour invokes a rather obscurely defined “sec-
ond empiricism” to ground the ontologies of Modes of Existence. These 
differences—as much matters of intellectual project and genre as of 
philosophical position—mark an important space between the tradition 
of science studies with which Latour’s work has been associated and his 
more recent writings, those on religion and more generally.
III
There exists a form of original utterance that speaks of the present, 
of definitive presence, of completion, of the fulfillment of time …; 
a form of speech whose sole characteristic is to constitute those 
it is addressed to as being close and saved; a kind of vehicle that 
differs absolutely from those we’ve evolved elsewhere to accede 
to the distant in order to control information about the world.
—Latour, Rejoicing
The perennially disputed relation between the truths of science and those 
of religion is addressed directly in Latour’s essay, “‘Thou Shall Not Freeze-
Frame,’ or, How Not to Misunderstand the Science and Religion Debate” 
(2005). Originally a talk for a lecture series titled “Science, Religion and 
the Human Experience,” the essay offers a set of formulations regard-
ing that relation that Latour develops in detail in Rejoicing and iterates 
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in more recent writings. The essay also involves, contra iconoclasts of all 
persuasions, a crucially revised interpretation of the biblical command-
ment prohibiting images. Rhetorically reflexive throughout, the essay is, 
among other things, a mock (but not mocked) sermon. Latour writes: 
“Religion, at least in the tradition I am going to talk from, namely the 
Christian one, is a way of preaching, of predicating, of enunciating truth 
in a certain manner—this is why I have to mimic in writing the situation 
of an oration given from the pulpit” (28).
Latour begins with a strong contrast between “speaking religiously,” 
evidently as in prayer or ritual utterance, and what he calls “double-click 
communication,” that is, the idea or ideal of an unmediated transfer of 
information. The truth of a double-click message, if any such existed, 
would be its exact correspondence to an objectively determinable state 
of affairs. Religious speech acts, on the other hand, “transport” not infor-
mation but persons. In religious speech as in love talk, what attests to the 
truth of an utterance is not its correspondence to some putatively objec-
tive reality but its renewal of speakers’ and hearers’ confidence in the real-
ity of something vital: a sense of closeness; a promise of futurity (29-31). 
Here as elsewhere in Latour’s writings on religion, claims are put forth 
largely through analogy, allusion, and intimation—which is not untypi-
cal, of course, of theological arguments or sermons.
Clearly, Latour observes, it would be improper, what he calls a “cat-
egory mistake,” to judge the truth of a religious speech act using double-
click communication as a measure.42 Just as it would be wrong to maintain 
that sentences such as “I love you” have no truth value just because they 
possess no informational content, it is wrong, in seeking to understand 
the angel Gabriel’s salutation to the Virgin, to ask who Mary was, to pon-
der “whether or not she was really a Virgin,” or to imagine that she might 
have been impregnated with “spermatic rays.” “Paradoxically,” Latour 
writes, “by formatting questions in the procrustean bed of information 
transfer so as to get at ‘exactly’ what it meant, I would have deformed it, 
transmogrified it into an absurd belief, the sort of belief that weighs reli-
gion down and lets it slide toward the refuse heap of past obscurantism” 
(33). In Rejoicing, Latour describes—at length and with considerable 
scorn—religious scholars’ efforts to explicate New Testament texts so as 
to make them more reasonable-sounding, more conformant to historical 
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data, or otherwise palatable to intellectual tastes corrupted, as he sees 
it, by Double Click (here and elsewhere personified and often associ-
ated ironically, or maybe not so ironically, with “the Evil One”). He con-
tinues in the essay: “The only way to understand stories such as that of 
the Annunciation is to repeat them, that is to utter again a Word which 
produces into the listener the same effect,” one that “impregnates. . . with 
the same gift, the same present of renewed presence. Tonight, I am your 
Gabriel!” (33).
Seeking explicitly to evoke the power and effects of religious trans-
mission, Latour turns from verbal to visual representation and comments 
on a set of strong images from Christian iconography. We do not, or 
should not, assess such images, he observes, by their fidelity to presumed 
true originals. Nor should we isolate or “freeze-frame” them from the 
flow of mediating representations that enable their truths to be realized 
(this being Latour’s revision of the second commandment). He goes on 
to stress the comparably vital role of relays of inscriptions, images, and 
other representations in science (reports, charts, photographs, math-
ematical formulae, and so forth). “Truth,” Latour writes, “is not to be 
found in correspondence—either between the word and the world in the 
case of science, or between the original and the copy in the case of reli-
gion—but in taking up again the task of continuing the flow, of elongating 
the cascade of mediations one step further” (46). The commonly sup-
posed objective realities behind genes or the microbe theory of disease 
are like the mistakenly supposed “originals” of visual representations of 
the empty Sepulcher or of the arresting thorn-crowned face of Jesus in 
a trompe-l’oeil painting of the Veronica veil. In all these, what matters, 
what sustains the truth of the events and the reality of the figures in ques-
tion, is the continuity of the practices of representation that mediate 
their existence.
Elaborating these points in the essay’s concluding pages, Latour 
observes, in what operates as an important and continuing distinction, 
that, while the mediating chains of reference that secure the truths of sci-
ence are counterparts to the flows of utterances and images that convey 
the truths of religion, the relays in each go “in two different directions” 
(46). In science, they bring what is far close (for example, through astro-
nomical photographs, charts, and models), but religious texts and images 
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bring us to what is near—our neighbor and our salvation. Because 
Moderns have worshipped the false idol of Double Click, Latour main-
tains, they have misunderstood—indeed, reversed—how truth and real-
ity are secured both in science and in religion. To correct what he calls 
this “comedy of errors,” he offers a set of alternative characterizations 
of religious belief and scientific knowledge that are central to Modes of 
Existence and repeated, with variations, in his Gifford lectures. “Belief,” 
he writes, “is not a quasi-knowledge question plus a leap of faith to reach 
even further away; knowledge is not a quasi-belief question that would 
be answerable by looking directly at things close at hand.” Rather, a leap 
of religious faith “aims at jumping, dancing towards the present and 
the close, to redirect attention away from indifference and habituation.” 
Conversely but comparably, knowledge in science “is not a direct grasp of 
the plain and the visible … but an extraordinarily daring, complex, and 
intricate confidence in chains of nested transformations of documents 
that, through many different types of proofs, lead toward new types of 
visions that force us to break away from the intuitions and prejudices of 
common sense” (45-46). The parallels and reversals in this set of com-
parisons are striking. Simultaneously vague and enthusiastic, they join 
an evocation of the most familiar and accessible experiences of religious 
faith to a celebration of the most heroic activities and exalted achieve-
ments of science while maintaining a sharp distinction between the two. 
They are nothing if not diplomatic.
IV
In seeking to frame an account of the relations between science and reli-
gion that is both generally acceptable and also corrective of what he sees as 
past philosophical and theological errors, Latour has taken on a task that 
is immense and, as suggested in Rejoicing, variously—certainly rhetori-
cally and perhaps, for Latour, conceptually as well—“tormented.” Such 
an account must negotiate steep differences of view between Moderns, 
many of them invested in conventionally celebratory views of science 
and some of them scornfully antireligious, and Christian communi-
cants, many of them invested in conventionally orthodox religious views 
and some of them resentfully anti-science. Thus, while secular-minded 
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readers may welcome a theology that claims neither supernatural nor sub-
stantial status for its god(s) and that segregates religion from politics and 
morality, communicants might feel that something essential has been lost 
in the negotiations. Accordingly, Latour’s accounts of religion vis-à-vis 
science operate with a good bit of euphemism, circumlocution, studied 
vagueness, and, it could be said, equivocation. For example, while Latour 
derides familiar theological allusions to realms “above” or “beyond” the 
natural or the material, the apparent heterodox force of such gestures is 
considerably defused by his equally strong efforts to undermine famil-
iar understandings of “nature” and “matter.” Similarly, while he seems to 
suggest that religion is immanence all the way down and all the way up, 
too, it is not surprising that fellow faithful sense in his texts assurances of 
something like orthodoxy.43
To speak religiously to Moderns, Latour has tied together a theoreti-
cally sophisticated account of scientific knowledge with a rhetorically 
deft Christian apologetics to forge a singular quasi-symmetrical anthro-
potheology. The writings that compose it are bold, inventive, and in 
many ways compelling. Structurally and stylistically, Rejoicing, Modes of 
Existence, and related essays are remarkable works of lyric philosophiz-
ing, recalling works by Kierkegaard and, in their strong personal voice, 
Nietzsche. Fellow theologians are likely to be most appreciative of the 
originality of their formulations and also most closely attuned to their 
distinctive idioms.44 Other readers will find them a rich resource for 
ongoing, reprised, or newly conceived scholarly projects. Historians and 
theorists of Western modernity will profitably engage with Latour’s theo-
logically inflected takes on law, politics, and economics. Those in literary 
and visual studies will appreciate his suggestive accounts of the re-pres-
encing effects of texts and images, religious and otherwise. And humani-
ties scholars of all stripes will be delighted by passages of an order of wit 
and literateness—vernacular as well as erudite—not often encountered 
in the pages of theologians, not to mention social scientists. Readers and 
scholars in all these fields, however, are likely to be perplexed by various 
aspects of these writings and to find them, to various extents, intellectu-
ally or experientially alien.
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V
I am not going to speak of religion in general, as if there 
existed some universal domain, topic, or problem called 
“religion” that could allow one to compare divinities, 
rituals, and beliefs from Papua New Guinea to Mecca, 
from Easter Island to Vatican City. A person of faith has 
only one religion, as a child has only one mother.
—Latour, “‘Thou Shall Not Freeze-Frame’”
In his writings on religion, Latour has been concerned with a relatively 
confined set of aspects of a vast and multifaceted subject.45 The focus is 
on religious representation and utterance, which, in Rejoicing and related 
essays, are identified largely with Christian iconography, New Testament 
texts, and the verbal practices of Catholic communicants. In Modes of 
Existence, the religious mode of existence is explicitly restricted to the 
beings of Christianity while demons, ghosts, fetish-gods, and other exotic 
divinities are assigned to a separate, somewhat obscurely described mode 
labeled “metamorphosis.” Beings of the latter kind are sustained not, as 
in religion-proper,46 by flows of sacred texts and images, but by a process 
that Latour calls “psychogenesis”—associated with shamans, exorcism, 
psychotropic drugs, and psychoanalysis—and explains as “the exterior 
production of interiorities.” Also, strikingly, no other major religious 
tradition is mentioned in Modes of Existence, his five-hundred-page-plus 
“Anthropology of the Moderns.” Writing as a professed Catholic, Latour 
could not be expected to deal with other faiths in the same manner or 
detail as he deals with Christianity. Nevertheless, readers are likely to 
miss some acknowledgment of the existence of other religious traditions 
and also of their variety, both as observed and as experienced.47
Experience carries a great deal of weight in Modes of Existence. The 
inquiry’s method, “a second empiricism,” is, Latour explains, a developed 
or extreme version of William James’s “radical empiricism”: that is, the 
inclusion of nothing that is not in experience and the exclusion of noth-
ing that is.48 Moreover, the test of the truth of its accounts of Modern 
values is, he tells readers, the accord of those accounts with their own 
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experience. With regard to religion, however, the appeals to experience 
are highly selective and readers may find them otherwise thorny.
Some of the difficulties can be seen in the following passages, in 
which Latour specifies the mode of existence of “religious beings”—that 
is, the beings of Christianity, also identified as “the beings sensitive to the 
Word”—and explains their categorical differences from what he calls “the 
beings of metamorphosis.”
Religious beings … are truly beings; there’s really no reason 
to doubt this. They come from outside, they grip us, dwell 
in us, talk to us, invite us; we address them, pray to them, 
beseech them.
By granting them their own ontological status, we can 
already advance quite far in our respect for experience. We 
shall no longer have to deny thousands of years of testimony; 
we shall no longer need to assert sanctimoniously that all the 
prophets, all the martyrs, all the exegetes, all the faithful have 
“deceived themselves” in “mistaking” for real beings what 
were “in fact nothing but” words or brain waves. …
It appears infinitely simpler, more economical, more ele-
gant, too, to stick to the testimony of the saints, the mystics, 
the confessors, and the faithful, in order to direct our atten-
tion toward that toward which they direct theirs: beings come 
to them and demand that they be instituted by them. But 
these beings have the peculiar feature of appearing to those 
whose souls they overwhelm in saving them. … If we are to 
be empirical, then, these are the ones we must follow. … Like 
the beings of metamorphosis, religious beings belong to a 
genre “susceptible to being turned on and off.” With one dif-
ference: if they appear—and our cities and countrysides are 
still dotted with sanctuaries erected to harbor the emotions 
these apparitions have aroused—they disappear even more 
surely. Moreover, this intermittence has provided the basis for 
mockery, and has been taken as proof of their lack of being …; 
the critical spirit has not held back in this regard. But the big 
advantage of an inquiry into modes of existence is that it can, 
on the contrary, include this feature in the specifications: one 
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of the characteristics of religious beings is that neither their 
appearance nor their disappearance can be controlled. (308-309)
This seems to be saying that the existence of the beings of religion-proper 
is (only) in the particular experiences of those who experience such 
beings and that the reality of their existence is secured by our agree-
ing—out of respect for those experiences—not to question that reality. 
It also seems to be saying that, in spite of evident similarities, the invis-
ible beings proper to Christianity cannot exist in the same manner as the 
invisible beings of other religions because only the former conform to 
what Christianity teaches about such beings.49 The advantage noted here 
(“the big advantage of an inquiry into modes of existence is that it can 
… include this feature in the specifications”) is that the person conduct-
ing such an inquiry can specify as a singular feature of the ontology of 
the beings of his own religion—and, indeed, as a manifestation of their 
autonomous power (that is, to appear and disappear uncontrollably)—
what might otherwise be taken as their compromised reality: that is, the 
nondemonstrability of their existence and the fitfulness of their presence 
even in the experience of the faithful.
There is, clearly, no arguing with the structure or elements of an onto-
logical claim of this kind. Readers not party to the type of stipulative 
logic involved may feel there is something hocus-pocus about it or note 
the apparent self-affirming circularity. Latour, however, defends its ratio-
nality strenuously: “I hope the reader will do me justice on this point: not 
once in this inquiry have I required anyone to give up the most ordinary 
logic; I have only asked that, with the same ordinary reasoning, the same 
natural language, they follow other threads. … [The beings of religion] 
are rational through and through. Like psyches. Like fictions. Like refer-
ences” (307). And, in any case, one may find it hard not to be charmed 
by a universe emptied of “matter” and animated by invisible “beings” 
flitting among souls, sliding among the pages of old books, in company 
with Heathcliff and perhaps Athena, as real as quarks and as reasonable 
as cats or mats.
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VI
If I still dare speak, it’s only because I think I can 
brush aside the shadow that the ways of science once 
cast over the ways of being produced by religion.
—Latour, Rejoicing
Labeled an “inquiry,” Modes of Existence can be seen as Latour’s final 
report on his thirty-year-long comparative investigation of truth-regimes. 
Aspects of the inquiry, however, clearly had foregone conclusions, a num-
ber of which operate as axioms or, in Latour’s term, “pre[-]positions,” that 
is, as proper attitudes taken or given in advance. The sharp distinction 
and mutual incommensurability of the modes of veridiction of science 
and religion appear to be axioms of this kind. As set forth in Modes of 
Existence, these features obtain across the board: all truth-regimes involve 
distinct modes of existence, which themselves involve distinct discursive 
tonalities, interpretive keys, and modes of veridiction. One of the work’s 
central conclusions (or givens), however, is that Moderns have brought 
much unhappiness upon themselves, the rest of humanity, and the rest of 
creation through their confusion of the truth-regimes associated with sci-
ence and religion in particular and through their failure to respect the dif-
ferences between the respective interpretive keys and tonalities of each.
One may agree: there is something tone-deaf in seeking to establish 
the truth of the Annunciation the way one might that of a theory of bio-
logical evolution. One can also see the broad advantages of maintain-
ing a clear distinction between the modes of veridiction associated with 
religions and the natural sciences: it protects visions of the Virgin from 
dismissal in terms of empirical facticity and evidence regarding Jupiter’s 
moons from dismissal in terms of scriptural or ecclesiastical authority. 
Indeed, a strict partition of “science” and “religion” has obvious benefits 
for both, as demonstrated by the recurrent efforts of advocates or defend-
ers of each to establish one.50 Nevertheless, in view of the close, exten-
sive, and formative connections between the development of the mod-
ern Western sciences and the institutions of religion, one must question 
the extent to which their respective discursive tonalities or even truth-
regimes can be distinguished, certainly historically and, in some regards, 
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currently as well.51 And, in view of the exceptionally heterogeneous and 
continuously shifting contents of the packages of ideas, practices, insti-
tutions, and communities that have been and could be assembled under 
each of these terms, “science” as well as “religion” (and the latter even if 
confined to Christianity), one must question the conceptual coherence 
and practical workability of any claim about the fundamental nature of 
either of them or of their relationship.
When Moderns “start talking about the ‘conflict between Science 
and Religion,’” Latour writes, “they act as though it were a matter of 
opposing (or ‘reconciling,’ which is worse) two types of approach: one 
that would give us Matter, the ‘here below,’ the rational, the natural, and 
one that would offer us the spiritual, the beyond, the supernatural, the 
supreme values!” (322). The sort of opposition and/or reconciliation 
Latour describes here is familiar in the idea of “nonoverlapping magiste-
ria,” as proposed by biologist Stephen Jay Gould (1999). In Gould’s divi-
sion, authority over the realm of facts and accounts of the natural world 
is claimed for science while religion is granted authority over the realm of 
values along with instruction in moral conduct. Gould’s apportionment 
of the epistemic and moral universe is endorsed by many scientists, who 
believe they have the best of the bargain, and is also accepted by many 
theologians, happy to be granted clear title to a piece of the territory.52 
Of course, partitions like Gould’s perpetuate what Latour identifies as 
key problematic dualisms of Modern thought: facts and values, matter 
and spirit, nature and culture. But Latour has sought only to challenge 
the terms in which those partitions have been drawn, not their existence 
as such. Few contemporary theorists have been more alert to the prob-
lems of conceptual segregation than Latour or devoted as much energy 
to exposing the dubious divides of Western thought. To the extent, how-
ever, that Modes of Existence depicts “science” and “religion” as distinct 
and counterpoised monoliths, its revisionist ontology, even as it discards 
familiar dualisms or significantly redistributes their traditionally defin-
ing elements, goes some distance toward perpetuating one of the most 
dubious of them.
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VII
I’ve got better things to do than to portray the ups and 
downs of the children of last century: things like altering the 
arrow of progress[,] … giving another meaning to the long 
history of the West, doing away with modernization.
—Latour, Rejoicing
Latour does not claim to be a historian, but his work involves a good bit 
of historiography as well as important theorizing about historicity and 
temporality.53 The Pasteurization of France is, among other things, a his-
tory of the emergence of modern theories of disease; We Have Never Been 
Modern is, of course, a thorough overturning of modernity’s self-flatter-
ing autobiography; Rejoicing relates the successive efforts of Christian 
theologians to meet the successive challenges of rationalism, both classi-
cal and modern; and both Modes of Existence and Facing Gaia involve sig-
nificantly revised versions of major chapters of Western social, political, 
and intellectual history.
The fields and approaches that make up science studies, including 
actor-network theory (ANT), are programmatically anti-whiggish. They 
reject familiar heroic-progressivist narratives of the history of science 
and comparable manifest-destiny accounts of the history of technology. 
Moreover, they tell very different kinds of stories about both. ANT’s 
defining method is the slow, careful tracing of the construction of con-
tingent networks of multiple, heterogeneous, complexly interrelated 
elements. While ANT accounts register practical successes and failures, 
they do not score the ideas and artifacts whose construction they narrate 
as intrinsically grand or foolish, nor do they portray the human agents 
whose efforts they follow as blind or faithful to (the) truth.
In his role of missionary to the Moderns, Latour sets aside this com-
mitment to symmetrical historiography. Seeking to “[alter] the arrow of 
progress,” he flips it around to point backward. Where Latour’s Moderns 
tell of a rise from darkness and superstition through Reason and Science, 
he tells of a fall from unity and faith through the embrace of those very 
(misunderstood) values. His tale is of a community assembled by a sal-
vific message; of the entrance of malign forces offering knowledge and 
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power; of the folly and fumbles of leaders; of a message obscured, a 
people left wandering, and a land in ruin; and of the chance, perhaps, of 
redemption and renewal.54
The tale is old and familiar. To be sure, that is no reason to dismiss 
it. Nevertheless, the idea of the Scientific Revolution and the European 
Enlightenment as catastrophes for humanity is likely to be resisted by 
many of Latour’s academic readers, including—and in spite of their 
shared sense of the ills of modernity—a good number of them in the 
humanities. It is not that such readers endorse familiar celebratory 
accounts. Intellectual, literary, and social historians, along with political 
theorists, are more likely to regard both developments, along with the 
Protestant Reformation, the Industrial Revolution, and other chapters in 
standard histories of modernity, as very mixed bags with very complex 
and variously operating ingredients. It is, rather, that they have learned 
to be skeptical of myths of a Fall, whether into Technology, Commerce, 
Individualism, or Fragmentation, and also of moralized histories, whether 
triumphal or nostalgic.55 Many of us are inclined to see not only the twen-
tieth century but also the past two millennia and perhaps the entire his-
tory of humanity as a long series of, precisely, “ups and downs”: of local 
gains and losses, dominances and defeats; of emergences and extinctions 
both large and small; but not of globally grand triumphs and/or great 
botches, in either order. And many of us find the idea of modernity, or 
“the secular age,” or any age, as a “parenthesis” in human history (Latour 
2004, 234)—as if an interruption or aberration—very peculiar. “But, of 
course!” Latour might exclaim. “That is because you are Moderns—or 
worse, Postmoderns!”
It is true: many of us are, to various extents, one or the other of these 
or both of them. Insofar as we are, even as we appreciate and appropri-
ate Latour’s work around the clock, we will be troubled and more or 
less alienated by an image of the West in which critical thought is cast 
as the enemy of the ways to truth and the fools and knaves of intellec-
tual history are named Galileo, Hume, Kant, Voltaire, Émile Durkheim, 
Sigmund Freud, and Jacques Derrida.
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VIII
Psychology is to the subject what epistemology is to 
the object. One must be countered as forcefully as 
the other in order for experience to be tracked.
—Latour, Modes of Existence
In spite of the homage that he pays to William James, Latour rejects the 
relevance of psychology to the understanding of experience, including 
religious experience.56 The field or, rather, fields of psychology (there are, 
of course, many specializations and variants) have a lot to answer for in 
the way of simplistic accounts of, among other things, the nature, sources, 
and effects of religious beliefs and experiences. There are, however, 
quarters of those fields where the assumptions of classic epistemology 
are rejected as strenuously as Latour rejects them (and for many of the 
same reasons) and where questions of subjects, psyches, and persons are 
approached in ways that accord closely with his own elaborated views of 
them. The relevant approaches, called, variously, “nonrepresentational,” 
“ecological,” “embodied,” or “enactive,” also suggest ways to understand 
beliefs—religious, scientific, and other—that do justice to their complex 
phenomenological dynamics.57
Latour is comparably insistent that the religious mode of existence, 
and religion as such (or at least Christianity), cannot be approached by 
the social sciences more generally:
There is a risk, obviously, that [the] requirement to treat 
religion rationally will be mistaken for a return to the criti-
cal spirit, that is, to the good old “good sense” of the social 
sciences. But it should be clear by now that we can expect 
nothing at all from the “social explanation” of religion, which 
would amount to losing the thread of the salvation-bearers 
by breaking it and replacing it with another, while seeking to 
prove that “behind” religion there is, for example, “society,” 
“carefully concealed” but “reversed” and “disguised.” Such 
an “explanation” would amount to losing religion. … There 
is nothing “behind” religion … since each mode is its own 
explanation, complete in its kind. (Modes of Existence, 307)
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But, of course, religion, religious experience, and the related operations 
of mediation that Latour describes in ontological terms can be and have 
been described otherwise, by no means always either reductively or criti-
cally. Ethnologically and historically informed accounts of religious ideas, 
practices, and institutions, Christian and other, along with subtle explo-
rations of religious subjectivities, have been produced for more than a 
century by anthropologists, classicists, and other scholars of religion who 
have shown no interest in exposing anything “behind” the objects of their 
study or inclination to mock anything within them.
If Latour makes little use of these accounts, it is not because he 
is unaware of them. It is because they are irrelevant to what he has 
taken to be his task. For Latour, to “speak well” of religion—that is, of 
Christianity—is to speak of it religiously, which means in its traditional 
scriptural, theological, and homiletic idioms and not otherwise. The pro-
priety or cordiality required here is less a matter of language than of atti-
tude and, indeed, of attachment. The attitudes and attachments of a per-
son of faith occupying the role of communicant or theological apologist 
are crucially different from those of a scholar of religion comparing prac-
tices from Papua New Guinea to Vatican City (though they may, in fact, 
be the same person). Emic and etic, inside and outside, the experienced 
and the observed: the differences between them cannot be bridged; they 
can only be finessed. This, the “hard problem” of the philosophical tra-
dition, is also the hard problem of anthropotheological diplomacy.58 As 
simultaneously anthropologist of and missionary to the Moderns, Latour 
has attempted to solve or negotiate it by forging an original idiom—a 
way of speaking—that joins compelling evocations of religious experi-
ence to passionate theorizing in the service of a prophetic summons to 
worldwide conversion. There is good reason to think the mission will 
fail. What has been constructed along the way, however, will reward our 
exploration for some time to come.
Chapter Five
What Was “Close Reading”?: A Century 
of Method in Literary Studies
This chapter originated as a talk to a group of young digital humanities 
scholars seeking to learn about the history of methods in the humani-
ties. I am not a historian by profession and it is not my usual role, but 
I attempt here to mobilize my sixty years in and around the literary 
academy to address a double question: how did “close reading” figure 
in Anglo-American literary studies over the course of the past century, 
and how does it figure now in the discourses of the digital humanities? At 
the end, I offer some general reflections on methods, past and possibly 
future, in literary studies.
I
Close reading, it has been said, is the “primary methodology” of literary 
studies ( Jockers 2013, 6). That is true in a sense, but the term methodol-
ogy suggests something more coherent, circumscribed, and specifically 
research-focused than has been the case here. Reading individual texts 
with attention to their linguistic features and rhetorical operations is very 
different, of course, from subjecting large bodies of digitized materials 
to the sorts of computational processes now wittily (and mischievously) 
called “distant reading.” But the term close reading has been used to name 
some very diverse activities: from a New Critic unraveling Shakespearian 
puns in the 1930s to a Marxist scholar exposing the political unconscious 
of Victorian novels in the 1980s or, today, a first-grader “analyzing” a 
book by Dr. Seuss in accord with the directives of the American national 
Common Core Curriculum.
If not quite a methodology, however, the practices of close read-
ing have certainly been a persistent feature of Anglo-American literary 
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studies. Indeed, their ongoing performance may be the one constant 
in a field notorious for its succession of new “approaches.” The parade 
is familiar from textbook rubrics: the old historical philology followed 
by the New Criticism, structuralism, reader-response criticism, New 
Historicism, feminist criticism, deconstruction, cultural studies, ideology 
critique, and so forth, with many others in between. Almost any parade 
becomes comical when it goes on long enough, and the succession of 
approaches in literary studies has been seen as showing the futility of all 
of them. There is good reason to reject that view, as I shall suggest below. 
But the point I want to stress here is that, for all the shifts they reflect, 
every one of the approaches just named—from the New Criticism, and 
indeed from the old historical philology, through deconstruction, to 
ideology critique—involved reading individual texts closely. The texts 
varied from presumed literary masterpieces to works of popular culture 
and documents of manifest oppression; the discourses that directed 
their examination varied from Christian humanism to structuralist lin-
guistics to queer theory; and the spirit in which they were examined var-
ied from the appreciative to the disinterested to the deeply suspicious. 
Nevertheless, throughout the twentieth century, whatever the mood, 
motive, or materials, if one was teaching literature or doing literary criti-
cism in the Anglo-American literary academy, one was likely to be read-
ing at least some individual texts closely.
If, as seems to be the case, the practices of close reading have operated 
in literary studies not as one method among others but as virtually defini-
tive of the field, then how are we to understand a method whose advo-
cates define it in opposition to—and, indeed, as superseding—precisely 
those practices? Depending on one’s perspective, the ascendance of “dis-
tant reading” can be seen as marking the dissolution of literary studies, 
at least as a humanities discipline (see, for example, Kirsch 2014), or as 
the proper elevation of the field into computational posthumanism. In 
arguments defending either of these two opposed views, invocations of 
“close reading”—celebratory or derogatory—are a recurrent ploy. I con-
sider some of these invocations below. First, however, a bit of history will 
be instructive.
68 Chapter Five
II
The term close reading refers not only to an activity with regard to texts 
but also to a type of text itself: a technically informed, fine-grained anal-
ysis of some piece of writing, usually in connection with some broader 
question of interest. The practice has multiple ancestors, including clas-
sical rhetorical analysis, biblical exegesis, and legal interpretation, and it 
also has some cousins, such as iconology and psychoanalysis. All of these 
would have been familiar to the small group of accomplished British dons 
and poets whose efforts to reform literary study in the 1920s and 1930s 
came to be called “the New Criticism” and whose critical essays served as 
models for the practices that came to be called “close reading.”
In its time, the New Criticism was young, cool, and radical. I. A. 
Richards was a beginning instructor at Cambridge University when he 
assigned the classroom exercises in poetry reading that led to his influ-
ential book Practical Criticism, published in 1929. William Empson, a 
student of Richards, was twenty-three when he wrote Seven Types of 
Ambiguity (1947), which became a paradigm of virtuoso close reading 
for several generations. T. S. Eliot’s Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and 
Criticism, published in 1920, excoriated dull scholarship from a position 
of confident connoisseurship and set the standard for high-toned literary 
discriminations.
The views and practices of this group were introduced to American 
readers in the 1930s by the southern poet and critic John Crowe Ransom, 
and they were taken up with particular enthusiasm by two of his stu-
dents, Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, originally at Vanderbilt, 
later at Yale. Brooks and Warren’s coauthored textbook, Understanding 
Poetry, first published in 1938, was immensely influential. By the time a 
second edition appeared in 1950, it was being assigned in more than 250 
colleges and universities in the United States (Davis 2011). Its chapter 
titles—“Structure,” “Tension,” “Irony,” “Imagery,” “Rhythm,” “Tone”—
are the familiar obsessions of New Critical close readings, and its large 
collection of examples and “texts for further study” weighed heavily in 
the academic canon for decades afterward: Shakespeare’s sonnets, Keats’s 
odes, works by Browning, Tennyson, and Gerard Manley Hopkins, and 
modernist works by, among others, Ezra Pound, Elizabeth Bishop, and 
William Carlos Williams.
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 The New Criticism was promoted as a corrective for the pedantries 
of early twentieth-century literary scholarship. But the practices of close 
reading themselves were promoted as a specifically pedagogical remedy 
for what were seen as the inadequacies of college students: young men 
(almost exclusively—we are speaking of the 1920s and 1930s) who, in 
Brooks’ words, “actually approached Keats’s Ode to a Nightingale in the 
same spirit and with the same expectations with which they approached 
an editorial in the local county newspaper or an advertisement in the cur-
rent Sears, Roebuck catalogue” (1979, 593).59 Indeed, the popularity and 
persistence of those practices have often been attributed, not altogether 
unjustly, to their handiness for teachers. Some forty years after the pub-
lication of Understanding Poetry, Hugh Kenner, a learned critic of mod-
ernist poetry, remarked: “The curious thing is how a classroom strategy 
could come to mistake itself for a critical discipline” (1976, 36; cited by 
Brooks 1995, 84). Kenner was being snide, of course, but the association 
of close reading with pedagogy—as distinct from learned criticism—
persisted through much of the century.
To return to the history: Before the New Criticism, in the first quarter 
of the century, the study of literature consisted largely of the production, 
transmission, and acquisition of facts about sets of texts. What one estab-
lished as a scholar, imparted as a teacher, and learned as a student were 
commonly the names of historically important authors and some basic 
facts about their lives; the titles, publication dates, and sources—espe-
cially classical—of their major works; relations of influence among them; 
and the readily observable features that distinguished forms, styles, and 
genres (the medieval romance, the Petrarchan sonnet, the Jacobean 
drama, and so forth). One could say that, before the New Criticism, liter-
ary study was “distant reading” with a vengeance. With the work of the 
New Critics, it moved increasingly from filling library shelves with schol-
arly editions and literary histories to studying and describing how indi-
vidual texts produced the effects that gave them historical importance or 
current interest.
Against the historians and philologists, who treated literary texts as 
dusty achievements, the New Critics stressed literature as art.60 A poem, 
wrote Ransom, is a “living object” (1937, 601). As poets and wordsmiths 
themselves, they were interested in the craft of text making. As men of 
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letters (Cambridge, Vanderbilt, Yale) and, in increasing numbers since 
the 1960s, literary women (the earliest included poet Josephine Miles at 
Berkeley), they were appreciators of aesthetic effects. Though close read-
ing is often described as a method of interpretation, the New Critics—
certainly the first generation of them—were concerned less with estab-
lishing the meaning of a text than with understanding its operative 
machinery. Indeed, a New Critical “reading” was something like an exer-
cise in reverse engineering: the examination of an artifact to see how it 
was made and how it worked.
The aims and spirit of the New Criticism are well represented in an 
inaugural piece by Ransom, published in 1937, titled “Criticism, Inc.” 
He explains the title: “Professors of literature are learned but not criti-
cal men. … Nevertheless it is from the professors of literature … that I 
should hope eventually for the erection of intelligent standards of criti-
cism. It is their business. … Perhaps I use a distasteful figure, but I have 
the idea that what we need is Criticism, Inc., or Criticism, Ltd” (587–88). 
The “figure” or metaphor—literary studies as a business—would have 
been “distasteful” because literary academics understood that art and let-
ters were remote from commerce. That shared understanding, and the 
shared antagonism to Big Business and Big Industry, created a bond and 
otherwise strange fellowship between the conservative southern poets 
and the left-wing New York intellectuals who, in the 1940s and 1950s, 
were the major advocates and practitioners of the New Criticism in the 
United States.
Ransom, referring in the essay to the relation between historical 
scholarship and criticism, is clear about which should be up front and on 
top: “Behind appreciation … is historical scholarship. It is indispensable. 
But it is instrumental and cannot be the end itself. In this respect histori-
cal studies have the same standing as linguistic studies [that is, philol-
ogy]: language and history are aids” (595). He also makes explicit the 
New Critics’ pedagogical mission: “The students of the future must be 
permitted to study literature, and not merely about literature. But I think 
this is what the good students have always wanted to do. The wonder is 
that they have allowed themselves so long to be denied” (588).
Only toward the end of the essay does Ransom say what the new 
forms of literary study would consist in, and then in just a few phrases: 
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“They would be technical studies of poetry[;] for instance, [in a particu-
lar poem] … if they treated its metric; its inversions …; its tropes; its 
fictions, or inventions by which it secures ‘aesthetic distance’ …; or any 
other devices, on the general understanding that any systematic usage 
which does not hold good for prose is a poetic device” (600). This is fol-
lowed by a bit of New Critical mystery mongering:
The critic should regard the poem as nothing short of a des-
perate ontological or metaphysical manoeuvre. … [The] 
poem celebrates the object which is real, individual, and qual-
itatively infinite. [The critic] knows that his practical interests 
will reduce this living object to a mere utility, and that his 
sciences will disintegrate it for their convenience into their 
respective abstracts. The poet wishes to defend his object’s 
existence against its enemies, and the critic wishes to know 
what he is doing, and how. (601)
As I said: rather like reverse engineering.
It was often recalled that Ransom, like Richards before him, had sum-
moned criticism to be more “scientific,” but his meaning and aim were 
often misunderstood. Here is the passage:
Criticism must become more scientific, or precise and sys-
tematic, and this means that it must be developed by the col-
lective and sustained effort of learned persons—which means 
that its proper seat is in the universities. … It will never be a 
very exact science, or even a nearly exact one. But neither will 
psychology, if that term continues to refer to psychic rather 
than physical phenomena; nor will sociology …; nor even 
will economics. It does not matter whether we call them sci-
ences or just systematic studies. …The[y] … have immeasur-
ably improved in understanding since they were taken over by 
the universities, and the same career looks possible for criti-
cism. (Ransom 1937, 587–88)
As I think is clear, Ransom was not seeking to make literary criticism sci-
entific in the positivist sense of the era. What he sought, rather, was to 
move it from the margins of the field to the center and to claim for its 
practitioners a form of technical expertise that elevated its status from 
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an occasional pursuit to a duly accredited and properly housed academic 
program. If that sounds like what promoters of the digital humanities are 
seeking today, both for themselves and for the practices of “distant read-
ing,” then it is very much to the point here, with all the historical ironies 
that doubling involves.
Other doublings and ironies are apparent in the hostile reactions that 
greeted the New Criticism. Such reactions came, as Ransom anticipated, 
from “the present incumbents of the professorial chairs,” who, he wrote 
derisively, “spend a lifetime in compiling the data of literature and yet 
rarely or never commit to a literary judgment” (587). A notable counter-
polemic appeared in 1949 in the pages of PMLA. Its author was Douglas 
Bush, an eminent Shakespeare scholar at Harvard. Its self-consciously 
conservative title was “The New Criticism: Some Old-Fashioned 
Queries.” Bush writes: “The new criticism, the offspring of Mr. Richards 
and Mr. Eliot, has carried the marks of a mixed heredity. … [Their] close 
reading of poetry has braced the flaccid sinews of this generation of read-
ers and has had some highly beneficial effects upon teaching and writing 
… . But … a scholar-historian may not be disposed to grant all its claims 
and assumptions” (13). The grudging concessions and sense of strained 
dignity are familiar in the responses of upstaged eminences. By the late 
1940s the hold of the old historicism had been effectively shaken, the 
literary academy was an increasingly lively place, and Bush could speak 
ruefully but accurately of the New Critics’ “tone of conscious superior-
ity” (14). After chiding Ransom and others for gaffes reflecting their sup-
posed ignorance of history, he goes on to charge them with leaving ordi-
nary readers out in the cold: “The common reader might go so far as to 
think that poetry deals with life …. However valuable the processes and 
results of the new criticism, for some readers its preoccupation with tech-
nique, its aloof intellectuality, its fear of emotion and action, its avoidance 
of moral values, … all this suggests the dangers of a timid aestheticism” 
(20). Bush concludes his essay with a bit of table-turning: the charge—
or, rather, countercharge—of scientism: “Since poetry does after all 
deal with experience, the most fastidious critics have to touch on it [;] 
yet they may give the impression that they are looking, not at human 
beings, but at specimens mounted on slides. Indeed, though the critics 
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have censured scholarship for aping science, their own aims and methods 
seem much more deserving of the charge” (20).
Much of this is quaint but also, I think, remarkably recognizable. 
Virtually the same set of general claims and charges were rehearsed 
throughout the century, irrespective of the methods at issue and, indeed, 
irrespective of which side was being taken, revolutionary or counterrevo-
lutionary. Thirty or forty years later, the same resentful tones would be 
heard from the New Critics themselves, no longer young, or cool, or radi-
cal and now upstaged by deconstruction and what they called “high the-
ory.” Ransom’s reference to the vested interests of incumbent professors; 
the charge of elitism in Bush’s invocation of “the common reader”; the 
exchanged charges of hyper-formalism (or “aestheticism”) and scientism: 
these would all recur in the “theory wars” of the 1970s and 1980s, in the 
“canon wars” of the 1980s and 1990s, and, like much else in both these 
essays, in current polemics around the digital humanities. It looks like a 
pattern. It may even be a law of history. It is time to turn to Franco Moretti 
and the twenty-first century.
III
It was Moretti, of course, who broached the idea that literary studies 
would benefit from a turn away from close reading to a new set of prac-
tices that could be called “distant reading.” The key passage appears 
in an essay titled “Conjectures on World Literature,” originally pub-
lished in 2000:
The trouble with close reading (in all of its incarnations, from 
the new criticism to deconstruction) is that it necessarily 
depends on an extremely small canon …. And if you want to 
look beyond the canon … close reading will not do it. It’s not 
designed to do it, it’s designed to do the opposite. At bottom, 
it’s a theological exercise—very solemn treatment of very few 
texts taken very seriously—whereas what we really need is a 
little pact with the devil: we know how to read texts, now let’s 
learn how not to read them. Distant reading: where distance, 
let me repeat it, is a condition of knowledge: it allows you to 
focus on units that are much smaller or much larger than the 
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text: devices, themes, tropes—or genres and systems. And if, 
between the very small and the very large, the text itself disap-
pears, well, it is one of those cases when one can justifiably 
say, Less is more. If we want to understand the system in its 
entirety, we must accept losing something. We always pay a 
price for theoretical knowledge: reality is infinitely rich; con-
cepts are abstract, are poor. But it’s precisely this “poverty” 
that makes it possible to handle them, and therefore to know. 
This is why less is actually more. (Moretti 2000, 57–58)
The rhetoric is neat; the argument is bold; and several strong themes and 
claims echo in current arguments promoting the digital humanities. One 
is the theme of scale: the association of “close reading” with a few small 
things. Another is knowledge: the summons to literary critics and schol-
ars to dare “to know,” to produce more abstract, theoretical, and com-
prehensive knowledge. A third, the most consequential in institutional 
terms, is less is more: the suggestion that, for literary studies to operate as 
a field of genuine knowledge production, scholars must sacrifice some-
thing: their interest in “the text itself ” and the centrality of close reading 
to their practices.
The themes of scale and less-is-more are sounded, less playfully, in 
an article by Matthew Wilkens titled “Canons, Close Reading, and the 
Evolution of Method” (2011). Wilkens sees literary canons as a product 
of the practices of close reading and also as something like a moral prob-
lem—a matter of injustice to the excluded—as well as a methodological 
one. He writes: “What little we do read is deeply nonrepresentative of 
the full field of literary and cultural production, as critics of our existing 
canons have rightly observed for decades …. So canons … are an enor-
mous problem, one that follows from our single working method as lit-
erary scholars—that is, from the need to perform always and only close 
reading as a means of cultural analysis” (251). His solution is clear: “We 
need to do less close reading and more of anything and everything else 
that might help us extract information from and about texts as indicators 
of larger cultural issues” (251). After describing a computational study 
and the benefits of algorithmic methods, Wilkens concludes: “This [i.e., 
the turn to such methods] will hurt, but it will also result in categori-
cally better, more broadly based, more inclusive, and finally more useful 
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humanities scholarship” (257). The words are earnest, but the argument 
is dubious. Close reading is by no means the only working method of lit-
erary scholars. Moreover, while literary canons—that is, the works most 
widely celebrated and referenced in the culture, most regularly assigned 
in literature classes, and most frequently discussed in professional jour-
nals—commonly reflect, among other things, the tastes and interests 
of the professoriate, they are not determined by the reading practices of 
scholars. Most significantly, the mere existence of a literary canon places 
no limit on the number, the type, or the cultural status of the texts avail-
able for study, whether as cultural indicators or as anything else.
There are also the simple facts of the matter. As literary studies have 
been pursued under the auspices of structuralism, semiotics, New 
Historicism, deconstruction, feminism, critical race theory, postcolo-
nial criticism, and queer theory, the types and cultural status of the texts 
examined by literary scholars and read closely in their classrooms have 
continuously expanded. Those “texts” now include writings of every 
form and provenance, whether currently admired or reviled and whether 
currently read or unread; and they can in principle (and often do in fact) 
include any inscription, or image, or artifact whatsoever. Wilkens sug-
gests that less close reading of individual texts and more computational 
studies of large bodies of texts will somehow address the other “problem 
of the canon,” by which he presumably means the past snubbing of popu-
lar writings and of works by women and members of minority groups. 
But if the offense is that many worthy or interesting texts remain unread 
because of past biases, then what is wanted, surely, is to have those texts 
read, not just counted. Wilkens seeks to promote research methods that 
he sees as undervalued in literary studies. The aim is commendable but 
his arguments do not serve it well.
The themes of scale and knowledge in Moretti’s piece also recur in a 
book by Matthew Jockers titled Macroanalysis: Digital Methods and 
Literary History (2013). Jockers is explicit in associating desirable epis-
temic aims with the aims of science and proper research methods with 
the methods used by scientists. “The goal of science,” he writes (he adds 
“we hope”), “is to develop the best possible explanation for some phe-
nomenon. This is done via a careful and exhaustive gathering of evidence 
…. Literary studies should strive for a similar goal” (5–6). Like science, 
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he continues, literary studies should seek the best methods available for 
gathering evidence and, again like science, should welcome big data and 
scale its methods accordingly.
It was Jockers’ description of close reading as a “methodology” that 
I cited earlier. Here is the passage I was quoting: “The study of literature 
relies upon careful observation, the sustained, concentrated reading of 
text. This, our primary methodology, is ‘close reading.’ Science has a meth-
odological advantage in the use of experimentation. Experimentation 
offers a method through which competing observations and conclusions 
may be tested and ruled out …. We are highly invested in interpretations, 
and it is very difficult to ‘rule out’ an interpretation” (6). Granting the 
value of literary interpretation in some regards, Jockers continues: “But 
interpretation is fueled by observation, and as a method of evidence 
gathering, observation … is flawed. Despite all their efforts to repress 
them, researchers will have irrepressible biases …. Observation is flawed 
in the same way that generalization from the specific is flawed: … the 
selection of the sample is always something less than perfect, and so the 
observed results are likewise imperfect” (6–7). Jockers believes that big 
data is solving these problems in the sciences. He writes: “Big data are 
fundamentally altering the way that much science and social science get 
done …. [M]any areas of research are no longer dependent upon con-
trolled, artificial experiments or upon observations derived from data 
sampling” (7). And, he argues, big data should change the game in liter-
ary studies as well:
Back in the 1990s, gathering literary evidence meant reading 
books, noting “things” (a phallic symbol here, a biblical refer-
ence there, a stylistic flourish, an allusion, and so on) and then 
interpreting: making sense and arguments out of those obser-
vations. Today, in the age of digital libraries and large-scale 
book-digitization projects, the nature of the “evidence” avail-
able to us has changed, radically …. [M]assive digital corpora 
offer us unprecedented access to the literary record and invite, 
even demand, a new type of evidence gathering and mean-
ing making. The literary scholar of the twenty-first century 
can no longer be content with anecdotal evidence, with a few 
random “things” gathered from a few, even “representative,” 
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texts. … Like it or not, today’s literary-historical scholar can 
no longer risk being just a close reader: the sheer quantity of 
available data makes the traditional practice of close reading 
untenable as an exhaustive or definitive method of evidence 
gathering. (8–9)
There is much to query here, about Jockers’ view of science as well as of 
literary studies, but I will focus on a few central points. First, gathering 
evidence for claims is not a good way to describe research in most scien-
tific fields, and generating interpretations by reading books and noting 
things randomly and foolishly is a singularly bad way to describe what 
literary scholars did in the 1990s or at any other time. More significantly 
here, close reading never figured in literary studies as a “definitive,” much 
less “exhaustive,” way to gather evidence. In the case of a critical study 
focused on the thought, style, or achievement of one or more particular 
authors, the close reading of texts written by those authors would have 
to be central to any claims made. But even there, and certainly where 
broader historical or cultural claims are involved, it would be remark-
able for a literary scholar not to consult and invoke other documents and 
other types of data. The digital library is exceedingly handy for accessing 
such materials, but scholars’ shelves have not been otherwise empty up 
to now. Jockers is saying that literary historians “can no longer risk being” 
something that they never have been: that is, “just close readers.”
Second, the fact that some way of doing things is now possible does 
not make it necessary, as in Jockers’ term “demand.” Where big data is 
pertinent and computational processing would be useful, literary schol-
ars should take advantage of both. But there is no research imperative 
built into the size of some potential data set. New methods enable new 
questions to be posed and old answers to be sharpened or corrected. But 
in any field of knowledge production, significant questions come out of 
ongoing interests and problems, not usually just methods as such. Digital 
libraries and powerful search engines have already become research tools 
for most literary scholars. Those who are still in a cave on these mat-
ters are well advised to become familiar with such resources and with 
the types of projects they enable. It is understandable that those already 
working on such projects would want to urge others to explore such 
resources as possible avenues to interesting new research for themselves. 
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But Jockers seems to be urging or cautioning more than that in his “like it 
or not” address to his colleagues. What people in literary studies are apt 
to hear him saying is that the existence of those “massive digital corpora” 
has made their current way of doing things inappropriate, impractical, 
and “untenable” and that they should be doing instead what he does.
A third point is important here. Jockers suggests that computational 
methods and big data allow researchers to avoid or mitigate the subjec-
tivity and bias built into human observation and also what he calls the 
“flaw” of generalizing from less than exhaustive data sets. But the idea or 
ideal of objective observation, like that of complete data sets (in effect, 
inspecting every swan before concluding anything about the color of 
swans), has been effectively challenged by a century of empirical and the-
oretical work in the history, sociology, and philosophy of science. Jockers 
is not alone among contemporary literary scholars in his enthusiasm for, 
but rather old-fashioned view of, “science.” (The persistent singular sug-
gests a dubious conception of these heterogeneous practices as some-
thing monolithic.) For all the talk of “paradigm shifts” among digital 
humanists, literary Darwinists, and advocates of cognitive cultural stud-
ies, the notion of science to which they appeal tends to be fundamentally 
pre-Kuhnian.61
My allusion is, of course, to Thomas Kuhn, whose account of para-
digm shifts in the history of chemistry and physics challenged simple pro-
gressivist views of how the natural sciences develop (Kuhn 1962). Even 
more pertinent here, however, is Paul Feyerabend’s once scandalous, 
now celebrated, volume, published in 1975, titled Against Method. To the 
central question posed by philosophers of science—what method leads 
scientists to new discoveries and successful theories?—the prevailing 
answer was Karl Popper’s “conjectures and refutations,” or the so-called 
hypothetico-deductive method (Popper 1962).62 Feyerabend’s answer 
was, Anything goes! Contrary to outraged misreadings of his argument, he 
was saying not that scientists are capricious but that they are inventive, 
resourceful, and opportunistic (his examples included Galileo, Newton, 
and Einstein). Feyerabend’s major point in Against Method is that there 
are no rules for success in science: that is, no specifiable, generalizable way 
to make discoveries or to produce persuasive, useable theories. The trou-
ble with telling literary scholars to be “like scientists” in their methods 
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is not that it is scientistic (though it is that as well) but that it tells them 
nothing in particular.
Jockers’ worries over the methods used in literary studies are largely 
misplaced. The fact that a critic’s interpretation is based in part on his or 
her observations as an individual reader does not compromise the inter-
est or usefulness of that interpretation. The same is true of a scholar’s his-
torical account or theoretical claim. Of course that individuality—and 
inevitable, but not necessarily pernicious, bias—leaves the interpreta-
tion, claim, or account open to dispute by other readers or scholars. At 
the same time, however, the grounding in personal observation and expe-
rience opens the possibility of shareable insights and of connection to 
shareable experiences, which—largely, if not wholly—is what motivates 
our interest in a literary interpretation as such. And, along with connec-
tions to broader intellectual issues and other concerns, that grounding 
and that attendant possibility—of shareable insights and of connection 
to shareable experiences—are also what sustain the value of much his-
torical and theoretical research in the humanities as such.
There is a long story to tell—longer than proper to claim space for 
here—about the differences of epistemic aim, achievement, and value in 
the humanities and the sciences.63 But it is clear, I think, that a central 
question here is whether scholarly and critical methods in literary studies 
are properly assessed by reference to research methods in a field like geol-
ogy—the specific science that Jockers invokes in an opening anecdote as 
having led, during a dinner conversation with a representative scientist, to 
his embarrassment at being unable to defend the ways in which research 
was done in his own field. More use of big data or computer algorithms by 
literary scholars will not solve the methodological problems that Jockers 
sees in literary studies. The problems, if that is what they are, are built into 
standard scholarly practice in the field, the legacy of classical humanistic 
practices reinforced by various contemporary approaches. The only way 
to end the embarrassment at what literary critics and literary historians 
do would be to persuade them to do something else instead, something 
more like social science research. That seems, in fact, to be what Moretti 
proposes in the name of “distant reading” and what Wilkens, Jockers, and 
others are promoting in the name of “digital humanities”: not, perhaps, to 
cease doing traditional literary study altogether but to start doing less of 
80 Chapter Five
it and to do more research in which the data consist of large numbers of 
texts and the questions asked and answered are independent of the inter-
est—literary or otherwise—of any of those texts.
Less is more: perhaps. Moretti calls the exchange he proposes—less 
close reading for more genuine knowledge—“a little pact with the devil.” 
Pacts with the devil, even what look like little ones, deserve scrutiny. 
Famously, one ends up getting less than one bargained for and losing 
more than one thought.
Moretti is right to describe close reading as “a theological exercise”; 
not, however, in the sense, as he suggests, of the reverential examination 
of a text but in the sense of an expansive commentary on one. In liter-
ary studies, a close reading, whether in a classroom or a journal article, is 
typically the occasion for more general observations and often for quite 
wide-ranging reflections. They may be observations about the style or 
genre of the text at hand, or about its author, or reflections on the era in 
which it was written. But they are often observations and reflections—
more or less subtle, more or less original—about related human circum-
stances and experiences. And even when not especially subtle or origi-
nal, they can afford some insight into, and a sense of connection with, 
the circumstances and experiences of people who are otherwise remote. 
Contrary to charges raised across the years, the practices promoted by 
the New Criticism did not require that readers “forget history” or “ignore 
the outside world.” Full-dress close readings, now as ever, can be showy 
or strained. They can also be dim, thin, derivative, or pedestrian and, 
when motivated by a history of injury, sulky or venomous. But now as 
ever, they can offer those who hear or read them potentially illuminating 
engagements with regions of language, thought, and experience not oth-
erwise commonly encountered.
“Close reading” makes a neat contrast to “distant reading,” but not 
a pertinent one for promoting the value of computational methods for 
literary studies. My final example here is a pair of short passages in a 
coauthored book titled Digital_Humanities. Referring to the tools nec-
essary “to thoughtfully and meaningfully sift through, analyze, visualize, 
map and evaluate the deluge of data … the digital age has unleashed,” 
the authors write: “One way of navigating this process is through distant 
reading: a form of analysis that focuses on larger units. It is a term that 
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is specifically arrayed against the deep hermeneutics of extracting mean-
ing from a text through ever-closer, microscopic readings” (Burdick et al 
2012, 39). A page later, they amplify this: “Close reading has its roots in 
the philological traditions of the humanities, but for more than a genera-
tion has often been equated with deep hermeneutics and exegesis, tech-
niques in which interpretations are ‘excavated’ from a text through ever-
closer readings of textual evidence, references, word choices, semantics, 
and registers” (40).
Both descriptions are awkwardly phrased, perhaps reflecting ideas 
inserted at various times by each of the five authors who collaborated in 
its production. But especially notable, I think, is the oddness of some of 
the language used to describe the activities associated with close reading. 
We generally speak of inferring or identifying meanings and of offering or 
suggesting interpretations, not of “extracting” or “excavating” them like 
teeth, oil, or corpses. Also odd are the phrases “ever-closer” and “ever-
closer, microscopic.” Close reading often involves attention to features 
such as word choice or, in connection with rhyme or alliteration, indi-
vidual sounds or letters. But there is nothing like a microscope lens being 
focused “ever-closer,” as if obsessively or maniacally. Like the rather vio-
lent “extract” or the creepy “excavate,” 64 such language makes the prac-
tices so described sound distinctly unpleasant, rather unnatural, and cer-
tainly very alien.
More significantly here and contrary to the contrast being drawn, 
attention to microfeatures does not distinguish the practices of close 
reading from those of distant reading or the digital humanities. We 
recall Moretti’s inaugural description: “Distant reading … allows you to 
focus on units that are much smaller or much larger than the text: devices, 
themes, tropes—or genres and systems” (emphasis added). And in fact, 
the tagging and counting of very small textual units figures centrally in 
many digital humanities projects, including studies by Moretti himself.
For example, in an article titled “Style, Inc. Reflections on Seven 
Thousand Titles (British Novels, 1740–1850)” (2009), Moretti displays 
the results of a study correlating the length, grammatical structure, and 
other features of those seven thousand titles with the number of nov-
els published in each decade. He goes on to note historical trends in 
the occurrence of those features, including, in the later decades, when 
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increasing numbers of novels flooded the market, the use of the indefinite 
article (a) versus the definite article (the). This differential usage, he sug-
gests, as in the titles A Mummer’s Wife versus The Infidel Father, signaled to 
prospective consumers that a particular novel offered, respectively, either 
a progressive or a conservative point of view on social developments. 
Moretti elaborates the suggestion with considerable subtlety (noting, for 
example, that a is unrestricted and leaves the future open, whereas the is 
restricted and grammatically oriented to the past) and teases out the con-
notations of other microfeatures of those titles in an analysis that might 
have left Empson gasping with admiration.
Of course, Moretti’s interpretation of the data he has gathered can be 
challenged. His account of the implications of a and the is based at least in 
part on his subjective observations, here as a practiced reader and writer 
of the English language, and different explanations of the historical trends 
he identifies could be and have been offered.65 What is significant for the 
present argument is, first, that that would be true, mutatis mutandis, of 
the interpretation of the results of a study in any field, whatever the size 
of the data and however rigorous the computations: that is, the ground-
ing of the interpretation in the inevitably limited observations of an indi-
vidual human being. But, second, as I noted above, that kind of ground-
ing is also what makes an interpretation potentially compelling and gives 
it interest for, and appropriability by, fellow human beings. You could see 
it as an exchange: less putative (and, I would say, spurious) objectivity for 
more actual interest and usefulness. A pretty good bargain, I think.
The law of literary history that Moretti discovers (or corroborates or 
illustrates) in the Critical Inquiry article is that stylistic features of liter-
ary texts—titles, in this case—reflect market forces. Hence the “Inc.” in 
his own title, “Style, Inc.,” which recalls the title of John Crowe Ransom’s 
essay, “Criticism, Inc.,” and may involve a glancing allusion. Ransom, 
we remember, was suggesting that criticism is the proper “business” of 
literary studies, and he noted that his readers might find the term “dis-
tasteful.” Contrary to the old genteel-humanist view of art and letters 
as definitively remote from commerce, Moretti is suggesting that litera-
ture is a business like everything else. He means it provocatively, but his 
Critical Inquiry readers are not likely to find the association of art or let-
ters with the market either distasteful or surprising. It has been some 
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years—nearly a century—since literary studies was the “solemn treat-
ment of very few texts.”
IV
If you live a long time, you accumulate a lot of data. I offer here some 
general observations on method in literary studies. As I noted above, 
the succession of “approaches” in the field over the past century is not, 
in my view, a sign of futility or failure. What it reflects, rather, is a his-
tory of ongoing efforts by literary scholars to make their teaching and 
research responsive to developments within and beyond the academy, 
efforts that have been joined—and sometimes undercut—by the opera-
tion of dynamics that are general and recurrent enough to be called laws 
of history, at least of academic history. One such law is Everybody always 
overdoes everything. Professional pressures—inspiration energized by 
competition—push scholars into exhibiting the methods and virtues 
most conspicuously valued at the moment, and these tend be escalated 
and intensified to the point of exhaustion of the material, absurdity of the 
method, or pathology of the virtue.66 A second law or set of forces, giv-
ing weight to perennial calls for reform or revolution, is the existence of 
chronic tensions between fundamental but opposed impulses and styles: 
for example, in literary studies, between populism and elitism, moral-
ism—including political moralism—and formalism, and subjectivism 
and positivism. A third law follows from the interaction of the first two: 
Everybody complains of being misrepresented and caricatured, and everybody 
is misrepresented and caricatured. Bush complained of the New Critics’ 
“cavalier” dismissal of historical scholarship; 67 and Ransom’s treatment 
of it was pretty glib.
The developments to which scholars were responding during the 
twentieth century were quite significant. Literary study was one thing 
when a small number of Christian men were teaching the professionally 
aspiring sons of fellow professionals. It became another when members 
of an expanding professoriate were teaching students from middle- and 
working-class families or, later, when a sizeable number of faculty were 
women and a sizeable number of their students were from racial and eth-
nic minorities. And the field is yet another thing now, when faculty and 
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students are more likely to encounter texts on screens than anywhere 
else, and everyone is scrambling for positions, funding, and status in a 
shrinking quarter of the academy.
Over the course of the century, in literary studies as in other fields, the 
responses to changing institutional conditions and to broader changes, 
including intellectual developments, commonly led not to revolution-
ary overturns but to shifts of relative dominance, and there were always 
extensive residues of prior practices. The field was never “taken over” by 
the New Criticism or by any other single movement, and it remained—
not unhappily, I think—eclectic. The parade in the street was noisy and 
colorful, but up in the libraries, historians continued to write literary his-
tory, editors continued to produce editions of literary works, and, in both 
libraries and classrooms, almost everybody read at least some texts more 
or less closely.
Some changes of practice in literary studies proposed by advocates 
of the digital humanities would be revolutionary, and the developments 
they observe and cite as requiring these changes—from the technologi-
cal to the neurological—are, in their eyes, no less so.68 Talk of “seismic” 
and “tectonic” shifts is pervasive. Clearly, though, the interest and utility 
of close reading do not vanish in the face of digital libraries or ubiquitous 
computation. On the contrary, in the century upon us, where channels of 
communication are not only increasingly computerized but also increas-
ingly corporatized and where texts of all kinds are turned to manipulative 
ends with digitally multiplied effectiveness, the ability and disposition to 
read texts attentively, one by one (in addition, of course, to digital sophis-
tication), is likely to be an advantage. That textual ability and disposition 
also remains more generally crucial. The hope of receiving such reading 
is what keeps most of us—scholars and critics as well as poets and novel-
ists—writing, and the actual, even if only occasional, fulfillment of that 
hope is what keeps much textual production, literary and other, going. It 
is a practice that we all have a stake in preserving.*
* “What Was ‘Close Reading’?: A Century of Method in Literary Studies” originally 
appeared in The Minnesota Review, vol. 8,7 pp. 57-75. © 2016, Virginia Tech. All rights 
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Chapter Six
Scientizing the Humanities: Shifts, Collisions, Negotiations
The title of this essay can be interpreted both narrowly and broadly—
and, of course, as either appreciative or critical. It refers most broadly, and 
more or less appreciatively, to efforts on the part of scholars in humanities 
disciplines to introduce concepts, methods, or findings from the natural 
sciences into their home fields, usually in order to illuminate the custom-
ary objects of study in those fields: texts and artworks; writers and art-
ists; ideas, human practices, historical events; and so forth. Such efforts 
are not new but, over the past decade or two, have become considerably 
more extensive, more programmatic, and more self-consciously science-
allied than ever before. “Scientizing the humanities” also refers, more 
narrowly and rather more skeptically, to efforts that seek, as it is said, to 
“integrate” one or another humanities field with one or another science. 
Such efforts are reflected in calls for ongoing collaborations between 
scholars and scientists in particular fields (for example, between art his-
torians and neuroscientists) and in the growing prominence of hybrid 
fields or approaches such as neuroaesthetics, literary Darwinism, or cog-
nitive cultural studies. Thus, where literary scholars in the past might 
have explored Darwin’s influence on the late Victorian novel or Gertrude 
Stein’s interest in experimental psychology, they tell now of mammalian 
mating practices in Pride and Prejudice, the triggering of altruistic-pun-
ishment mechanisms in Oliver Twist, or the teasing of theory-of-mind 
modules in Mrs. Dalloway. At their most visionary, proponents of these 
approaches call for the total and terminal absorption of the humanities 
into the natural sciences, sometimes with rather millenarian-sounding 
promises and predictions.
The digital humanities are clearly a related development. Here 
efforts are not so much to make the humanities more scientific (though 
that is often an element) as to attune their practices more closely to 
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the increasing power and presence of information technologies. Again, 
though such efforts are not new, they are considerably more extensive 
and programmatic than ever before. Where, in the past, a professor of 
English might have demonstrated the advantages of computer use to a 
principled Luddite down the corridor, now groups of scholars in liter-
ary “laboratories” across North America build software platforms and 
access, count, chart, and correlate huge databases of digitized materials 
to various ends, some more consequential than others. One cannot be 
simply “for” or “against” these developments. What I shall do here is indi-
cate some considerations—historical, conceptual, and pragmatic—that I 
think are useful for understanding and assessing them.
I
The term that I have been using, developments, may appear too tame to 
many involved in the new approaches. Apocalyptic announcements 
abound and draw on a general sense, especially among premillennial aca-
demics, that a giant hinge has turned in the past decade or so, that our 
worlds—our students, the university, the culture, our own everyday prac-
tices—have, for better or worse, changed radically. The term revolution is 
not the one commonly used, but talk of seismic or tectonic shifts is per-
vasive. Among the reasons given for the announced upheavals, two are 
especially prominent. One is the ubiquity of information technologies 
and their rapidly growing centrality in our lives. The other is the deluge 
of what is claimed as radically illuminating news about ourselves issuing 
from the biological and behavioral sciences: news, especially, about our 
genes, our brains, and our evolutionary histories. I turn below to how this 
sense of a fundamental shift plays out in the scientizing projects I have 
been describing, but first I want to say something about the views of 
intellectual history implied in the discourses that promote them.
There are a number of models of the dynamics of intellectual his-
tory, models, that is, of how ideas and related practices, including sci-
entific ones, change. Three of them are especially relevant here. One, a 
familiar model, theological in origin but associated with popular ideas 
of science, is of a general progressive movement from darkness to light: 
onward and upward, from ignorance and error to knowledge and truth. 
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This is the model favored by scientizers inspired by the idea of “consil-
ience” developed by the sociobiologist E. O. Wilson. In his 1998 book 
Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, Wilson represents Western intellec-
tual history as a set of increasingly enlightened efforts, moving steadily 
toward harmony and unity since the seventeenth century, with disrup-
tions from two major counter-enlightenment forces: Romanticism and 
postmodernism, as he names them. Attached to this model of history 
is the idea of an intrinsically hierarchical organization of knowledge—
a chain or ladder of explanatory authority, with physics seen as founda-
tional to all other scientific pursuits and biology seen as foundational to 
both the humanities and the social sciences. In accordance with this view, 
the classic Western project of enlightenment will be consummated when 
the humanities and the social sciences (seen as now carelessly scattered 
and willfully isolated) join that progression toward harmony and unity 
so that the destined integration of all knowledge, from bottom to top, can 
be completed. Thus Wilson writes in Consilience: “When we have unified 
enough certain knowledge, we will understand who we are and why we 
are here” (Wilson 1998, 1). As Wilson himself acknowledges, this vision 
amounts to a naturalized millenarianism.69 The views of science on which 
it is based have been seriously challenged—many would say rendered 
obsolete—by a century of empirical work in the history of science.
A second, more historically informed view of the dynamics of scien-
tific change is associated with the work of Thomas Kuhn, especially The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, first published in 1962. Talk of “para-
digm shifts” and “epistemic breaks” by promoters of the new scientizing 
approaches draws implicitly on this second model, although, being pro-
motional, they tend to retain major elements of the onward-and-upward 
story that Kuhn sought to displace.70 A third model of the dynamics of 
intellectual history originates in Ludwik Fleck’s Genesis and Development 
of a Scientific Fact (1979 [1935]). Like Kuhn’s account of science (which 
it influenced), Fleck’s account challenges the familiar progressivist story. 
But it is more sociologically acute, more responsive to cultural history, 
and also more radical with regard to ideas of knowledge and truth. In a 
word, it is constructivist rather than realist.
In Fleck’s model, intellectual history is a dynamic field made up of 
the activities of multiple, distinct “thought collectives,” that is, groups of 
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intellectually interacting people, such as the members of particular reli-
gious sects or particular academic disciplines, and the ideas, discourses, 
and practices that they share. Scientific disciplines and academic fields 
of study are, in this model, neither hierarchically organized nor fixed in 
form; rather, they are continuously forming and transforming, some-
times merging and sometimes attenuating. Although the activities of 
fields and disciplines do not progress toward any general destiny, either 
unity or truth, they do issue in significant local achievements, including 
more or less radical conceptual innovations with relatively stable, broadly 
appropriated practical applications. There is much to be said for Fleck’s 
views, and I have said more about them here and elsewhere.71 They are 
of interest in the present context because they offer a well-developed 
alternative to the empirically dubious model of intellectual history that 
underwrites Wilson’s program of pandisciplinary consilience and related 
calls for integrating the humanities with the sciences.
II
A fundamental consideration in assessing the new scientizing approaches 
is their relation to the aims and perspectives of the humanities as distinct 
from those of the natural sciences and, in the case of the digital humani-
ties, as distinct from those of computer engineering. A recent article by 
Katherine Hayles is useful in highlighting the issues. Hayles is a longtime 
advocate of connections between the sciences and humanities, an influ-
ential analyst of all things digital, and a major proponent of posthuman-
ism (or, at least, one of the sets of theoretical perspectives so-named). The 
article with which I am concerned is titled “Cognition Everywhere: The 
Rise of the Cognitive Nonconscious and the Costs of Consciousness” 
(2014). Readers familiar with the digital humanities scene will recognize 
an allusion to the idea of ubiquitous computation or, in a phrase used by 
one of its advocates, “computation everywhere” (Wolfram 2014). Part of 
Hayles’s effort in her article is to suggest a comparable ubiquity to cogni-
tion, which, in her view, is properly understood to include the informa-
tion-processing activities of mechanical as well as biological systems. Her 
major aim in the article, however, is to counter arguments by influential 
literary scholars to the effect that projects in the digital humanities fail to 
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satisfy certain important disciplinary interests addressed by more tradi-
tional methods of study.
“Many print-based scholars,” Hayles writes, “see algorithmic analyses 
as rivals to how literary analysis has traditionally been performed, argu-
ing that digital-humanities algorithms are nothing more than glorified 
calculating machines” (213). Such objections, she believes, are based on 
scholars’ ignorance of the current capacities of computers, along with 
an exaggerated sense of the importance of consciousness and of the dis-
tinctiveness or worthiness of human cognitive capacities more generally. 
Accordingly, she devotes much of the article to describing the human-
like things that computers can now do—for example, “learn languages,” 
“draw inferences,” “compose music”—and, conversely, to detailing the 
limits and frailties of human cognition and consciousness as revealed 
by neuroscience and compared with the operations of computers. Thus 
she points out that computers used in financial markets can now process 
information automatically at speeds measured in millisecond differences, 
thereby providing enormous advantages to the traders using them, and 
that comparable advantages can now be obtained in the humanities, 
where computers, operating without the “presuppositions or biases” that 
come with human cognition and consciousness, “allow questions to be 
posed that simply could not have been asked or answered using human 
cognition alone” (212).
Hayles does not explain why literary scholars should want to pose and 
answer questions—presumably about works of literature, individually or 
in sets of various kinds—that they would not have asked or could not 
have answered using their own human cognitive capacities. The reason 
commonly supplied by advocates of the digital humanities (for example, 
Moretti 2000 and Jockers 2013, as discussed in chapter 5) is that knowl-
edge—or, with emphasis, “real,” “objective,” “factual” knowledge—is 
thereby increased. But the explanation raises a number of other ques-
tions: What aims or interests are served by a sheer increase of factual 
information about some thing or set of things? Does a mere increase of 
objective, factual information constitute what we usually mean by knowl-
edge? And does a mere increase of objective, factual information about 
various of its objects of study—without connection to any interests or 
purposes—make sense as a project for any humanities discipline as such?
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A proper appreciation of major advances in information technology 
and neuroscience, Hayles writes, “requires a shift in conceptual frame-
works so extensive that it might as well be called an epistemic break” 
(218). “Today,” she cautions, “the humanities stand at a crossroad.” One 
path “reinforces the idea that humans are special, that they are the source 
of almost all the cognition on the planet, and that human viewpoints 
therefore count the most in determining what the world means.” On the 
other, better, path, scholars in the humanities would accept an enlarged 
“idea of cognition to include [the] nonconscious activities” of technical 
devices as well as of other biological systems (216-17). “With the result-
ing shifts of perspective,” she believes, “many of the misunderstandings 
about the kinds of interventions the digital humanities are now making 
in the humanities [would] simply fade away” (218).
In seeking to correct what she takes to be misunderstandings of the 
digital humanities on the part of humanities scholars, Hayles strives to 
be informative and conciliatory. But her major efforts, I think, miss the 
point of many critics’ concerns. Noting the growing significance of what 
she names here “the cognitive nonconscious,” she writes: “One conclu-
sion seems inescapable: the humanities cannot continue to take the quest 
for meaning as an unquestioned premise for their ways of doing busi-
ness” (199). The phrasing suggests some misunderstandings on Hayles’s 
part. Humanities scholars do not generally see a (or “the”) quest for, or 
provision of, meaning as a central goal or premise of their activities. Nor 
do critics generally see the inability of computers to come up with the 
meaning(s) of texts (or of anything else) as the crucial limit of digital 
humanities. It’s not that computers cannot produce or “interpret” textual 
“meanings” in some senses of those terms; they already can or soon will. 
The problem is that many of the algorithmic performances and produc-
tions currently invoked as examples of the achievements or promise of 
computers lack the type of interest that we find in the performances and 
productions of fellow humans as such. Calling the computational activi-
ties of technical devices “cognitive” and noting their similarity to actions 
performed nonconsciously by humans does not erase the sense of a cru-
cial difference between the two or supply the type of interest—attrac-
tion, concern, connection, fascination, delight—found specifically in the 
latter.72 Contrary to charges commonly leveled by enthusiasts of artificial 
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intelligence, artificial life, and other computational wonders, the interest 
in question does not reveal a prejudice in favor of carbon- versus silicon-
based “cognition,” “intelligence,” or “life.” What makes the actions, perfor-
mances, and productions of other humans—writers and composers, art-
ists and critics, kings and revolutionaries—especially interesting to us is 
not our conviction that humans are superior to machines and nonhuman 
animals; it is our recognition that they are the same sorts of machines and 
animals that we ourselves are.
A good part of the interest of the actions and productions of other 
humans may have to do with our experiencing the world, fairly uniquely 
among machines and animals, as subjects—experiencing it, that is, with 
what we call consciousness or a sense of self. Hayles, having perhaps 
heard such observations from digital-resistant humanists, goes to some 
trouble to expose subjectivity, consciousness, and a sense of self as illu-
sions. But the effort is, again I think, misplaced. Recognizing that sub-
jective experiences—one’s own and other peoples’—are, as she terms 
them, “epiphenomena of underlying material processes” (202-203) does 
not make them any less interesting as experiences. Nor does it erase the 
difference that we generally register—perceptually, conceptually, and 
emotionally—between experiencing beings as such and material pro-
cesses as such.
Hayles writes of the anthropocentric bias that attends the operations 
of consciousness in humans, a result, she explains, of our (illusory) sense 
of possessing a particular self and our concern for its well-being. This bias, 
she suggests, leads humans to overestimate their importance in the world 
and their ability to control the complex ecological systems in which they 
are embedded, with various ecological catastrophes among the con-
sequences. Aside from the suggestion of a proper estimate of humans’ 
importance in the world (who could arrive at such an assessment, and 
how?), this observation is no doubt true. But the anthropocentrism of 
the humanities is as definitive as the astro-centrism of astronomy or the 
bio-centrism of biology, with the addition, among humanities scholars, 
of a type of interest in the defining objects of their study—that is, human 
ideas, artifacts, practices, and events—that comes from a particular bond 
of kinship with the authors, agents, and subjects of those ideas, artifacts, 
practices, and events.
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This discipline-defining anthropocentrism does not require a par-
ticularly high regard for all things human. It certainly does not require 
a refusal to recognize our biological nature or cognitive limits. Hayles 
argues that the news from neuroscience and due recognition of the ubiq-
uity of the cognitive nonconscious together undercut standard views of 
human rationality and the power of reason. Outside some departments 
of philosophy, however, it is generally not scholars in the humanities 
who overvalue rationality. After all, the idea of reason has not had a very 
good press among writers, critics, and theorists for some time now—one 
may think of the doubts about it raised (as E. O. Wilson is aware) by the 
Romantics or of its treatment by Nietzsche or psychoanalytic theory. 
Nor is it humanists who need to recognize the existence of what Hayles 
calls “systemic human blindnesses.” On the contrary, if we have a concept 
like hubris and a chastened sense of human capacities more generally, it 
has come largely from poets, humanistic philosophers, and those who 
study and transmit their views. Humanities scholars these days gener-
ally acknowledge—and many of them stress—the continuities between 
humans and other animals; and, although a strong suspicion of a not 
well-understood Darwinism remains widespread, most of them, I believe, 
would acknowledge that our capacities, impulses, and responses reflect, 
among other things, the evolutionary history of the species. Scholars in 
the humanities may be inclined to add that the capacities, impulses, and 
responses of humans also reflect our relatively complex neural organiza-
tion and are shaped by the evidently unique existence, among us, of lan-
guage and intergenerationally transmitted artifacts, ideas, practices, and 
institutionalized norms. But most evolutionary biologists and neurosci-
entists would be inclined to note the same things.
III
Hayles’s evocation of a decisive crossroads for the humanities recalls a 
comparable evocation by literary Darwinist, Joseph Carroll. In an article 
titled “Three Scenarios for Literary Darwinism” (2010), Carroll describes 
three possible future trajectories for the critical approach that he founded 
and promotes. In the first scenario, literary Darwinism would remain a 
minor movement. In a second more hopeful one, the movement would 
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become mainstream but still only as one among other “‘approaches’ to 
literature.” In the third scenario, which Carroll urges, the field of literary 
studies, along with all other humanities fields, would be totally trans-
formed by evolutionary theory and integrated with anthropology, eco-
nomics, sociology, and political science—all similarly transformed—to 
make up a new field that he calls “the evolutionary human sciences.”
Those familiar with literary Darwinism will recall that scholars pursu-
ing this approach seek to explain why we read poems or novels, and also 
why authors write them and, sometimes, why fictional characters behave 
as they do, in the same way that evolutionary psychologists explain vir-
tually everything else that humans do—that is, as manifestations of the 
operation of putative universal, hard-wired mechanisms that evolved to 
enhance the reproductive fitness of our Stone Age ancestors. My concern 
here is not with the assumptions, methods, or claims of evolutionary 
psychology (I have examined them elsewhere)73 but with the idea, pro-
moted by Carroll and other literary Darwinists, that those assumptions, 
methods, and claims should be the foundation of literary studies and, in 
Carroll’s case, of all other humanities fields as well.74
Toward the end of his article, Carroll observes that the future of liter-
ary Darwinism is hard to predict. If his third, integrationist scenario fails 
to be taken up by humanities scholars, it will be, he writes, because of an 
entrenched “mind/body dualism” and an ideological “pluralism” based 
on habit, convention, and scholars’ ignorance of science. On the other 
hand, he continues, if literary studies joins the other evolutionary human 
sciences, then “the institutional resistance of the postmodern establish-
ment will crumble from within … as a result of intellectual dry rot” (60) 
and a rich and pleasant prospect will open for those who remain:
Aspiring literary scholars will have open before them a wide 
spectrum of methodological choices, ranging from the purely 
discursive, essayistic form of commentary that now domi-
nates the humanities to the rigorously quantitative, empiri-
cal methods that now prevail in the sciences …. [Graduate 
students] will not cast about desperately for novelty, taking 
recourse in superficial verbal variations ensconced in sophisti-
cal theoretical ambiguities. They will, rather, wake up like kids 
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at Christmas, delighted with the endless opportunities for 
real, legitimate discovery that are open to them. (64)
He concludes with the evidently non-ironic observation that the third 
scenario will be hard to achieve but that “it promises discovery, things 
not yet dreamed of, lying in the bosom of reality” (64).
Carroll has little good to say of literary studies as traditionally or, 
especially, as currently pursued. Hayles’s evocation of forking paths for 
the humanities has none of Carroll’s biliousness, but the alternatives she 
offers are, in some respects, similarly framed. Like Carroll, she finds liter-
ary studies crucially deficient and, like him, she is optimistic with regard 
to the future if the avenue she urges is followed. In Hayles’s account, while 
the cost of taking the wrong path is the “isolation of the humanities from 
the sciences and engineering,” with the right path, “the search for mean-
ing [duly understood as “information flows”] then becomes a pervasive 
activity among humans, animals, and technical devices, with many differ-
ent kinds of agents contributing to the rich ecology of collaborating, rein-
forcing, contesting and conflicting interpretations” (218). Some features 
of the traditional humanities, Hayles writes, will have a place amid this 
interpretive multiplicity and diversity: “The sophisticated methods the 
humanities have developed for comparing different interpretations then 
pay rich dividends for other fields and open up to any number of excit-
ing collaborative projects” (218). She concludes encouragingly: “The 
humanities can make important contributions to such fields as architec-
ture, electrical and mechanical engineering, computer science, industrial 
design, and many other fields” (217-18).
I suspect that the prospect of exciting collaborations with mechanical 
engineers and computer scientists would not persuade many premillen-
nial humanities scholars and teachers to give up their privileging of the 
study of ideas, artifacts, and individual texts by individual human beings. 
It might well be attractive, however, to a good number of young research-
ers already at home in the world of information technology—blogs and 
games, platforms and programs—and especially to those already engaged 
in computational projects. Similarly, Carroll’s promise of endless oppor-
tunities, via evolutionary psychology, for “real, legitimate discovery” “in 
the bosom of reality” may appeal to some graduate students of litera-
ture already captivated by a certain idea of science and of what it is to 
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be genuinely scientific. But it is not likely to end the attraction of a good 
many of them to “superficial verbal variations ensconced in sophistical 
theoretical ambiguities”—or to what Carroll hears as such. I return below 
to the significance of these differences of disciplinary training, intellec-
tual taste, and personal temperament.
IV
I would like to turn directly now to what could be described as the his-
torically distinctive aims and achievements of the humanities. They are 
not easy to describe and current celebrations of the humanities tend to 
be nostalgic and selective at best and, at worst, vacuous.75 According to 
Carroll and others (Dennett 2006, Slingerland 2008), resistance to the 
new scientizing approaches reflects an obsolete mind/body dualism that 
places an artificial barrier between the humanities and the sciences. The 
charge is misdirected but useful for sharpening the terms of the differ-
ences at issue. There is, of course, a longstanding theologically grounded 
insistence on the distinctness of the realms of the spiritual and the mate-
rial; and it is often allied with the claim that there are forms of knowl-
edge—revealed or intuitive, for example—that are higher or deeper than 
scientific findings or with the idea that there are phenomena, such as 
consciousness or “products of the human mind” that cannot be explained 
in physical terms or approached naturalistically. But resistance to the idea 
of integrating the humanities and the natural sciences does not require 
any of those hoary dualisms. It is not that the disciplines are properly 
attached to distinct realms of being but that humans orient themselves 
to the phenomenal world in multiple ways and that these orientations are 
reflected in the different aims and practices of the various arts and sci-
ences and, in the West, of the various academic disciplines.
One of the ways we orient ourselves toward the world is by seeking 
to extend our knowledge of, and strengthen our control over, the physi-
cal conditions of our existence. Accordingly, we seek to chart, model, and 
explain those conditions conceptually and to modify them or intervene in 
their operations technically. But humans everywhere also seek to develop 
and manifest themselves as experiencing creatures and, accordingly, are 
commonly engaged by the experiences, creations, and reflections of their 
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fellow humans. These two are not the only ways that we orient ourselves 
toward the world; the list could be extended. But they are clearly distinct, 
and they evoke the different aims and practices that, in the West, have 
become specialized, or roughly specialized, as the natural sciences and 
the humanities.
Contrary to the suggestion and conviction of many promoters of 
Wilson’s “consilience,” the specific value of the modern sciences does not 
lie in their ability to deliver “certain knowledge.”76 It lies, rather, in what 
has evolved historically as a set of conceptual commitments and related 
practices attached to aims that are, variously, both pragmatic and intellec-
tual. The commitments in question, notably naturalism, empiricism, and 
experimentalism, along with the types of practice they entail, constitute 
an extremely efficient apparatus for generating models of the operations 
of the physical world that enable us to predict, control, and intervene in 
those operations effectively and reliably. To the extent that any human 
project has those sorts of aims, the apparatus of modern science is prob-
ably the most consistently effective means for achieving them.
Scientific theories, models, and accounts also, but less centrally, 
respond to our desire for intellectually satisfying explanations and inter-
pretations of the phenomenal world. They are less central in this regard 
because the experience of intellectual satisfaction is considerably more 
variable than the observation of pragmatic effectiveness. All may agree 
that a bridge has been built, and most may agree that an ailing baby has 
been cured. But an explanation of some complex and humanly signifi-
cant set of phenomena—say, of art, love, or religion—that some people 
find uniquely adequate may strike others as superficial and still others as 
clearly improper. The more consistent reliability of empirical, experimen-
tal, and naturalistic models and explanations in serving pragmatic aims 
does not make them the only kinds of accounts of the phenomenal world 
that we value or the only ones generally recognized as knowledge.77
I have referred to certain aims and achievements of the humanities as 
historically distinctive. The word historically is crucial here. The humani-
ties are not an essential or natural kind. They are clusters of contingently 
institutionalized custodial, intellectual, and pedagogic practices. For the 
past four hundred years or so, those practices, as pursued by Western 
and Western-educated scholars, have included the identification, 
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preservation, description, analysis, explication, dissemination, and 
often—but not always—celebration of what are regarded, at any given 
time, as significant human events and cultural achievements.78 “Research” 
in the humanities—or, as we say, “scholarship”—is commonly under-
stood as the disciplined pursuit of such practices. “Study” in the humani-
ties is commonly understood as the acquisition of expert knowledge of 
some specific body of materials (largely but not exclusively textual) and 
the development of techniques and skills—for example, archival, philo-
logical, musicological, iconological, or analytic—required for the pursuit 
of such practices. This description is not, I think, notably tendentious. 
But it does suggest the distinctive intellectual character of the humanities 
disciplines and their specific institutional, social, and cultural functions.
The argument made by Wilson, Carroll, and others promoting the 
new scientizing approaches is not that study in the humanities should 
be more closely engaged with or better informed by the natural sciences. 
Moves in these directions are, in my view, long overdue and, where they 
occur, to be applauded. The promotional argument is, rather, that the 
study of art, literature, music, philosophy, and so forth should be more 
“scientific” in method and aim, with desirable method usually described 
as “quantitative” and “objective” and desirable aim usually referred 
to—in pointed contrast with whatever the humanities are thought to 
seek or achieve—as “serious,” “genuine,” or (especially oddly) “adult” 
knowledge.79
It is true that our aesthetic, critical, and reflective engagements with 
the world do not produce what is usually thought of as scientific knowl-
edge. But engagements of those kinds do have significant effects, includ-
ing intellectual ones. Their effects are not as palpable, demonstrable, 
immediate, or pragmatically translatable as the products of our investiga-
tive or interventionist engagements with the world, but they can be con-
sequential. To the extent that the pedagogic and scholarly practices of the 
humanities elicit, enable, and shape such engagements, they also can be, 
in the same way, personally and communally consequential: important 
for our continued development, both individually and generationally, as 
responsive, creative, critical, and reflective creatures.
Traditionally in the humanities, one “studies” the phenomena of art, 
literature, religion, and philosophy—that is, human creations, practices, 
98 Chapter Six
and ideas—in the sense of examining them closely: not, however, usually 
just to gather facts about them or just to register their empirically describ-
able features but, rather, with a view to understanding and elucidating 
the motives and experiences involved in their production and reception. 
Exploring, describing, and seeking to understand motives and experi-
ences are fundamentally different from counting, measuring, and seek-
ing to explain empirically observable phenomena. Seeking to understand 
and convey experiences is fundamentally different from seeking to explain 
behaviors. The humanities are, in that respect, typically first-person or, 
in a term from anthropology that I prefer, emic, that is, operating from 
the perspective of participating insiders, rather than third-person or, in 
the corresponding term, etic, that is, operating from the perspective of 
observing outsiders. Typically partisan rather than impartial, the human-
ities are an institutional locus not of disinterested interest in humans as 
one biological species among others but of distinctly self-interested con-
cern for species capable of conscious experience—which, as we know 
from our interest in animal fables, cartoons, and science fiction, exceeds 
the species Homo sapiens by quite a bit.
It is certainly possible to study human practices, beliefs, and cul-
tural products as “natural phenomena.” For example, paintings, poems, 
and philosophical essays can be compared to the material products or 
bodily displays of other creatures, such as anthills and peacocks’ tails. 
Comparisons of this sort are not unusual in the work of sociobiolo-
gists and, following them, literary Darwinists.80 And, of course, human 
practices and their various products and traces can be investigated and 
described in strictly quantitative, physical terms without reference to 
individual human experiences. Doing so is standard practice in fields 
such as demography or economics and, following them, in the digital 
humanities.81 Investigations and descriptions of these kinds undoubtedly 
produce facts about certain aspects of the usual objects of humanistic 
study. The question commonly raised by those resisting the new scien-
tizing and computational methods is to what extent the production and 
possession of such facts serve the traditional aims of the humanities.
Since I don’t think the answer to that question is obvious, I want to 
comment briefly on disciplinary aims and methods. In humanities schol-
arship, as in any domain of human activity from agriculture to deep-sea 
Scientizing the Humanities: Shifts, Collisions, Negotiations 99
diving, methods are usually developed to further existing purposes. Here 
as elsewhere, however, the relation between method and purpose can be 
complex. Humans are curious, manipulative, and inventive creatures, and 
our purposes are continuously enlarged and transformed by the availabil-
ity of new methods and their associated instruments. Whatever the initial 
purpose for which an instrument was fashioned—whether stick, bowl, or 
computer—we are likely to discover other useful or interesting things we 
can do with it; and those novel activities will generate new purposes and 
instruments, which will require and privilege new skills and talents. For 
these reasons, the invocation of past purposes and current practices as 
the sole criteria for assessing new methods in the humanities amounts to 
a stultifying conservatism. But resistance to various scientizing or digitiz-
ing methods may have a more substantive component, namely, that their 
outcomes—the evolutionary explanations, the cognitive redescriptions, 
the computer-generated correlations—appear crude, banal, or trivial by 
virtually any measure of intellectual value. To the extent that advocates 
of the new methods ignore such criticism, they produce their own self-
immurement and stultification.
The differences I’ve been noting in the epistemic orientations and 
social functions of the humanities and the natural sciences are significant 
but, as I have emphasized, they are historical, not intrinsic. Nothing holds 
disciplinary differences in place but ongoing practices and their relation 
to the broader social collective. Insofar as distinctive practices and social 
functions exist, however, they have important practical implications for 
the new hybrid programs.
V
Academic and scientific subfields—for example, eighteenth-century 
French literature, high-energy particle physics, or Lacanian film stud-
ies—are what Ludwik Fleck called “thought collectives.” They are dis-
tinguished from one another not only by subject domain or what aspect 
of the phenomenal world they study but also, and no less crucially, by 
implicit systems of linked assumptions, discourses, and technical prac-
tices or what Fleck called “thought styles.” Kuhn called them, or some-
thing like them, “paradigms.” I describe them elsewhere (Smith 2005/6, 
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108-129) as “disciplinary cultures.” The awkwardness of the disciplinary 
newcomer—the art historian bumbling in the laboratory of the neurosci-
entist, or the neuroscientist bumbling in the gallery of the art historian—
is like that of any other cultural immigrant. Becoming acculturated as a 
neuroscientist or an art historian is not just a matter of mastering a set of 
canonical ideas, texts, images, or techniques. It is also a matter of know-
ing a set of tacit but crucial norms: what counts as a well-designed experi-
ment, a useful model, a rigorous analysis, or a subtle interpretation. It is a 
matter of knowing what matters: the important issues in the field, the sig-
nificant rival views, which connections are crucial and which irrelevant. It 
is having a fund of informal know-how acquired through a personal his-
tory of active practice as, precisely, an active practitioner.
The existence of highly specific disciplinary cultures creates difficul-
ties for any interdisciplinary venture, even when the conjunction involves 
closely related but historically distinct fields, such as evolutionary and 
developmental biology, now joined in the field of “evo-devo.” Thought 
styles are powerful in shaping perceptions as well as discourses and 
practices, and there can be chasms of mutual incomprehension between 
members of different thought collectives, including academic disciplines 
and the subfields within them. One may think here of clinical and experi-
mental psychology or of analytic and continental philosophy. The diffi-
culties increase, of course, as the fields involved are more diverse in aim 
and orientation, and some difficulties are specific to ventures seeking to 
merge humanities fields with natural sciences or engineering.
An especially significant set of problems arises from the long-standing 
prestige differentials among academic disciplines, which exactly mirror 
Wilson’s hierarchy but in reverse: here, physics is at the top while fields 
such as art history or literary studies are at the bottom. (Although there 
are no intrinsic hierarchies among disciplines, there are, of course, de 
facto dominances.) Consilient engagements between humanities schol-
ars and scientists or engineers would presumably work well in both 
directions. That is the hope, claim, and promise of the new collaborative 
ventures. But the prestige differentials here are very steep, and the forces 
sustaining them draw on other invidious distinctions in the culture of the 
academy and in the broader culture as well. They are reflected in familiar 
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contrasts between hard and soft disciplines, between real things and mere 
words, and, as noted above, between serious work and mere play.
Prestige differentials are significant in this context because they exac-
erbate a number of perennial problems in projects that seek to cross the 
Two Cultures. One is the tendency of humanities scholars to regard the 
scientific and technical materials that they import—findings, concepts, 
and methods—altogether uncritically, even when, as is largely the case 
in the new hybrid fields, those materials are still being developed and 
are still controversial in their own scientific disciplines. Duly studious 
humanities scholars may become quite knowledgeable about findings, 
concepts, and methods in fields such as evolutionary psychology or cog-
nitive neuroscience, and they can be quite adept at summarizing them for 
fellow humanists. But they are generally not equipped to assess experi-
mental designs, statistical analyses, or the robustness of conclusions in 
those fields. These evaluative skills come with training and experience 
working in the fields themselves, which, as I have already noted, bring 
practicing scientists detailed knowledge of current theoretical and meth-
odological issues and important rival approaches. Because scientizing 
humanities scholars are at a disadvantage in these respects, they often put 
their money on transient ideas and methods. For example, assumptions 
about human development and evolution central to evolutionary psy-
chology and literary Darwinism are questioned by established scientists 
and theorists in related scientific fields, such as genetics, evolutionary 
biology, and developmental psychology (see, for example, Oyama 2000 
and Pigliucci and Müller 2010). Similarly, concepts in the neurosciences 
that figure prominently in cognitive approaches in the humanities—from 
the significance of mirror neurons for human behavior to the existence of 
a specific theory-of-mind module—are undergoing extensive modifica-
tion in those fields (see, for example, Cook et al 2014).
No less significant for the temper of would-be consilient collabora-
tions are the sorts of differences mentioned above in regard to the likely 
uptakes of Hayles’s and Carroll’s hopeful visions. There are not, in my 
view, two different types of people in the world, humanities types and 
science types. But in project-related interactions between scholars and 
scientists or scholars and engineers, strong differences of personal and 
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intellectual temperament as well as talent, taste, and style are likely to 
give rise to severe cognitive dissonances in both directions.82
VI
Many of the difficulties traced here have been noted by scholars and 
scientists who themselves work in hybrid fields. For example, Johanna 
Drucker, a historian of graphic design and a major theorist of the digital 
humanities, calls attention to a fundamental clash between, on the one 
hand, qualities such as complexity, ambiguity, and indeterminacy that are 
generally appreciated in the humanities and, on the other hand, quali-
ties such as simplicity, clarity, and predictability that are highly valued in 
computer engineering and reflected in the binary character of informa-
tion technology itself (Drucker 2012). In its “rush to be computational,” 
Drucker suggests, digital scholarship is in danger of forgetting hard-won 
theoretical perspectives in the humanities, among them constructivism 
and relativism, which she names explicitly.
Similarly, Anjan Chatterjee, a neuroscientist who also conducts 
research in the hybrid field of neuroaesthetics, writes of the fundamen-
tal challenges faced by efforts to bring brain science into the humanities 
fields traditionally concerned with aesthetics: art history, literary theory, 
philosophy, and so forth. Chatterjee asks, “When does neuroscience pro-
vide deeper descriptive texture to our knowledge of aesthetics, and when 
does it deliver added explanatory force?,” and comments:
Knowing that the pleasure of viewing a beautiful painting is 
correlated with activity within the orbito-frontal cortex … 
adds biologic texture to our understanding of the rewards of 
aesthetic experiences. However, it is not obvious that it … 
advances our understanding of the psychological nature of 
that reward. For neuroscience to make important contribu-
tions to aesthetics, the possibility of an inner psychophysics 
has to be taken seriously. (Chatterjee 2011, 60).
The comment is urbane and perceptive. A correlation between some-
one’s report of pleasure in viewing a painting and an image of activity 
in some area of that person’s brain does not explain the pleasure. But it 
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does add “biologic[al] texture” to our understanding of that kind of expe-
rience—a nice turn of phrase that reflects the contribution of a certain 
type of scientific knowledge to a classically humanistic enterprise while 
at the same time acknowledging its limits.
Connecting an observation of neuronal activity to a reported experi-
ence of pleasure is partly a conceptual problem: the classical philosophi-
cal conundrum of mediating between third-person observations and 
first-person experiences, which I have referred to as, respectively, etic and 
emic perspectives. But making such connections is also a rhetorical prob-
lem, a matter of finding some way to articulate—join together—two ver-
bal-intellectual idioms that have evolved historically to serve significantly 
different ends: on the one hand, the observational, impersonal idiom of 
the natural sciences, which strives to be informative and appropriately 
precise; and, on the other hand, the phenomenological, experiential 
idiom of the humanities, which strives to be evocative and appropriately 
subtle. Negotiating these two perspectives and joining these two idioms 
is not an impossible task.83 But it requires a kind of intellectual-linguistic 
tact, the cultivation of which is one of the major challenges faced by the 
new hybrid approaches.
VII
What we speak of now as “the natural sciences” and “the humanities” 
are only relatively stable assemblages of continuously emerging, devel-
oping, combining, and differentiating intellectual traditions and prac-
tices. Neither is likely to retain its current forms or even its identity in 
the future. On the contrary, we are witnessing major transformations and 
attenuations of both in our lifetimes. The “shifts”—though not quite “tec-
tonic”—are real enough. As the humanities become increasingly scien-
tized, the sciences themselves are becoming increasingly industrialized 
and commercialized (Shapin 2008, Mirowski 2011). Intellectual histori-
ans already have reason to ask, “What was ‘science’?” Sooner or later they 
will have reason to ask, “What was ‘classics’? What was ‘art history’?” 
and—perhaps especially puzzling—“What in the world was ‘English’?”
There is little reason to think the humanities will fold themselves 
into the natural sciences and, I believe, no good reason to think they 
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should. But there are reasons to think that at least some of the new hybrid 
approaches will survive and prosper. For one thing, they are attracting a 
good number of talented, energetic, and broadly informed young people. 
For another, considerable institutional resources are already invested 
in them. Significantly, practitioners have begun to respond to external 
criticism constructively rather than with defensive hostility and also to 
engage in discriminating internal criticism rather than indiscriminate 
mutual puffing.84 As increasingly mellowed, chastened, and sophisticated 
products of the new approaches—neuroaesthetics, cognitive cultural 
studies, digital humanities, and so forth—appear in journals, classrooms, 
and conferences, they will begin to join other practices in the humanities 
academy, both old and new, both disciplinary and interdisciplinary.
In Fleck’s model of intellectual history, disciplinary transformations, 
though continuous and sometimes radical, are not always revolutionary 
and never total. As new approaches make headway, established ones com-
monly continue for some time, typically transformed—sooner or later—
by the most significant new methods and ideas. At Duke University in 
the 1990s, even as its English department became notorious for ideol-
ogy critique, reader-response criticism, and queer theory, members of its 
faculty were teaching texts in Middle English and preparing editions of 
William Faulkner’s novels and Thomas Carlyle’s correspondence. Texts 
are still taught there in Middle English, although now with quite dif-
ferent emphases. The specific activities I have described as historically 
attached to the humanities disciplines—namely, identifying, preserving, 
elucidating, and disseminating significant cultural achievements and the 
record of significant human events—are not the only things that humani-
ties scholars do. But they are activities that are valuable for the human 
collective at large and that humanities scholars do more or less uniquely 
and more or less effectively. If academic scholars no longer do them, one 
must hope they are done by other agencies, human or nonhuman, for-
mally or informally. I don’t think the historically distinctive activities of 
the humanities disciplines will disappear. But they may be dispersed: 
not housed in a distinct quarter of the academic world and perhaps not 
housed in the academy at all. Many of those activities were performed 
in the past outside the academy—for example, domestically, or by clergy 
or hired tutors. Many have already been transferred largely to electronic 
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venues—for example, to online courses, blogs, and websites—and one 
may anticipate further dispersals to venues of that kind.
There is much in what I have described here to give us pause and per-
haps to make us weep. Two further considerations, however, can be heart-
ening. First, there is good reason to think that, even with the attenuation 
of “print culture” and the flat-out disappearance of “classics,” “English,” 
and even “philosophy,” humans across the globe will still be inclined 
to recall, savor, and ponder what fellow humans have done, made, and 
articulated, no matter how—or via what medium—it is transmitted. 
Second, although desegregations and new mixtures typically elicit fears 
of a homogenized or mongrelized future, both cultural and biological 
history remind us that hybrids often turn out to be sturdier than their 
ancestors and, indeed, to be especially favored in surprising ways. The 
traditional Western disciplines, both the sciences and the humanities, 
are being severely shaken up by important intellectual and technological 
developments. But the disciplines—again, all of them—are also being 
put together in myriad new ways. The new disciplinary configurations are 
not, in my view, moving toward ultimate harmony or unity. But they may 
be opening out to intellectual landscapes more interesting than most of 
us imagine.*
* “Scientizing the Humanities: Shifts, Collisions, Negotiations,” originally appeared 
in Common Knowledge, vol. 22:3, pp. 353-372. © 2016, Duke University Press. 
All rights reserved. Republished by permission of the copyright holder. www.
dukeupress.edu
Chapter 7
Perplexing Realities: Practicing 
Relativism in the Anthropocene
This chapter began as a talk prepared for a colloquium titled “Climate 
Realism.” Its conveners asked, “How is  realism—in both the aesthetic 
history of representation and the philosophical tradition that under-
writes it—transformed by contending with our new experience of cli-
mate in the Anthropocene?”85 For many people, ideas of reality, in the 
sense of taken-for-granted beliefs about what the world is like, have been 
duly updated, radically unsettled, or otherwise affected by reports of cli-
mate change. In a good many cases, such ideas have been affected directly 
by experiences of the forces and effects involved. Aside, however, from 
various renewed invocations and amplified self-endorsements, the realist 
tradition in philosophy does not seem to have been transformed by those 
reports or such experiences. Nor has work in that tradition, either classic 
or current, been notably significant in illuminating either of them. With 
regard to the perplexities of climate change as elsewhere, however, the 
traditions of constructivist thought described in previous chapters offer 
useful perspectives for conceptualization and practice.
Consideration of three such perplexities will illustrate the point. One 
is how to respond to malign appropriations of constructivist critiques 
of standard accounts of scientific knowledge. An essay by Bruno Latour 
often cited in that connection, “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” 
(2004), provides a point of entry here. A second is how to understand 
climate “denialism,” the rejection of the descriptions, explanations, and 
predictions of climate science by large segments of the public. Here 
Ludwik Fleck’s account of belief systems is illuminating, especially when 
joined with contemporary constructivist understandings of human cog-
nition. A third perplexity is the existence of multiple, sometimes radically 
divergent, operative realities. Here the commitment of constructivist 
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social scientists to methodological symmetry can be instructive for eth-
ical-political practice as well as for conceptualization. At the end of the 
chapter, I reflect on a set of related problems, both conceptual and practi-
cal, in recent writings by environmentalists.
I
Realism, in academic philosophy, is the view that the objects we per-
ceive and describe, with the features we observe and characterize, exist 
independent of our perceptions and ways of describing them—or, as it 
is often put, that there is “an objective reality” apart from what we think 
or say. This view is commonly attended by two other ideas. One is that a 
belief or statement is true insofar as it corresponds to that objective real-
ity or represents the features of that world accurately. The other is that 
science is a distinctive method for discovering those features and for 
arriving at true beliefs about its workings. Thus philosopher of science 
Philip Kitcher, explaining the “broadly realist conception of science” he 
seeks to defend, describes its components (or, as he writes, its “old-fash-
ioned virtues”) as follows: “Scientists find out things about a world that 
is independent of human cognition; they advance true statements, use 
concepts that conform to natural divisions, [and] develop schemata that 
capture objective dependencies” (Kitcher 1995, 127).86
These views, formulated in more or less these terms, are familiar. 
They have, however, been subject to significant challenges. Skeptical 
philosophers since antiquity have pointed out that we cannot glimpse a 
putatively objective, autonomous reality around the corner of our own 
perceptions.87 Of course, we (or the scientists among us) may chart the 
apparent regularities of our humanly shared perceptible world and, with 
various technologies, detect remote, complex, ordinarily imperceptible 
phenomena. And we (or the philosophers among us) may attempt to 
infer the essential, underlying features of such a putatively objective real-
ity through, as it is said, the use of reason and logic. But what we (scien-
tists and philosophers included) cannot do is conceive or describe the 
putative features of such a putative reality independent of any humanly 
derived concepts or discursive idioms.
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Ontologies—purported accounts of what’s really out there, or what’s 
underneath it all, or what there really is—can be more or less conceptu-
ally congenial and pragmatically workable, and we may admire, endorse, 
or adopt various of them accordingly. What they cannot be, however, is 
“objectively correct.” Contemporary philosophers have mounted impor-
tant related challenges to conventional realist views.88 The work of philos-
opher of science, P. Kyle Stanford, is of particular interest here. Arguing 
from the historical record, Stanford advocates an essentially pragmatist 
(he calls it “instrumentalist”) view of the sciences and, with it, of our 
relation to the experienced world (Stanford 2006, 2016). Scientific theo-
ries are effective, he writes, not, as realists commonly maintain, “because 
they are true” but, rather, “because they help us successfully navigate the 
world in productive and systematic ways” (Stanford 2016, 96).89
In response to such challenges, academic philosophers have defended, 
qualified, and updated what they continue to name realism. Over the past 
Figure 1. A Glimpse of Reality? Anonymous woodcut in Camille Flammarion, 
L’Atmosphère: Météorologie Populaire, Paris 1888, p. 163. Source: Wikimedia Commons
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few decades, for example, we have been offered “scientific realism,” “real-
ism with a human face,” “post-positivist realism,” and “speculative real-
ism,” each with a set of related ontologies and epistemologies, that is, 
conjectures about what really is and claims about how we (or some of 
us) can know it. Specific realist and neorealist positions are not my con-
cern here, but I would make a general observation: with all due respect, 
climate change does not change everything.90 Where conceptually prob-
lematic invocations of a knowable objective reality have been effectively 
challenged, their intellectual status is not redeemed by our appreciation 
of the evidence of global warming or by our frustration at the denial of 
that evidence. Likewise, important challenges to realist views of scien-
tific authority are not made irrelevant by our appreciation of the efforts 
of climate scientists or by our awareness of campaigns to discredit 
those efforts.
The above observation evidently needs emphasis in view of persistent 
claims to the contrary: the claim, for example, that a robust philosophi-
cal realism is needed to counter the “alternative facts” spun out by politi-
cal strategists, or that a “postmodern” critique of objectivism has led to a 
public mistrust of scientific knowledge.91 Dubious claims of these kinds 
should, I think, be countered and rejected. But we may also acknowledge 
the intellectual and pragmatic perplexities they reflect regarding the reali-
ties of, among other things, climate change.
Some of those perplexities were given vivid expression by Bruno 
Latour in the essay mentioned above, “Why Has Critique Run Out of 
Steam?: From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern.” Published in 2004, 
it continues to be widely cited and remains influential in relation to these 
issues. In a passage of particular interest, Latour quotes a political strate-
gist seeking to deflect concern about global warming who advises making 
“the lack of scientific certainty” a primary point in arguments. “Do you 
see why I am worried?” Latour asks. “I myself have spent some time in the 
past trying to show ‘the lack of scientific certainty’ inherent in the construc-
tion of fact[s]” (227). He continues with a cascade of further questions:
Was I foolishly mistaken? … Was I wrong to participate in the 
invention of this field known as science studies? …Why does 
it burn my tongue to say that global warming is a fact whether 
you like it or not? Why can’t I simply say that the argument 
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is closed for good? … Should we apologize for having been 
wrong all along? Or should we rather bring the sword of 
criticism to criticism itself and do a bit of soul searching? … 
Nothing guarantees, after all, that we should be right all the 
time … Isn’t this what criticism intended to say: that there is 
no sure ground anywhere? But what does it mean when this 
lack of sure ground is taken away from us by the worst possible 
fellows as an argument against the things we cherish? (227)
Here and elsewhere in the essay, Latour poses crucial questions and 
says powerful things. But, here as elsewhere, the ironies are complex, 
the allusions ambiguous, and the recommendations somewhat elusive 
or equivocal.
His aim, Latour writes, is to raise some issues about “critique”: “not,” 
he continues, “to depress the reader, but to press ahead, to redirect our 
meager capacities as fast as possible.” But both the redirection proposed 
and the meaning of the contrast at the heart of it—from “matters of 
fact” to “matters of concern”—are open to widely differing interpreta-
tions. One interpretation, current in the literary academy, is that schol-
ars should turn from critique to more positive activities: to caring about 
texts and other things; to taking writers at their word instead of “digging 
deeply” into their texts for hidden meanings; to being less concerned with 
facts and more with affects; and so forth. This interpretation is reflected 
in a recent article titled “The New Modesty in Literary Criticism.” Its 
author, Jeffrey Williams, writes as follows:
In the theory years, you were what your reading was—Marxist, 
feminist, deconstructionist, queer … Some who were in that 
camp, with its suspicious habits, began moving away from it 
by the late 1990s and early 2000s …Other scholars also began 
to worry about the effects of theory. In a much-discussed … 
essay, “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?,” the sociologist 
of science Bruno Latour worried that the relativism and social 
constructionism of postmodern theory had discredited good 
science. (Williams 2015)
That is not, of course, quite what Latour said was worrying him.
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I suggest another way to interpret Latour’s worries below but would 
offer a word, first, on my perspective on these issues. It derives in part 
from my association with the literary academy but is shaped more signifi-
cantly by an early intellectual sympathy with the constructivist tradition 
in philosophy and the social sciences. The interest and sympathy were 
reflected in talks and articles I presented to academic audiences in the 
1990s. At the time, the American academy was much occupied by the 
“science wars”—fought, it should be recalled, by those defending tradi-
tional, largely rationalist-realist views of science against those promoting 
the relatively novel, largely constructivist views emerging from science 
studies. I was myself much occupied at the time both expounding the lat-
ter views and attempting to untangle ignorant confusions and malicious 
conflations regarding them, for example, their identification as (or with) 
“deconstructionism,” “postmodernism,” or “social constructionism,” and 
their conflation with Marxist ideology critique and/or, sometimes in the 
same breath, with classic idealism. There were lessons to be learned from 
those controversies about advocacy under conditions of extreme polar-
ization and motivated distortion. These are, of course, just the conditions 
that we face today with regard to climate change and that Latour evokes 
in the opening pages of his essay. We may return, then, to what he prob-
ably was and was not saying there.
In urging a turn from “matters of fact” to “matters of concern,” Latour 
was certainly not saying that we should revive triumphalist narratives of 
the history of science or realist-rationalist explanations of the authority 
of scientific knowledge. Nor was he repudiating either the critiques of 
such accounts elaborated over the twentieth century by constructivist 
theorists of science or the alternative accounts developed in the field of 
science studies by, among others, himself. Such critiques have continued 
to win his endorsement and the alternative accounts continue to figure 
centrally in his work, including his writings on climate change.92 What 
he may have been doing in the essay, at least in part, was calling on his 
fellow researchers and theorists in science studies to turn from critical 
treatments of traditional epistemology (or “matters of fact”), which had 
lost their urgency (“run out of steam”), to more concrete and pressing 
problems (or “matters of concern”), such as controversies over climate 
change, where their expertise might be useful. Such calls for increased 
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engagement with current problems were already familiar in the field and 
remain current in it, along with debates over scholars’ commitment to 
neutrality versus explicit advocacy (Demeritt 2006, Zuiderent-Jerak and 
Jensen 2007). This interpretation lacks the drama and scope implied by 
the title of Latour’s essay and by various allusions in the text.93 It has the 
advantage, however, of making sense in relation to his work as a theorist 
and practitioner of science studies. It also allows us to have some grip 
both on the “worries” he evokes rather obliquely in that opening passage 
and on the responses to such worries that he seems to suggest there.
The fact that “the worst possible fellows” say things that sound like 
what we say certainly presents problems, but they are not new ones. 
Indeed, they are ancient and proverbial. The devil or assorted devils have 
always quoted scripture for their own purposes. That has never been 
thought a good reason to stop preaching, much less to abandon scripture. 
It has been thought a good reason to clarify one’s teachings and to pay 
close attention to the situations and idioms of those one seeks to address. 
Constructivist accounts of science are, of course, not scriptural. As it 
happens, though, this is the solution to which Latour himself turns after 
detailing his corresponding worries, as a quasi-theologian, about ques-
tionable treatments of the New Testament. The title of the work in which 
he spells this out is Rejoicing: Or the Torments of Religious Speech (2013). 
We may recall his “burn[ing]” “tongue” in the passage from “Why Has 
Critique Lost its Steam” quoted above. More to the point here, it is what 
Latour attempts, under the label “diplomacy,” in regard to, among other 
things, constructivist accounts of science in the Anthropocene (Latour 
2015, “Diplomacy in the Face of Gaia”).
II
I turn now to a second set of perplexities related to climate change: not 
efforts on the part of assorted devils to discredit evidence of its reality 
but the denial or disregard of that evidence on the part of large segments 
of the public. Current writings by environmentalists invoke a suite of 
psychological tendencies to explain these reactions—or, as one witty 
title has it, Don’t Even Think About It: Why Our Brains are Wired to Ignore 
Climate Change (Marshall 2014).94 A different angle on them is suggested 
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by an important line of empirically informed inquiry in cognitive theory 
and philosophy of mind. For those pursuing this line of thought, the 
question is not, as in classical epistemology, how we, or the philosophers 
or scientists among us, arrive at the truth. The question is, rather,  how 
humans generally come to believe what they believe or know what they 
think they know.
In traditional accounts, beliefs are commonly conceived as discrete, 
correct-or-incorrect propositions about the world (“the earth is flat,” “the 
earth is round,” and so forth) located in our minds. Beliefs might be bet-
ter conceived, however, as systems of linked assumptions, ideas, images, 
and recollections and related perceptual and behavioral dispositions. 
This alternative view is suggested by several intellectual traditions. One 
is research and theory in empirical psychology, cognitive science, and 
neuroscience. A second, drawing on the first and on work in theoretical 
biology, is an influential approach in philosophy of mind.95 The relevant 
accounts in each of these fields stress the dynamic, interactive, and embod-
ied character of the processes and products of cognition: that is, of learn-
ing, remembering, figuring out, and planning, and of knowledge, mem-
ories, ideas, and beliefs. Increasingly in these fields, human cognition is 
identified not with so-called higher, rational, or computational processes 
occurring inside our heads but, rather, with our ongoing responsive inter-
actions with our environments as fully embodied creatures.
Throughout our lives, we interact with our environments in ways 
that continuously modify our bodily structures and how they operate; 
and these modifications affect our subsequent interactions with our 
environments, both what we perceive and how we act. It is not only that 
our bodily structures and their operations define what we can “detect” 
about the world, but also that the world that each of us can act on and be 
acted upon by is a specific perceptual and behavioral niche. Through the 
very process of living, moving about in, and exploring the world, we, like 
other creatures, continuously form cognitive constructs of the features 
of those niches; and, in turn, we, like other creatures, are continuously 
shaped—bodily and thus also cognitively—by the features of the niches 
with which we interact. Given the reciprocal dynamics just described, we 
can never become pure spectators of the world, observing a reality alto-
gether independent of us. This is not to say, however, that we are locked 
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out of “the real world.” It is to say, rather, that, like other creatures, we 
are inextricably interlocked with the real-as-can-be world. The objective 
reality posited in realist and neorealist ontologies is commonly evoked 
as “out there,” as a realm of Being distinct and apart from the humans 
who, as it were, just happen to inhabit it. Our operative realities, however, 
that is, the perceptual and behavioral niches with which we can and do 
interact and which can be consequential for us, are not distinct from the 
humans—philosophers and scientists included—who inhabit them. On 
the contrary, they are continuously realized, brought forth and made real 
for us, through the very processes of our living in them.
Much of what we experience as external to ourselves and speak of as 
“reality” can be understood as the relatively stable, provisionally work-
able configuration of objects, forces, and processes that we continuously 
construct through our ongoing, effective-enough interactions with our 
experiential environments. The strong sense we may have of the simple 
out-there-ness of “what’s out there” can be seen, accordingly, not as an 
undeniable intuition of an ontological given but as the thoroughly con-
tingent product of complex processes of perceptual and behavioral coor-
dination. These processes tend to issue in relatively similar patterns of 
response to relatively recurrent and stable conditions in our experience, 
and they are thus relatively predictable and reliable in their effects. We 
may appreciate, then, the experiential sources and apparent experiential 
confirmation of classic realist ideas. But we need not endorse those ideas 
in their classic versions. Specifically, we need not presume any isomor-
phism or other form of matching or mirroring between what we expe-
rience as and name “reality” and the putative objective properties of a 
presumptively independent universe. And we need not presume that the 
effectiveness of our individual actions or communally developed tech-
nologies depends on our having correct representations of a universe 
altogether apart from us in our minds, our science textbooks, or our engi-
neering manuals.
The view of human cognition outlined above was developed relatively 
independently of the tradition of constructivist epistemology associated 
with the history and sociology of science. Both, however, reject classic 
rationalist accounts of knowledge; and the alternative accounts of knowl-
edge and belief developed by each are mutually supportive. As noted in 
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previous chapters, one of the earliest articulations of constructivist epis-
temology is Ludwik Fleck’s Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact 
(1979 [1935]). A scholar of medical history and shrewd amateur sociol-
ogist as well as a practicing biologist, Fleck sought to describe the forma-
tion of scientific knowledge in relation to the more general dynamics of 
human cognition at both the individual and the sociohistorical levels. Of 
particular interest here is his analysis of what he calls “belief systems” and 
what he describes as their “tendency to inertia.” He writes: “Once a struc-
turally complete and closed system of beliefs consisting of many details 
and relations has been formed, it offers tenacious resistance to anything 
that contradicts it” (27, translation modified). Fleck relates this tendency 
to what he describes as the ongoing “mutual attunement” of beliefs, per-
ceptions, and material practices among the members of an epistemic 
community or, in his term, “thought collective.” Through this process, 
collectives develop characteristic “thought styles,” which is to say, shared 
habits of perception, interpretation, and explanation.
Several features of belief systems, so understood, are relevant to cli-
mate skepticism and denialism. One is the dense interdependence of 
their elements. For example, different sets of communally shared assump-
tions may dispose us to see—perceive and interpret—a severe drought 
as evidence of global warming, or as part of a normal weather cycle, or as 
punishment by the gods. And, reciprocally, our interpreting a drought in 
one or another of these ways will reinforce those assumptions and, with 
them, our continued disposition to perceive and respond to comparable 
events in just those ways. This ongoing positive feedback loop gives con-
siderable stability to our belief systems. By the same token, however, it 
makes those systems strongly resistant to change.
A second relevant feature of belief systems, so understood, is their 
social constitution and institutional maintenance: that is, the fact that 
they are both formed and stabilized through our ongoing interactions 
with, among other things, other people, especially members of our par-
ticular epistemic communities. A good part of what re-stabilizes a convic-
tion (for example, a belief that the earth is flat) in the face of potentially 
destabilizing experiences (for example, some clever fellow’s demonstra-
tion that the earth is round) is the renewal of the collective social practices 
through which that conviction was formed in the first place—practices, it 
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must be stressed, that are not only verbal but embodied and also, usually, 
materially consequential as well. If a belief system remains stable among 
the members of some collective, it is because the perceptual and behav-
ioral dispositions associated with it allow its members to operate effec-
tively in whatever domains of thought and practice are significant in their 
lives. Thus, convictions or beliefs that are clearly mistaken or irrational 
in relation to currently prevailing and sophisticated understandings of 
the world—for example, the conviction that droughts are divine punish-
ments—may nevertheless serve, or have served, the members of a partic-
ular community well enough in the only worlds they actually inhabit/ed.
This perspective on belief systems allows us to appreciate some 
aspects of so-called belief-perseverance not always recognized by those 
who invoke the tendency to explain stubborn skepticisms regarding cli-
mate change. First, the tendency in question (I call it “cognitive conser-
vatism” [Smith 1997, 50-51, 84-86]) is not a flaw in our mental makeup 
or a maladaptive hangover from our evolutionary history. Rather, it is 
a powerful but ambivalently operating—sometimes good, sometimes 
bad—feature of human cognition. Cognitive plasticity is obviously 
necessary for any creature that survives, as humans do, by its ability to 
learn and to modify its behavior responsively. But so also is the counter-
tendency, that is, our ability and inclination to retain our beliefs beyond 
the occasion of their formation. Much of intellectual life and intellectual 
history can be understood as the interplay of these complementary ten-
dencies and their assessment from different perspectives. Thus, given our 
well-developed capacity to learn from others, we can be duly “informed” 
and “enlightened” but also, as we say (usually of other people), “duped” 
or “indoctrinated.” And, given our ability and inclination to hold fast to 
what we believe, we can be stubborn in our attachment to error or, as we 
say (usually of ourselves), steadfast in our defense of truth.
I would also stress, accordingly, the generality of cognitive conserva-
tism. The tendencies associated with it—rationalization, dissonance-
avoidance, confirmation bias, and so forth—are not restricted to the 
naive or the uneducated. Physicians hold fast to their diagnoses, schol-
ars to their glosses. Philosophers discredit the intellectual competence of 
challengers; scientists discount anomalies as flukes. These tendencies are 
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routinely attributed to climate skeptics and climate denialists. We should 
not be surprised if they were found among environmentalists as well.
III
This last possibility recalls Latour’s suggestion, in the passage quoted ear-
lier, that those engaged in critique should examine their own attitudes 
and practices. “Or should we rather bring the sword of criticism to criti-
cism itself and do a bit of soul searching?,” he asks, and adds: “Nothing 
guarantees, after all, that we should be right all the time.” The suggestion 
has been taken as urging a wholesale abandonment of practices of cri-
tique and has spawned, accordingly, a good deal of rather indiscriminate 
anti-critical declaiming to that effect.96 Latour has his own quarrels with 
some types of critique and often writes—indiscriminately enough—of 
“the critical spirit” or “the critical mind.” But the soul-searching he rec-
ommends here can be understood differently: not as critical suicide but, 
rather, as a type of principled reflexivity urged and often pursued in sci-
ence studies. Latour himself has urged and pursued it under the term 
“symmetrical anthropology.” Thus he admonishes field anthropologists to 
“come home” and examine Western, modern beliefs the way they exam-
ine the beliefs of other cultures. And, as discussed in chapter 4 above, he 
illustrates the practice by describing the facts constructed and accorded 
authority in Western science in pointed parallel with the fetishes con-
structed and worshiped in the past by Gold Coast natives (Latour 2010, 
“On the Cult of the Factish Gods”).
A recent “ontological turn” in anthropology is of related interest. The 
development is usually described as a determination by ethnographers 
and theoretical anthropologists both to “take seriously” the cosmologies 
of indigenous peoples and to question seriously their own ontological 
assumptions.97 There may be no direct historical connections, but one 
can see this self-disciplining turn as a radicalization of the more general 
commitment to explanatory symmetry and reflexivity put forth in the 
sociology of science in the 1970s and sustained more generally in con-
structivist studies of science and technology (STS). As discussed in pre-
vious chapters, the aim of those twin commitments was to avoid the com-
monly lopsided—self-flattering and strongly presentist—explanations of 
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scientific achievement familiar in rationalist epistemology and triumpha-
list intellectual history. And, as I have argued throughout, although the 
practices associated with those commitments are certainly relativistic in 
some respects, they are neither foolish nor objectionable but, on the con-
trary, can be especially valuable in dealing with conceptual and ethical 
perplexities, including the kind that concern us here.
An example relevant to climate change is a study by Arlie Russell 
Hochschild titled Strangers in their Own Land (2016). A social psycholo-
gist, Hochschild sought to understand why people living in some of the 
most petro-polluted regions of the United States vote regularly for can-
didates who support both the oil-extracting, chemical-producing indus-
tries responsible for the pollution and the free-market practices that have 
destroyed their natural environment and threaten their homes and health. 
She calls it “The Great Paradox.” Focusing on a coastal region in Louisiana, 
Hochschild interviewed a good number of such people, following them 
in their daily routines and speaking with them in their homes, churches, 
and workplaces. She describes the study as involving efforts to surmount 
“the wall of empathy” that separated her, a self-described liberal and pro-
gressive, from the men and women—all professed members of the con-
servative Tea Party—whose lives and views she documented: factory 
workers, fishermen, gospel singers, small-business owners, local officials, 
and so forth. Hochschild’s determination to report their views impartially 
is evident throughout the book. Of particular interest here are her efforts 
to find counterparts, in her own sentiments, to those expressed by her 
subjects and also to find parallels to them in feelings, views, and values 
commonly expressed by her liberal friends and associates. I return below 
to some of the Tea Party members’ views and sentiments. What I want 
to note here are both the symmetry and the reflexivity displayed in those 
efforts: forms of intellectual and ethical good practice that can bring us, 
as they evidently brought Hochschild herself, to insights not otherwise 
readily available and to understandings of ourselves as well as others that 
can be politically as well as psychically valuable.98
Recent thought about these issues is inevitably shadowed by the 
coincident political dramas unfolding in the United States. The realities 
evoked in Hochschild’s book are especially haunting. Many oppositional 
slogans, “Love trumps hate,” “We have nothing to fear but fear,” and so 
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forth, are probably beside the point. The most politically significant 
views that Hochschild encountered among her Tea Party subjects were 
born not of fear or raw hatred but, rather, of nostalgia and deep resent-
ment. While she does not use the latter term, her reports, like those of 
many other observers, suggest that, along with the sense of a better world 
lost, a sense of injured merit—and, in effect, of injustice—may be among 
the most powerful motivators of current rural and working-class politics 
in the United States.99 The values and attitudes that Hochschild describes 
among the people she studied are largely the homely ones familiar to 
observers and social historians of the American South and Midwest: 
personal independence, in-group loyalty, hard work, and pride in sta-
tus. Louisiana Tea Party voters are not resentful of their petro-industry 
employers, to whom they are grateful for jobs and for whatever measure 
of local prosperity they see. Nor are they resentful of superrich business-
people, whom they admire for their industriousness and success. They are 
resentful of people and groups whom they see as getting special attention 
or getting ahead unfairly—largely blacks, gays, and immigrants—and 
perhaps most deeply of those, “liberals” and “elites,” whom they see as 
putting those people and groups ahead while condemning them as back-
ward, bigoted, or worse. The Great Paradox is hardly paradoxical at all.
Some reflections suggest themselves accordingly. It is probably not 
the “postmodern” critique of rationalist-realist epistemology that makes 
rural, working-class voters in the United States ignore climate science. It 
may not even require industry-funded campaigns to win and sustain their 
support for anti-regulation candidates.  It may be enough that they see 
environmentalism, not altogether incorrectly, as a liberal-elite agenda and 
that global warming remains, for them, a distant and abstract concept.100 
At least two important lessons seem to follow. One is that hopes for a 
grassroots movement of resistance to the extraction of fossil fuels must 
be checked against the force of such views and of the political realities to 
which they give rise. Here as elsewhere, malice can trump prudence and 
resentment can trump everything. The other is that, to be effective, envi-
ronmentalist arguments, like arguments against the devil quoting scrip-
ture, must be attuned to the conceptual idioms of their actual audiences 
and calibrated to their operative realities.
120 Chapter 7
IV
In describing, above, the generality of belief-persistence, I noted that 
the tendencies associated with it might be found among environmental-
ists as well as among climate skeptics and denialists. What I had in mind 
was the persistent hope or conviction, common among the writers cited 
here, that widespread recognition of the perils involved in global warm-
ing will lead to the emergence of a climate-conscious and climate-con-
scientious human collective, either a major new coalition or, in effect, an 
ingroup of humanity as a whole.
Those voicing such hopes often invoke past cultural shifts and large-
scale movements as precedents. Thus appeals are made to abolitionism, 
feminism, the anti-Vietnam War movement, and the acceptance of gay 
marriage, with the French or Russian revolutions and perhaps, for some, 
the rise of Christianity as shadow models of historical success.101 But such 
appeals must ignore or downplay the significantly different forces and 
circumstances that exist here: notably, the diffuseness, complexity, and 
relative impersonality of the harms involved, the magnitude of the imme-
diate costs or sacrifices required, and the uncertainty and abstractness of 
the benefits, if any, to be gained. In a recent book, The Great Derangement, 
Indian writer Amitav Ghosh, noting a range of discouraging historical 
precedents and comparably discouraging current political and economic 
conditions, writes (with a perhaps unwitting double emphasis): “The 
refusal to acknowledge these realities sometimes lends an air of unreality 
to discussions of climate change” (Ghosh 2016, 145).102
Other differences are equally important. The varied phenomena that 
we sum up as climate change have aspects that make due recognition both 
difficult to arrive at and difficult to communicate. Some of the relevant 
phenomena are violent and manifest but local and transient; others are 
large and widespread but slow and not readily perceptible; all are exceed-
ingly unevenly distributed globally and even regionally. The relevant 
information is technical, complex, and not easily absorbed or retained by 
individuals, even those with specialized training. Such information is also 
neither ready to hand or easy to come by, and much of the data is, in fact, 
disputed among experts. Those in the past who theorized or summoned 
large-scale uprisings did not confront and probably could not have imag-
ined the combined aggregating, stupefying, and disaggregating effects 
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of the hyper-mass media, which, even as they enable the mobilization of 
multitudes, sharpen and polarize group differences and isolate communi-
ties from potentially illuminating interactions with others.
As emphasized by environmentalists, there is a virtual consensus 
of informed scientists regarding the destructive, destabilizing effects of 
anthropogenic climate change, and one could claim a virtual consen-
sus of academics, intellectuals, and thoughtful, well-intentioned people 
regarding the need for a set of appropriate responses. This statement of 
double consensus, however, obscures a number of sticky issues. What 
responses are appropriate? By what methods, in what assemblies, and 
with what authority, will that appropriateness be determined, and in 
accord with which—or whose—interests, views, and priorities? Latour’s 
essay, “Why has Critique Run out of Steam?,” is often invoked, here as 
elsewhere, as urging us (presumably thoughtful, well-meaning academ-
ics and intellectuals) to turn from “matters of fact,” meaning, perhaps 
(among other things) the detailed data of climate science, to “matters of 
concern,” meaning, perhaps (among other things), the actual quotidian 
threats involved. Given, however, significant differences of situation as 
well as multiple, divergent interests among “us” (certainly among humans 
generally and even just among thoughtful, well-meaning academics and 
intellectuals), it is not clear, especially when equally justifiable interests 
conflict, which matters of concern should concern us most. Humanity? 
Every one of us? If not, then who? The biosphere? Every nook, niche, and 
creature? If not, then which ones? Future generations? How far into the 
future? If not thousands of years, then how many?
It is also not clear what form responses can take that would be on a 
scale great enough to have the required or desired effects. Fossil fuels 
should, of course, be replaced by renewable sources of energy. But where, 
when, by what technical, political, and/or economic means, and through 
what social agencies? Are geo-engineered protections or mitigations 
(cement pilings, floodgates, cloud seeding, and so forth) altogether to be 
disdained, as suggested by those intent on purely socio-economic and/or 
spiritual transformations? If so, then when exactly should we give up driv-
ing cars and having children, and through what form of incentive and/or 
compulsion, administered and monitored by what governmental agen-
cies? Duly detailed attention to such questions might better prepare us 
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for the conflicts and losses thereby indicated and perhaps encourage the 
compromises and sacrifices required by all for the survival of anything.103 
Conversely, without acknowledgment of these and other comparably dif-
ficult issues, environmentalists’ summons to responsible action becomes 
only too readily ignorable.
Many scientists and environmental activists write as if geophysical 
facts will triumph of themselves or will do so when the machinations of 
“merchants of doubt” are exposed. Often overlooked is the significance 
of the variable conditions of the reception of those facts, and also the 
significance, for different listeners, of how the accuracy of that informa-
tion is authorized and how such exposures are mediated. Recently and 
especially as spurred by climate change, historians and political scien-
tists have joined sociologists of science in observing the limits of the so-
called “deficit model” of science communication, in which scientists are 
seen primarily as inherently credible deliverers of accurate information 
to an ignorant public (Howe 2014, Simis et al 2016, Jasanoff and Simmet 
2017). Environmental activists sometimes suggest that the Internet or 
social media amount to vastly expanded, presumably democratic, public 
spheres. But, as noted by most media scholars and commentators, these 
electronic venues have tended to become more or less tightly sealed 
social enclosures, as, of course, more familiar concrete spaces (pubs, 
squares, and town halls included) could also be. The “public sphere” of 
Critical Theory was always an idealized concept.
Writers voicing hopes for the emergence of an environment-con-
scious global collective also appeal to allegedly universal human values 
or natural impulses as dependable motivators. Thus British environmen-
tal activist George  Marshall writes of the universality of parental care 
for children and other “nonnegotiable sacred values” (Marshall 2014), 
and American environmental historian Jedidiah  Purdy describes the 
“self-restraint” that follows from a recognition of personal “guilt” and 
thus “responsibility” (Purdy 2016).104 Others write of a “treasuring” of 
the natural world and life-forms awakened by encounters with natu-
ral beauty and sharpened by art or the due study of biology (Wilson and 
Kellert 1993). The universality and naturalness of such impulses may be 
doubted, however, along with the political effectiveness of such recogni-
tions and treasuring as may, indeed, occur among various, but probably 
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quite limited, groups of people. Those invoking such allegedly endemic 
responses and moral norms, parental love included, must disregard their 
well-attested cultural variability and also their evident failure to prevent 
persistent patterns of rather nasty behavior among humans everywhere. I 
remarked above that climate change doesn’t change everything. It doesn’t 
change everyone, either.
The difficulties involved in such appeals and arguments are illustrated 
in a recent book, Defiant Earth (2017), by Australian environmental 
ethicist Clive Hamilton. Hamilton calls for “a new anthropocentrism” 
anchored in a recognition of our unmatched achievements (“marvels 
of intellect and culture”) joined with our equally unrivalled power to 
destroy. He goes on to argue that because, unlike other creatures, humans 
have the freedom to choose, we have the duty to repair or avert the envi-
ronmental damages and threats caused by the unbridled exercise of our 
powers. Hamilton describes these ideas as “the defining truths of the 
age” (55), but his highly abstract moral logic is not likely to transform 
the behavior of many people. At the same time, the theologically tinged 
image of humans as demigods obscures an arguably more useful recog-
nition of a range of relevant human attributes, including some reliable, 
though strictly sublunary, creative capacities.
In addition to the forms of denialism noted above, there is an incli-
nation among environmentalist writers to suggest that the failings of 
dominant views and values (notably Western, modern, materialistic, and 
male-associated) are exposed by global warming and will be duly hum-
bled while the benefits of marginal views and values (notably non-West-
ern, traditional, spiritual, and female-associated) are redeemed by it and 
will be duly elevated.105 There is sometimes a grim satisfaction to these 
suggestions of reversals. One could call it Anthropocene Schadenfreude: 
all may go down in darkness, but the despised and rejected—those who 
suffered under capitalism and imperialism, who railed against secularism 
and modernity, and who predicted catastrophe and ruin—will, as one 
writer puts it, have “the last laugh.”106
Futurology is a high risk sport for amateurs and must be, for profes-
sionals, an increasingly thankless task. It is exceedingly hard to predict 
how the complex and highly differentiated effects of climate change will 
play out in the long run or even in the middle run. As I have suggested, 
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there is good reason to doubt that those effects will be countered by the 
united efforts of a duly enlightened global human community. What 
seems more likely is the ad hoc emergence of local coalitions in the face 
of more or less urgent local threats. Barbarism may not be the only alter-
native to socialism, as Rosa Luxemburg believed and as Isabelle Stengers 
(2015) echoes. But it also seems likely that, as critical resources (habit-
able shelter, cultivatable land, food, water, energy, and so forth) become 
increasingly scarce, there will be struggles, more or less barbarous, 
between different groups.
My aim here has certainly not been to discredit the efforts of environ-
mental advocates and activists. I admire greatly the scholars and writers 
whose works I have been citing and would want to share their most opti-
mistic views. My aim, rather, has been to articulate some of the problems 
I see associated with these efforts and to suggest some alternative ways to 
respond to the concerns we share. It comes down, perhaps, to advising 
more relevantly informed imaginings and goals and to suggesting that we 
grant not, of course, the equal validity of all views or the equal conse-
quentiality of all realities but the equal force of all views and realities for 
those who hold and inhabit them and, therefore, their substantial claim 
on the attention of those of us who—on whatever terrain, intellectual or 
practical, ethical or political—must operate in relation to them.
It is just as well that climate change does not change everything or 
everyone. Adaptive as well as maladaptive capacities will no doubt 
continue be displayed. At least some past wisdom is likely to remain a 
resource in the face of large-scale historical obliviousness. Even as reali-
ties change radically, humans will probably continue to form collectives, 
continue to instruct and to learn from one another, and, we may hope, 
operate in many places more or less effectively—and, sometimes, less 
rather than more barbarously.
Notes
Notes to Chapter 1
1. To address a contemporary concern: there is nothing anthropocentric in this 
view. In the accounts referenced here, the same is understood to be true of the 
relation between the processes and products of cognition in all organisms: 
that is, specification, articulation, and realization through embodied dynamic 
interaction.
2. See, e.g., Fleck 1935, Kuhn 1962, Feyerabend 1975 and 1985, Gibson 1979, 
Maturana and Varela 1980, Knorr Cetina 1981, Latour 1988, Pickering 1995, 
Noë 2004, Thompson 2010, Hutto and Myin 2017. Constructivist challenges 
to classical epistemology are by no means recent in origin. Some have been 
part of the philosophical tradition since Protagoras; others can be traced 
without difficulty to the ideas of Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, William 
James, and John Dewey. For some of the lineages, see Golinsky 1995. For a 
sample of the range of contemporary constructivist approaches and a set of 
efforts at a comprehensive definition, see Becerra and Castorina 2018.
3. See, e.g., Boghossian 2006. Boghossian casts constructivism as a politically 
motivated “fear of knowledge” on the part of members of socially 
disadvantaged groups and the philosophically disadvantaged academics who 
speak for them.
4. For discussion of what I call the Egalitarian Fallacy and other improper 
charges and inferences, including quietism, nihilism, anything-goes-ism, 
and self-refutation, see Smith 1988, 150-184; 1997, 1-36, 73-87; 2005/6, 
18-45. For equivocal invocations and/or disavowals of relativism, see Smith 
2005/6, 85-107.
5. For examples of such practices in the “science wars,” see Gross and Levitt 
1998, Sokal and Bricmont 1998, and Koertge 1998, 3–6, discussed in Smith 
2005/6, 115-127. For the display of such practices in a purported exposure 
of the “unpalatable relativism” of constructivism, see Boghossian 2002, 
discussed in Smith 2002 (“Reply to an Analytic Philosopher”).
6. See, e.g., Harré and Krausz 1996, 75, 100, and 112-13.
7. For related discussion focused on invocations and denials of the Holocaust, 
see Smith 1997, 23-36. For comparable arguments regarding invocations and 
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denials of climate change and comparable questioning of the assumptions 
involved, see the exchanges between Baker and Oreskes 2017 and Fuller 2017.
8. For important early accounts of the developments, see Pickering 1992.
9. For an informed attempt to sort out the affinities and differences, see 
Jensen 2017.
10. For the former, see, e.g., Boyer 2001. For the latter, see, e.g., Haught 2003.
11. “[W]e may have to abandon, for our part, the very notion of ‘Belief ’” (Latour 
2013, 14). In an entry on the term “Belief ” in the online version of the book 
(AIME), Latour writes: “The inquiry proceeds from an original form of 
agnosticism which consists not of disbelieving but of leaving entirely to one 
side the notion of belief in order to treat veridiction conflicts between modes” 
(AIME, accessed 23 December 2017).
12. Latour, AIME, entry on “Belief.” Accessed 23 December 2017.
13. See, e.g., the glib dismissals of religion by a number of philosophers and 
scientists at the symposia Beyond Belief 2006 and 2007.
14. For an early pragmatist version, see Dewey 1958. “To see the organism 
in nature,” Dewey wrote, “is the answer to the problems which haunt 
philosophy. And when thus seen [the organism] … will be seen to be 
in [nature], not as marbles are in a box but as events are in history, in a 
moving, growing never finished process” (295). For a survey of such views of 
cognition and a discussion of the variants, see Hutto and Myin 2017, 1-53.
15. To say that cognitive processes and products are not reducible to two 
distinct types is not to say that they are homogeneous. On the contrary, 
what is important here are both the general heterogeneity of what we call our 
“beliefs” and the individual distinctiveness of our mental lives. For related 
discussion, see Smith 2010, 69-80.
16. For the continuity of the dispositions and activities commonly associated 
with religion and those involved in art and politics, see Burkert 1998. On 
the evident continuity of anthropologists’ understandings of “religion” and 
“culture,” see Smith 2009, 89-94.
17. For a comparable characterization, see the text version, Latour 2013, 184-185.
18. As observed by most scholars of the subject (though characteristically 
disputed by monotheologians), the term “religion” requires comparable 
pluralizing in comparable controversies.
Notes to Chapter 2
19. See Harré and Krausz 1996 for a taxonomy of relativisms and an attempt, 
as they write, “to extricate and examine the arguments, abstracted from 
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sources ancient and modern, that have been offered for and against the main 
varieties” (1). See Baghramian 2004 for the idea of a “family” of claims, 
positions, or doctrines. For an unhappy evocation of the supposed (and 
perhaps real enough) moral relativism of contemporary college students, see 
Thomson 2001, discussed in Smith 2001 (“Comment”). For a “postmodern 
relativism” identified by a failure on the part of various scholars to offer 
certain desirable emphases in their work, see Mohanty 1997 and the 
discussion in Smith 2005/6, 34-38.
20. On the early figures and what I discuss as “pre-post-modern relativism,” see 
Smith 2005/6, 18-45.
21. These intentions are clear in the following passages by anthropologist Ruth 
Benedict and sociologist David Bloor:
Any scientific study requires that there be no preferential weighting of 
one or another of the items in the series it selects for its consideration. In 
all the less controversial fields like the study of cacti or termites or the 
nature of nebulae, the necessary method of study is to group the relevant 
material and to take note of all possible variant forms and conditions …. 
It is only in the study of man himself that the major social sciences have 
substituted the study of one local variation, that of Western civilization. 
(Benedict [1934] 1959, 3)
If [the sociologist’s] theories are to satisfy the requirement of 
maximum generality they will have to apply to both true and false beliefs 
…. The sociologist seeks theories which explain the beliefs which are 
in fact found, regardless of how the investigator evaluates them …. The 
approaches that have just been sketched suggest that the sociology of 
scientific knowledge should adhere to the following four tenets …. (Bloor 
[1976] 1991, 5, 7).
22. I discuss the self-affirming circularity involved in such arguments in Smith 
1997, 73-87 and 118-124.
23. Despite the quantities of logical ink poured over their heads, none of the 
major thinkers thus putatively refuted—for example, Feyerabend, Foucault, 
Derrida, Rorty, or Latour—has seen reason to acknowledge the alleged error 
of their thinking on the crucial issues.
24. I refer here to such principles as historical and cultural contextualization 
and explanatory impartiality and reflexivity, not to such (alleged) views as 
the utter uniqueness of every culture or the impossibility of cross-cultural 
generalizations.
25. For work on linguistic relativity, see Gumperz and Levinson 1996. For the 
historicity of concepts such as science, knowledge, and objectivity, see Giere 
2006, Daston and Galison 2007, Shapin 2008. For a rigorous articulation of 
epistemological relativism, defended handily against standard philosophical 
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refutation-arguments, see Kusch 2002. For philosophical defenses of 
relativism as such and a useful overview of current philosophical treatments 
of the issues, see García-Carpintero and Kölbel 2008.
26. For examples of such denunciations, see, respectively, Wilson 1998, 
Boghossian 2006, and Ratzinger 2005. For an exegesis of “the dictatorship of 
relativism” in the Vatican example, see Smith 2007.
27. Atran’s examples are singularly ill-chosen. Many lay readers as well as 
anthropologists would find such beliefs recognizable and have no trouble 
restating them in familiar, credible-enough terms. But his claim here is 
already strained. The cultural relativism of anthropologists does not typically 
arise from finding the beliefs of the people they study nonsensical as distinct 
from deeply different from beliefs generally accepted in Western cultures 
(see, e.g., Vivieros de Castro 2015).
28. See the discussion of dynamic, embodied, ecological, and enactive views 
of human cognition in chapters 1, 4 and 7. For further discussion of Atran’s 
examples and argument, see Smith 2009, 10-19.
29. For extensively informed discussion of these general points, see Lloyd 2007.
30. Behaviorists and Jesuits famously spoke of the power of conditioning or early 
training to shape the minds of the young.
31. Prominent among the alternative approaches are developmental systems 
theory (see Oyama et al 2001) and, as noted above, accounts of cognitive 
processes that stress their dynamic, interactive features (e.g., Núñez and 
Freeman 1999, Noë 2004, Melser 2004).
32. Fuller himself pointedly rejects the idea that the pursuit of sociology of 
science entails a refusal to offer judgments on public issues involving science. 
For an exchange between Fuller and fellow sociologists of science regarding 
his testimony in Kitzmiller v. Dover, see Lynch et al 2006.
33. In a subsequent commentary on his participation in the Dover trial, Fuller 
recognizes the political value of a contingency-conscious relativism. Noting 
that science studies “have a weak public presence and a history of being 
treated as pawns by more powerful players,” he writes: “Had I been more 
of a relativist, presumably I would have taken heed of these features of the 
situation and refrained from offering my services” (Fuller 2009, 116).
34. Such a disavowal occurs, for example, at the end of an analysis of various 
contemporary proposals for responding to the use or abuse of drugs by 
Jacques Derrida. The analysis itself is thoroughly mindful of contingency and 
explicitly committed to symmetry and evenhandedness. Derrida writes:
Depending on the circumstance … the discourse of “interdiction” can 
be justified just as well or just as badly as the liberal discourse …. Since 
it is impossible to justify absolutely either the one or the other of these 
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practices, one can never absolutely condemn them. In an emergency, this 
can only lead to equivocations, negotiations, and unstable compromises. 
And in any given, progressively evolving situation, these will need to be 
guided by a concern for the singularity of each individual experience and 
by a socio-political analysis that is at once as broadly and as finely tuned 
as possible. I say this not to avoid the question any more than I do to argue for 
relativism. (Derrida 1995, 239, emphasis added)
Martin Hägglund quotes the above passage following his sympathetic 
explication of a form of political thinking that he terms “hyperpoliticization” 
(2008, 234). Doubling the both the arguably relativistic observations and the 
explicit refusal of the presumed intellectual weakness, Hägglund writes:
For a hyperpolitical thinking, nothing (no set of values, no principle, 
no demand or political struggle) can be posited as good in itself …. 
Rather than having an ultimate legitimacy, it [any political order] can 
be challenged on the basis of what it does not include and must remain 
open to contestation because of its temporal constitution. To assert such a 
condition is not to give in to relativism” (184–85, emphasis added).
These disavowals of an undefined relativism appended to rigorous 
articulations of strenuously contingency-affirming, absolutism-rejecting 
views raise the question of what, in each case, “relativism” and either 
“argu[ing] for” or “giv[ing] in to” it are understood to mean. More generally, 
one might ask: On the basis of what specific considerations of intellectual 
history, or as the result of what individual experiences of usages of the term, 
are such disavowals thought necessary?
Notes to Chapter 4
35. The original version of this essay was prepared for a symposium titled 
Recomposing the Humanities with Bruno Latour.
36. The account summarized here is initially developed in Latour and Woolgar 
1986 and Latour 1987 and 1988. It is further elaborated and elucidated in 
Latour 1999 and 2005 (Reassembling the Social).
37. See chapters 5 and 6 in this volume.
38. Latour’s usage of the term Moderns—and, in connection with it, either “we” 
or “they”—varies widely, and the specific reference of the term in his work 
tends to be elusive. Most generally and neutrally, it seems to mean something 
like educated, post-Enlightenment, more or less secularized Westerners. 
Throughout his writings, however, and in tones ranging from affectionate 
irony to bitter sarcasm, Latour depicts the members of this group (or, in 
the ethnographic conceit of Latour 2013, this “tribe”) as fundamentally 
benighted, self-ignorant, and arrogant: mistaken about the constitution of 
their world, mistaken about their own motives and values, and given to airs 
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regarding those they regard as unenlightened. Since he gives few specific 
examples of individual Moderns, either historical or contemporary, readers 
will be inclined to understand the references in accord with their particular 
sense of Western history and their more general intellectual and cultural 
tastes and, of course, distastes.
39. See Latour and Wiebel 2002. The recurrent quote marks are Latour’s.
40. See, for example, Latour’s postface to the French translation of Genesis and 
Development (Latour 2005, “Transmettre la syphilis, partager l’objectivité”) and 
Latour 2013, 91.
41. As noted in chapter 1 above, what Latour would banish is not the term 
“belief ” as such (he acknowledges its innocuous usages) but its invidious or 
patronizing invocation, largely in relation to religious ideas. His efforts “to 
slip in between” what he calls “epistemological questions and ontological 
questions” reflect his related effort, in establishing the respect-worthiness 
of divinities, to escape the choice between a dubious claim of objective 
existence for such beings and an unwanted ascription of their existence to 
(mere) subjective belief. 
42. Latour stresses that it is also a mistake, though of a different kind, to appeal 
to a putative correspondence-to-reality to explain the efficacies of the 
natural sciences.
43. See, for example, Tim Howles’s rejoinder to Jan Golinski’s appreciative but 
distanced reading of “‘Thou Shall Not Freeze-Frame’” (Golinski 2010). 
Howles writes:
Religious people, Golinski thinks, “will still want to insist on the 
ontological reality of the things they believe in and will not be happy to 
have their religion reduced to the manipulation of signs that lack any 
reference to the real world.” … However, in the light of this chapter 
[i.e., chap. 11 in Modes of Existence], I suggest we can put Golinksi’s 
claim to bed as unfounded. Latour does not lead us into the realm of 
apophatic theology and the beings of [REL(IGION)] are not to be taken 
as merely Feuerbachian projections. There is ballast to Latour’s theology 
(Howles 2014).
44. See, e.g., the account of these writings by theologian Adam S. Miller 
(2013). Miller’s style is, like Latour’s, highly allusive and, in his case, also 
exceedingly gnomic.
45. The scope of the concept and the meanings of the term “religion” are, of 
course, extensively contested. On the concept, see Saler 1993 and Dubuisson 
2003; on the term, see J. Z. Smith 1998.
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46. My term “religion-proper” here and below refers to the mode that Latour 
names “Religion” and identifies, usually indirectly but always recognizably, 
with Christianity.
47. Latour’s references to non-Catholics or non-Christians tend to join them 
together in terms that are, at best, vague: for example, “those outside” 
versus “those inside” the Church or, sometimes, “the indifferent” versus 
“the faithful.”
48. In an entry on “Empiricism” in AIME, Latour writes: “Rereading James 
allows us to take radical empiricism as a watchword, but the phrase ‘radical 
empiricism’ takes on a more developed sense in AIME. . . AIME’s radicalism 
is even more extreme.”
49. “There is a constant risk,” Latour writes, “of interpolating, confusing the 
two, failing to respect the contrasts. To care for is not to save. To initiate the 
circulation of psychogenics is not at all the same thing as letting oneself be 
overwhelmed by angels” (Latour 2013, 304).
50. For a range of examples of such efforts, see Kurz 2003.
51. On the historical connections, see Brook 1991, Bowler and Morus 2005, 
341–66, and Harrison 2015. On the continuing connections, see Noble 1992.
52. I discuss the limited success of theological attempts at reconciliation in Smith 
2009, 95–120.
53. See, for example, the chapter in Latour 1999 titled “The Historicity of Things: 
Where Were Microbes before Pasteur?” (145–73) and, with notably different 
concerns and emphases, the article titled “Charles Péguy: Time, Space, and le 
Monde Moderne” (Latour 2015).
54. Elements of the tale recur throughout Latour’s writings. For recent instances, 
see Latour 2015 (“Charles Péguy”), 50, and Latour 2017, especially the sixth 
lecture, 184-219.
55. Representations of modernity as lapse, loss, and degeneration are a staple 
of traditional religious moralism and social conservatism and recur in more 
sophisticated forms in current so-called postsecularist thought. See, for 
example, Macintyre 1981, Taylor 2007, Gregory 2012, and Pfau 2013.
56. See the entry on “Psychology” in AIME, from which the epigraph to this 
section is drawn.
57. For related discussion and examples of these approaches, see pp. 15-16 
and 112-114 in this volume. I consider their implications for controversies 
in epistemology in Smith 1997, 37–51, 125–52. For their relevance to the 
understanding of beliefs, religious and other, see Smith 2009, 5–19.
58. The alternatives here are also commonly seen as the (“merely”) “subjective” 
and the (putatively) “objective.” As such, they are what Latour has sought, 
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in his writings on religion and more generally, “to slip in between” or, 
precisely, to finesse.
Notes to Chapter 5
59. Brooks continues: “In this matter the textbooks that had been put in their 
hands were almost useless. The authors had something to say about the poet’s 
life and the circumstances of his composition of the poem under study …. 
But the typical commentary did not provide an induction to this poem—or 
into poetry generally. The dollop of impressionistic criticism with which the 
commentary usually concluded certainly did not supply the need” (593).
60. Although they rebelled against the dominance of biographical scholarship, 
they did not, as is sometimes said, “banish the author.” As would be clear 
from any page of criticism by Empson, Eliot, or Ransom, authors were 
very much in evidence, but as artists, not as mere historical figures or 
biographical subjects.
61. See chapter 6, below, for examples and further discussion.
62. The echoes of Popper in Moretti’s title (“Conjectures on World Literature”) 
and in Jockers’ concern with literary interpretations that cannot be 
refuted are not accidental. Popper’s influence, direct or indirect, is evident 
throughout both their arguments.
63. For the longer story, see chapter 6 below and Smith 2005/6, 108–29.
64. Their quote marks on the latter term are not explained.
65. See Trumpener 2009. Moretti replies in the same issue of the journal.
66. In an instructive chapter in a volume of The Cambridge History of 
Literary Criticism, Wallace Martin notes that, by the 1950s, the New 
Critics themselves worried about the “proliferation of over-ingenious 
interpretations” and that some people felt that “New Criticism had dwindled 
into a pointless routine” (2000, 316). Martin adds: “Yet it is worth recalling 
that scholars had registered the same objection to scholarship in the 1920s; 
driven by the conventions of the disciplines to make a ‘contribution to 
knowledge’, writers [it was said] proposed ‘preposterous interpretations.’” 
“Admittedly,” he comments, “there had been a change in the provenance of 
interpretative activity. Instead of asserting that Bottom [in A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream] was James VI, the modern exegete would discover an 
archetype or a paradox” (316).
67. “Cavalier” is the term Bush uses in a rather strained set of puns (1949, 17).
68. For an arresting follow-us-or-die set of views, see Saklofske et al 2012. The 
authors write:
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Taking a wait-and-see attitude that cautiously preserves the status quo 
is akin to choosing an unnecessary slow death over the possibility of 
an innovative cure. In an era of budget crises, enrolment uncertainty, 
and an increasing lack of connections between university-level career 
preparation and professional practice, it would be foolish to ignore 
an opportunity to reinvent [the humanities] and reconsider existing 
paradigms and practices. Digital humanities represents an already-
established movement away from the doom-inviting stasis of the 
secondhand conservatism of universities that know the Net Generation 
has come, and yet decline to build the education system Net Geners both 
want and need. (329)
Notes to Chapter 6
69. Wilson describes himself in the preface to Consilience as a former fervent 
Baptist turned fervent believer in science.
70. See, e.g., Moretti 2007, where Franco Moretti, promoting big data and digital 
methods, invokes Kuhn’s Structure to explain how genres of the novel appear 
in discrete “cycles.” As noted in chapter 5, however, his major reference for 
scientific method is Karl Popper, whose Conjectures and Refutations: The 
Growth of Scientific Knowledge (1968) informs the title and supplies many 
of the details (“hunches” and “hypotheses,” “tests” and “experiments,” 
“corroborations” and “falsifications”) of Moretti’s influential article, 
“Conjectures on World Literature” (2000).
71. See Smith 2005/6, 46-84 (“Netting Truth: Ludwik Fleck’s Constructivist 
Genealogy”).
72. See Liu 2013. Liu argues that the significance (“meaning”) of digital 
humanities projects involves their ability—now, he suggests, quite limited—
to satisfy our interest in what we generally call “meaning.”
73. See Smith 2005/6, 130-52 (“Super Natural Science: The Claims of 
Evolutionary Psychology”).
74. Not surprisingly, literary Darwinism has received a good bit of sharp 
critical attention from scholars in the humanities. See especially Kramnick 
2011 and 2012.
75. For the former, see, e.g., Delbanco 2013. For the latter, see, e.g., the 
commissioned report on the humanities titled The Heart of the Matter (2013).
76. See e.g., Wilson 1998, 7, quoted above, and the dubious suggestion, by 
a promoter of such views, that “scholars in the literary humanities have 
struggled to achieve at least a semblance of the certitude possible in the 
sciences” (Fromm 2006).
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77. Given a history of dichotomous distinctions between “true knowledge” on 
the one hand and “mere opinion,” “mere belief,” or “mere superstition” on the 
other, it is not surprising that controversies over the relations between the 
sciences and the humanities continue to be dominated by struggles over the 
term knowledge: who owns it, who can deliver it, whose kind is “genuine.”
78. “Cultural” in these connections is generally understood as artistically or 
intellectually worthy as distinct from strictly physical, merely useful, merely 
commercially successful, or merely popular. Boundaries between such 
categories, however, are hard to keep clear, and classifications of individual 
genres and achievements—as in the cases of jazz, journalism, photography, 
gymnastics, cinema, or video-game design—are routinely subject to struggle 
and shifting negotiation.
79. Carroll, in an interview for the journal Science (Kean 2011, 655), remarks 
that “most [humanities scholarship] today” is “unable to contribute in 
any useful way to the serious world of adult knowledge.” Philosopher Alex 
Rosenberg writes that good naturalists “cannot take [literary studies] 
seriously as knowledge” if scholars “transparently flout science’s standards of 
objectivity.” He adds, evidently enjoying being wicked: “That does not mean 
anyone should stop doing literary criticism any more than forgoing fiction. 
Naturalism treats both as fun, but neither as knowledge” (Rosenberg 2011). 
See note 77, above, for the term “knowledge.”
80. Thus literary Darwinist Blakey Vermeule proposes, perhaps jokingly, that the 
neatly turned verse couplets of Alexander Pope can be explained the same 
way as the gaudy tail of the peacock: that is, as a display of a “handicapping” 
trait (here a time-consuming and otherwise useless talent for verbal wit) that 
evolved by sexual selection (Vermeule 2012).
81. See, e.g., the descriptions of “distant reading” and “macroanalysis” in 
chapter 5 above.
82. For a candid account of the occurrence of just such dissonances in a 
collaborative project, see Fitzgerald et al 2014.
83. For efforts by phenomenologists to bridge the first-person/third-person 
divide, see Petitot et al 2000.
84. For chastened responses, see Zunshine 2010. The contrast is to chest-
thumping works like Boyd et al 2010.
Notes to Chapter 7
85. See http://media.mcgill.ca/en/content/
climate-realism-international-colloquium.
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86. In a subsequent work, Kitcher defends a “modest realism” that seeks to 
incorporate more innovative components (Kitcher 2002). His position on 
those components, however, remains equivocal.
87. For an engaging image of such an imagined glimpse, see the late 19th-century 
Flammarion woodcut (figure 1). Here a pilgrim evidently catches a view of 
the machinery behind the everyday world of trees and houses, day and night, 
sun, moon, and stars. Notably, aside from one hand, only his head ventures—
or, perhaps, can gain admission—into that realm.
88. Such challenges to realism, at least when mounted by certifiable academic 
philosophers, are generally referred to in Anglo-analytic philosophy as 
“anti-realism.”
89. For comparable ideas developed in science studies (STS), see Pickering 1995 
and Gad et al 2015.
90. My reference is to the title of the important book, Klein 2014 (This Changes 
Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate).
91. For the former, see, e.g., M. P. Lynch 2017 (“Kick This Rock: Climate Change 
and Our Common Reality”). For the latter, see, e.g., Manda 2003 and 
Lepore 2017.
92. See, e.g., Latour 2013 and 2017.
93. Most egregiously perhaps, it does not explain Latour’s caustic allusions to 
deconstruction or to the training of students in the humanities. One may 
note, however, that the essay was originally a lecture given at the Stanford 
Humanities Center.
94. See also Hoffman 2015 and Stoknes 2015.
95. For important works exemplifying these approaches, see Gibson 1979, Varela 
et al 1991, Thelen and Smith 1994, Port and van Gelder 1995, Núñez and 
Freeman 1999, Noë 2004, Chemero 2009, Thompson 2010, Anderson 2014, 
and Hutto and Myin 2017. Barrett 2011 and Sharma 2015 offer original, 
engaging, and instructive introductions to them.
96. For incisive commentary, see Barnwell 2016.
97. For examples, see Charbonnier et al 2017. For informed commentary, see 
Jensen 2017.
98. Such insights and understandings are not, of course, thereby guaranteed. 
See M. Lynch 2000 for a cautionary analysis of the contingent operations of 
methodological reflexivity.
99. The sentiment described here is evidently powerful across the current 
political and demographic spectrum, and not only in the United States. We 
seem generally to see it as a sense of injustice when displayed by those we 
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ourselves see as victimized and as resentment when we are skeptical of the 
merit, injury, or idea of justice implicitly invoked.
100. Most of Hochschild’s subjects see global warming as a remote problem. Some 
of them expect a different apocalypse, with a Rapture of the pious, in their 
own lifetimes.
101. See, for example, Klein 2014, Marshall 2014, Oreskes and Conway 2014, 
Stengers 2015, and Purdy 2016.
102. For comparable observations and extended analyses, see Clark 2015 and 
Lorimer 2017.
103. On the significance of varied perspectives on such issues and the lack 
of public forums for their discussion and negotiation, see Jasanoff and 
Simmet 2017.
104. Environment-conscious writer Amitav Ghosh suggests that a broad-
based religious or quasi-religious movement might supply the needed 
transformative energy, but he does not appear to anticipate one (Ghosh 
2016). Other climate activists are explicit in invoking theology, religion, 
or religiosity as a desirable or crucial element of a due awakening (see, 
e.g., Stephenson 2015). For a detailed account of invocations and covert 
appropriations of religiosity by environmentalists, see Nelson 2010.
105. The image of existing class hierarchies overturned when conditions of 
survival change radically is evidently a recurrent conceit. See, e.g., Pierre 
Marivaux’s The Island of Slaves and J. M. Barrie’s The Admirable Crichton, in 
both of which, after a shipwreck, practical-minded, able-bodied slaves or 
servants become the masters.
106. Such people, including writers of fantasy and science fiction—genres 
disdained by the literary establishment in favor of classically “realist” 
novels—are what Amitav Ghosh calls, at one point, “the losers.” Alluding to 
several such works by non-Western writers ignored by Western critics but 
especially relevant to climate change, he comments: “But once again, the 
last laugh goes to that sly critic, the Anthropocene, which has muddied, and 
perhaps even reversed, our understanding of what it means to be ‘advanced’” 
(Ghosh 2016, 80).
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